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Abstract 
 
This study explores the Australian and New Zealand media-government relationship 
during foreign instability and regional military intervention. It offers a critique of print media 
coverage and political communication during the 2002-2003 Solomon Islands crisis and the 
subsequent Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. By reviewing the Indexing 
Hypothesis and CNN Effect, this thesis considers media and government data from the year 
preceding the intervention. By investigating the media-government relationship in the Pacific 
region, this study builds on the literature that has so far primarily focused on American and 
European led interventions. Previous research has illustrated the advantages and limitations to 
specific methodological practises. This study has drawn from the current literature to form a 
unique methodical approach. The methods to test the Australian and New Zealand media-
government relationship include content analysis, and qualitative techniques for use in four 
complementary tests. Findings from this study indicate that while there is some degree of the 
media using the political elite as a cue for newsworthy issues, the media appear to often report 
independently from the political elite perspectives. The political elite set the range of debate, 
and while the media stay within this range, they appear to sensationalise certain aspects of the 
debate. Government also appear to benefit from this media behaviour as it uses the media to 
gauge responses during the policy formation process. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Research 
 
 
“Sending in Australian troops to occupy Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme. It 
would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would be very difficult to justify to 
Australian taxpayers. And for how many years would such an occupation have to continue? 
And what would be the exit strategy? The real show-stopper, however, is that it would not 
work - no matter how it was dressed up, whether as an Australian or a Commonwealth or a 
Pacific Islands Forum initiative. The fundamental problem is that foreigners do not have 
answers for the deep-seated problems afflicting Solomon Islands.”  
 
– Alexander Downer, the then Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.1 
  
In the six months that followed this strident statement from Alexander Downer, Australian and New 
Zealand foreign policy made a U-turn. In what was to be a remarkable move for regional engagement, 
Australia and New Zealand conducted a joint military intervention in the Solomon Islands. The goal of 
this thesis is to analyse what led to this policy change and what role the media played in the 
proceedings. More importantly, it will explore government relationships with the media in times of 
foreign crises, as well as reflect on the role played by media in a democratic society.  
 
In recent years, debate surrounding the impact media have on foreign policy decision-making 
during international crises and military interventions has intensified. The essence of the debate centres 
on the degree of media independence from government influence. The ability of the media to be 
independent in their reporting of current affairs and in their scrutiny of state decisions is open to 
question. On the one hand, through agenda setting and framing, the media can sometimes directly or 
indirectly lead or challenged government priorities and policies. On the other, they may also be found 
taking their lead from the government.  In other words, media framing can either lead, challenge, or 
follow the perspectives of the political elite.  
 
For these reasons, the influence news media can bring to bear on a nation’s foreign policy, as 
either a facilitator or an impediment, is fundamental to the policy-making process itself. The 
relationship between news media and the political elite, when foreign policy issues are concerned, 
raises inevitable questions around the proper role of a democratic media, and its ability to report 
foreign policy and foreign interventions independently.  
 
                                                     
1
 Alexander Downer, "Neighbours Cannot Be Recolonised," The Australian,  January 8 2003. 
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This thesis seeks to explore the role Australian and New Zealand print media played in their 
nations’ foreign policy initiatives in the twelve-months preceding the 2003 Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The relationships between media and government can offer 
valuable insights into the impact media can have on government decision-making around foreign 
policy and foreign interventions. The media, however, is but one factor in the formation and delivery 
of foreign policy. A macro-level analysis of Australian and New Zealand foreign policy during the 
Solomon Islands crisis will clarify governmental responses and actions, while a micro-level 
examination of print media coverage and government actions during the year proceeding RAMSI will 
analyse the media-government relationship.  
 
The primary focus of this thesis is to establish the nature of media reporting on foreign 
intervention, and to show how this reflects or challenges media’s relationship with government, but 
also to see impact on policy making and outcomes. It is the role, the right and the obligation of 
independent journalists and the democratic media in general to question and scrutinize government.2 
This function ensures a measure of accountability from the political elite, and helps to maintain public 
trust in the processes of government. This is why the media has been termed the Fourth Estate of 
government. 3  At times, however, the nature of the media system itself can have the effect of 
undermining its role as the Fourth Estate of government. In many cases a more accurate description of 
the relationship between media and government would be of an implicitly mutually beneficial 
agreement. Journalists are continually constrained by the economic demands of a capitalist system. In 
order to guarantee that news outlets can always provide news on time and within budget, editors will 
allocate journalists to locations and situations where newsworthy material is consistently available. 
Governments also aid the media to meet these demands through the provision of close working 
relationships with key government insiders.4  
 
Journalists rely heavily on sources of ready information. However, journalist must balance 
their relationship with governments in order to maintain a working relationship; as indicated by media 
scholar Leon Sigal “they are not free to roam or probe at will.”5 Consequently, close relationships with 
the political elite are carefully fostered to ensure that legitimate information sources are always readily 
available as an efficient means of overcoming time and money restraints. On the other hand, the media 
can also act as a means by which the political elite are well supplied with information from the 
                                                     
2
 Julianne Schultz, Democracy, Accountability and the Media (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 1-14. 
3
 Ibid., 1-14. 
4
 Gaye Tuchman, Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 387; 
Jonathan  Mermin, "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven 
Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 3 (1997):  
5
 Leon V. Sigal, "Sources Make the News," in Reading the News, ed. Robert Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 16. 
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domestic and international arenas and such information can influence policy-makers’ decisions. The 
political process encourages the political elite to engage in this way with journalists to advance their 
own ends. Political actors can provide journalists with information and discourse which supports their 
own interests and policies, whilst challenging any opposing arguments.  
 
Contributing to this complexity in the exchange of information is the internal conflict that 
arises between different political actors or institutions seeking to advance their own agendas. The 
government apparatus is a place that offers briefings, releases, speeches, debates, and other 
newsworthy information on a relativity consistent basis, and is therefore essential to journalists and 
media outlets. For these reasons journalists can at times feel conflict between their obligation to 
continually question government and their duty to promote the business interests of their own media 
organisations. 
 
Research Focus and Rationale 
During a foreign crisis, the role of the independent media is debateable. The media sets its 
own agenda. However, many studies argue that journalists also regularly confer with government 
officials and politicians when considering what issues are newsworthy.6 When doing so, journalists 
often source information from the political elite, and consequently adopt their narratives. An extensive 
literature claims substantial political elite influence over the news media.7 This is referred to as the 
Indexing Hypothesis (Indexing).8  
 
The Indexing Hypothesis argues that news media are restricted by the nature of journalistic 
routines and index frames and narratives to the range of opinions amongst the political elites, 
expressed within political forums. As a result, media content often imitates the levels of consensus and 
dissent of the elite.9 When a high level of consensus within the elite forum is evident, counter frames 
challenging the government in the media are less common whereas dissent within elite forums creates 
                                                     
6
 Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What's News (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); Gaye Tuchman, "Objectivity as 
Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity," The American Journal of Sociology 77, 
no. 4 (1972): 660-679. 
7
 Lance W. Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States," Journal of Communication 
40, no. 2 (1990): 103-125; Lance W Bennett and J. D Klockner, "The Psychology of Mass-Mediated Publics," in 
The Psychology of Political Communication, ed. Ann N. Crigler (MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996); 
Lance W. Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence, & Scott Althaus, "None Dare Call It Torture: Indexing the Limits of 
Press Independence in the Abu Ghraib Scandal," Journal of Communication 56, no.  (2006): 467-485. Robert M. 
Entman and Benjamin I. Page, "The News before the Storm: Limits to Media Autonomy in Covering the Iraq 
War Debate," in Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in Gulf War, ed. Lance 
W. Bennett and David L. Paletz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 82-101. Daniel Hallin, The 
"Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Jonathan  Mermin, 
Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1999). 
8
 Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States." 
9
 Bennett, "None Dare Call It Torture: Indexing the Limits of Press Independence in the Abu Ghraib Scandal," 
468. 
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opportunities for news media to offer counter frames. When counter frames or challenging 
perspectives towards government policy are apparent in the media, these often reflect or are indexed 
to, the critical perspectives of the elite.10 
 
On the flip side, a number of academics argue that media coverage has at times been more 
independent and influenced policy change related to foreign intervention.11 This has been termed the 
CNN Effect and reverses what many scholars believe to be the typical media-government relationship. 
The CNN Effect describes what happens when the media, in certain circumstances, becomes the 
driving force behind policy change for foreign intervention. As described by leading media scholars 
Steven Livingston and Lance Bennett, the CNN Effect “is reportedly caused by coverage that brings 
crisis events so quickly and dramatically to public view that officials often lament a loss of policy 
control to media.”12  The amount and timing of media coverage, combined with specific framing 
narratives, pressures the government to respond to international crises. This sees the media as the 
agenda setting agent in the political communication environment. Two additional ways to consider the 
CNN Effect, put forward by Livingston, is as an accelerant to policy decision-making, and an 
impediment to policy goals.13  
 
The CNN Effect is essentially in conflict with the Indexing Hypothesis; however, Piers 
Robinson’s Policy-Media Interaction Model connects these two contrasting theories into an interactive 
framework.14 The model clarifies those instances where either the CNN Effect or Indexing occurs. It 
does this by analysing media framing and policy certainty, and identifying if media coverage precedes 
government activity or follows it.15 
 
Previous studies on the Indexing Hypothesis and CNN Effect were for the most part US-
based, drawing on the American foreign policy experience. This study focuses on the degree to which 
                                                     
10
 Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States." Hallin, The "Uncensored War": The 
Media and Vietnam. Mermin, Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-
Vietnam Era. 
11
 Steven Livingston, Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military 
Intervention, (Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Centre Research on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), 1997; Steven Livingston and W. Lance Bennett, 
"Gatekeeping, Indexing, and Live Events News: Is Technology Altering the Construction of News?," Political 
Communication 20, no. 4 (2003): 363-380. Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, "Humanitarian Crises and U.S. 
Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered," Political Communication 12, no. 4 (1995): 413-
429. Piers  Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention (London: Routledge, 
2002). 
12
 Livingston and Bennett, "Gatekeeping, Indexing, and Live Events News: Is Technology Altering the 
Construction of News?," 367. 
13
 Livingston, "Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military 
Intervention," 2. 
14
 Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention. 
15
 The Policy-Media Interaction Model will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Piers. Robinson, 
"The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis," Journal of Peace 
Research 37, no. 5 (2000): 613-633. 
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these previous studies might be applicable and useful in advancing an understanding of the media-
government relationship in a quite different regional setting. In the Pacific region, Australia and New 
Zealand are the regional powers and offer two valid cases for investigating the media-government 
relationships outside the US. 
 
 The Pacific region has experienced varying degrees of instability since colonisation. The 
early 2000s recorded a policy shift in Australia and New Zealand from a ‘hands-off’ approach to 
Pacific affairs to a greater engagement designed to address instability and the effects this had on 
regional security. The most remarkable event signifying the new approach was the cooperative 
regional intervention in the Solomon Islands in 2003, coined RAMSI. This policy shift created a 
unique research opportunity with which to identify the effects the media has on policy formation in the 
lead up to intervention.  
 
The year period from July 25th 2002 to July 24th 2003 in the year preceding RAMSI is the 
timeframe chosen for this investigation. The factors that emerged during this period make a 
comprehensive analysis of the policy formation process possible. During this period, two fundamental 
adaptations to Australian and New Zealand policy in respect of the Solomon Islands occurred. Firstly, 
in June 2002 New Zealand assigned a team of police officers to the Solomon Islands in a non-
combatant role to assist in reforming the corrupt elements of the Solomon Islands Police Force (SIPF). 
Secondly, in June 2003 the formation of a comprehensive military and civilian intervention was 
initiated. This study is concerned with a central question related to the media-government relationship 
in relation to the policy shift, and a number of sub-questions that help to address this central question.  
 
Research Questions 
The central question of this thesis is: 
1: To what extent did the Australian and New Zealand print media content lead, challenge, 
or follow government agendas and framing before the 2003 RAMSI intervention?  
 
Other questions that contribute to answering the central research questions are: 
2: Did Australian and New Zealand government actions, regarding the Solomon Islands 
crisis, precede or follow print media coverage?  
2.1: Did print news media coverage of the Solomon Islands crisis in the year 
preceding the 2003 RAMSI reflect the range of debate in the elite forum?  
3: How and to what degree were various sources used in the media when covering the 
Solomon Islands crisis and subsequent intervention? 
4: How were criticisms of the governments response to the crisis presented in the media 
compared to the critical perspectives expressed within elite forums?  
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4.1 Did the critical perspective in the media originate from the critical perspectives 
expressed by the political elite?  
 
The five questions that supplement the central question of this research address fundamental 
aspects of the media-government relationship. The timing in which the media and elite place the crisis 
on the agenda can identify if one group followed the other. If one group focuses on the crisis before 
the other than that group is more likely to have motivated the other to deliberate on the crisis. By 
analysing the range of debate employed by the media and elite, similarities and difference are 
identified to understand how each group defined the crisis and offered solutions, while critiquing 
government’s action or inaction. Additionally, the use of sources in the media identifies the degree 
government or alternative sources and perspectives were employed, and if one source or perspective 
was used more so than other perspectives. Finally, by considering how challenges to government were 
presented in the media, and if these varied from elite forum debates can further demonstrate if there is 
a relationship between political debate and media coverage. Furthermore, the analysis of critical 
perspectives inside and outside of political forums demonstrates areas of disagreement and uncertainty 
around policy. The way the media report these challenges - whether they follow government, 
Parliament or independent critical perspectives - can provide insight to media behaviour and the 
media-government relationship.  
 
By addressing these research questions, the nature of the media-government relationship in 
Australia and New Zealand can be analysed. Consequently, those instances when the political elite are 
seen to influence media content during a foreign policy crisis and intervention within the Pacific 
region can be better understood. On the other hand, instances when the media influence the political 
elite also require investigation to better understand the two-way relationship of these groups. These 
kinds of relationships raise questions as to the role of the media in its independent reporting of foreign 
policy. Therefore, significant issues, such as foreign intervention, require deliberate and 
comprehensive debate within public and political spheres.  
 
Research Approach 
This thesis employs quantitative and qualitative research methods with content analysis as the 
main method used. Content analysis of media coverage and official government documents and debate 
transcripts is the central methodology used in this research. The method determines the spectrum of 
debate utilised by media and government regarding the Solomon Islands crisis. The spectrum of 
debate is divided into three different framing categories: problems relating to the Solomon Islands 
crisis; solutions to these problems; and criticisms of government policy actions. Ascertaining the 
spectrum of debate used by the media and the political elite is the first step towards identifying 
whether Indexing or the CNN Effect occurs. The relationship between the spectrums of debate within 
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the media and the government directly affects the prospect of Indexing. When there are greater 
degrees of similarity between the spectrums of debate, there is a higher probability of media indexing 
their narrative to the government narrative.16 On the other hand, when there is wider variance in the 
spectrums of debate employed by the media and government, the probability of Indexing decreases.17 
However, this alone cannot determine the Indexing Hypothesis, or the CNN Effect and therefore other 
approaches are necessary. 
 
The next method uses a quantitative approach to investigate the volume and time-sequence of 
media coverage compared to government actions. The number of media articles and government 
actions is counted on a daily, weekly and monthly basis. This will provide a clear sequence of events 
that demonstrate who first placed the Solomon Islands crisis on the agenda. When government actions 
precede media coverage the possibility of the Indexing Hypothesis occurring is more likely. 18 
Conversely, when media coverage precedes government action the probability of a CNN Effect 
increases. 19  Additionally, the volume of data allows for further analysis of patterns and trends 
regarding the degree of attention the crisis received over the year period. The quantitative approach is 
supplemented with a qualitative analysis of media coverage and government actions to further verify 
the sequence of events.  
 
In order to provide a comprehensive investigation, the methodological approaches used by 
Lance Bennett20 and Jonathan Mermin21 are applied to this research. Bennett’s approach uses content 
analysis to investigate the different sources utilised by the media.  Content analysis identifies the 
degree to which the news media rely on the political elite as sources of information. Counting the 
number of sources within media articles will provide a clear understanding of the level of influence 
different types of sources can have on content to identify if media are largely serving the government 
or vice versa.  
 
To apply Mermin’s techniques, a content analysis is employed to discern the level of critical 
perspectives within media content. The levels of critical perspectives are compared to the total level of 
coverage. The findings from the analysis will determine the level of criticism present within the media 
debate. To investigate the origin of the critical perspectives in the media, a content analysis and a 
                                                     
16
 Mermin, Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era; Bennett, 
"Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States." 
17
 Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States."; Robinson, The CNN Effect: The 
Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention. 
18
 Mermin, "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign 
Policy." 
19
 Livingston and Eachus, "Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect 
Reconsidered." 
20
 Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States." 
21
 Mermin, Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era. 
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qualitative examination of critical perspectives within government debates are compared. This can 
determine if media content imitates the perspectives of the political elite, or if the media independently 
seek or present challenges against government.  
 
Structure of thesis 
This chapter introduced the research focus and rationale for this thesis. Chapter two reviews 
the current literature on media and intervention by evaluating how different scholars operationalize 
international communication theories to analyse and assess the media-government relationship. By 
reviewing the Indexing Hypothesis and CNN Effect, criteria that measure the media-government 
relationship in Australia and New Zealand are established to form the methodological basis for this 
study.  
 
Chapter three presents the case study in depth. It shows the macro-level factors that influenced 
Australian and New Zealand foreign policy formation during the late 1990s until RAMSI’s 
deployment. Finally, chapter three describes the background to the Solomon Islands crisis and the 
initial intervention in 2003.   
 
Chapter four outlines the methodology used to investigate the relationship between the 
Australian and New Zealand media and government. This involves the application of four tests to 
achieve a comprehensive understanding of the relationship. The first test determines who set the 
agenda. This is achieved by investigating the time-sequence and volume of media coverage and 
government activity, together with a qualitative analysis. The second test is a content analysis to 
establish the range of debate within each group. In conjunction with these tests, Lance Bennett and 
Jonathan Mermin’s research designs are used as a guide to form tests three and four respectively. 
Chapter four also outlines the purpose and significance of the quantitative test and content analysis, 
establishes the units of analysis, outline a codebook, and provides the results from the reliability test. 
Chapter five presents the findings from the four tests outlined in chapter four. Chapter six concludes 
with the major findings of this study and reassesses the theoretical foundations that explain the media-
government relationship in foreign crises and interventions in an Australian and New Zealand context.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
  
 The media’s role in foreign policy decision-making during crises is often disputed among 
scholars. Two key alternative schools of thought attempt to explain connections between western 
media and foreign policy decision-making: the Indexing Hypothesis and the CNN Effect. The 
Indexing Hypothesis supports the idea that the political elite drives the news agenda by defining the 
perspectives expressed in the news; the same perspectives as those expressed in elite forums. In 
contrast, the CNN Effect argues that the media can influence political decision-making under certain 
circumstances. An alternative way to consider the media-government relationship, as offered in the 
Policy-Media Interaction Model,22 is through the convergence of these two conflicting theories. The 
Policy-Media Interaction Model bridges the ideas proposed in the Indexing Hypothesis and the CNN 
Effect to identify circumstances in which the media are able to influence policy.23 
 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: to review the media-state relationship conceptually, and to 
identify different approaches for testing media-government relations. Different variations of how, 
when, and why media-policy relations operate have generated active debate among scholars. In 
addition, re-testing earlier ideas has further shaped discrepancies in the premise itself.  For example, 
the case of the 1992-1993 crisis in Somalia has been thoroughly scrutinized; however, different 
authors have drawn contrasting conclusions as to whether the media influenced policy change towards 
intervention, or the actions of policy-makers influenced the media response.24 
 
Researchers on media effects and humanitarian intervention have used a variety of research 
designs because media effects on policy are inherently difficult to measure. Frequently used methods 
include theoretically based case studies, such as Daniel Hallin’s three spheres of objective journalism 
as applied to the US media coverage of the Vietnam War.25 An additional method employed by Hallin 
was content analysis.26  Content analysis is a method often employed alongside other methods, such as 
Livingston and Eachus study that used content analysis and a quantitative approach to measure the 
                                                     
22
 Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Bernard Cohen, "A View from the Academy," in Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, ed. W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1994); Livingston and Eachus, "Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect 
Reconsidered."; Peter Jakobsen, "National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace 
Enforcement after the Cold War?," Journal of Peace Research 33 (1996): 205-215; Martin  Shaw, Civil Society 
and Media in Global Crises: Representing Distant Violence (London, New York Pinter, 1996); Mermin, 
"Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy."; Warren 
P. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence of Peace Operations (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute Of Peace Press, 1997); Piers Robinson, "Operation Restore Hope and the Illusion of a 
News Media Driven Intervention," Political Studies 49 (2001): 941-956; David N. Gibbs, "Realpolitik and 
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quantity of media coverage in relation to policy change. 27  In conjunction with these methods, 
qualitative approaches have been used to establish the tone and character of opinions and voices 
within media coverage and government debate.28 Alternatively, interview-based researches have been 
used to gauge the perceptions of policymakers, and other notable individuals.29 Such methods have 
been brought together to better understand the relationship between media and government through 
the application of the Policy-Media Interaction Model.30  
 
Agenda setting and framing are intrinsically part of the wider media effects debate. Thus, one 
or both media theories are often incorporated in the methodological approaches used to evaluate 
media-government relations. By assessing the existing methods as they are applied to test media and 
government relations, this chapter will develop a research method to systematically and 
methodologically measure the dynamic of media-government relations for this thesis’ case study.  
 
 
Agenda Setting 
Because news coverage is amongst the most widely followed type of information on public 
affairs, it can bring issues to the forefront of public attention. By publishing about certain issues, the 
media highlights the importance of those issues to the public over others. This process is described as 
the ‘transmission of salience’.31 As Bernard Cohen’s famous quote asserts, “the press may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its 
readers what to think about.”32 The role of the media as the agenda setting agent is a consequence of 
selecting news for limited broadcast space. Communications expert Maxwell McCombs describes 
agenda setting as: “an inadvertent by-product of reporting the news” that can influence the thought 
process of the community it serves.33 The news media are bound by the constraints of time and space 
due to the vast range of crises, events, and opinions worldwide. Through agenda setting, the news 
media can rank the value of issues by the amount of coverage each issue receives and the placement of 
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an issue within the news. In the event an issue does not make the news, the audience will seldom 
consider it to the same degree, if at all, with the other issues receiving attention. Current research into 
agenda setting shows that the rise and fall of coverage on an issue tends to dictate similar patterns of 
public interest. 34  This cause and effect relationship is significant when considering government 
influence over any media content which addresses foreign intervention issues.  
 
Framing 
Like agenda setting, framing is part of message construction. Framing is an essential 
component in agenda setting theory as it defines an issue for easy consumption. By applying unique 
discourse related to the changing social environment, the media play a role in shaping the way people 
view their community or nation. Media scholar Robert Entman describes framing as the particular 
aspects of a “narrative that encourage those perceiving and thinking about events to develop particular 
understandings of them.”35 The construction of a frame is part of filtering and transmitting news to 
support a particular angle or agenda for attracting audience attention. This is an important part of the 
media effects debate, because the way an issue or event is “characterized in news reports can have an 
influence on how it is understood by audiences.”36 Entman identifies two factors of framing that 
fundamentally contribute to the way an audience interprets events: selection and salience. 37  He 
differentiates between the two in this way; “[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”38  
 
 Using sensational media frames, journalists and newspapers can create more dramatic and 
exciting coverage of events or issues. Sensationalism is a way the media gain an audiences attention 
and general definition is that it appeals to an audience’s emotions through excitement, shock, fear and 
astonishment.39  It is argued by Karen Slattery that sensationalism can be used in the media for 
conscious or unconscious purposes, and consequently gains attention for a purposeful cause.40  
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 Framing, through the organisation of ideas to construct messages, can allegedly sway an 
audience towards a particular policy preference. This is specifically relevant to news frames on 
political issues, such as a nation’s response to domestic and foreign crisis. The way an issue is framed 
can create an environment that justifies and supports a specific policy approach.41 However, Scheafele 
and Tewksbury note that framing is a consequence of reducing complex stories to fit daily broadcasts 
so that they are easily consumed by a large audience, rather than attempting to deliberately sway an 
audience in a particular direction.42 
 
 
Elite Political Model 
The Indexing Hypothesis, and to a lesser degree the Propaganda Model, are examples of 
international political communication theories intended to explain media-government interaction. The 
Propaganda Model, which Herman and Chomsky formulate in their acclaimed book Manufacturing 
Consent, claims that the powerful classes within society have considerable influence over the media.43 
The model suggests that the structure of commercial news production in the market system is bound 
by elite constraints. This occurs because of unequal economic power, which has the effect of causing 
the media to ‘manufacture consent’ in order to serve elite interests. 44  The structure of news 
organisations enables them to act with “power over the flow of information.”45 This is a result of news 
organisations often being large, wealthy companies, seeking efficiency and cost-effective reporting. 
The model asserts that the elite are most likely in a position to filter the media, as they are, according 
to Walter Lippmann, a “specialized class that can override the short-sighted perspectives of the 
masses.”46 
 
The model explains how the structural conditions of media institutions censor or limit news 
media through a five-filter process of ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, and ideology.47 The 
relevance of the five filters can vary depending on the context of the situation in which they operate, in 
the same way as countries operate under individual systems. While all the filters have some relevance, 
sourcing and ideology are particularly relevant to Australian and New Zealand media coverage of 
foreign crises.   
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Sourcing is the filter often criticised as a cause of biased news reporting. Sourcing prestigious 
opinions in the media helps to build credibility for news stories and for particular perspectives 
favouring certain outcomes. Journalists rely on a steady flow of information to meet the daily demands 
of news production and it is their sources which help to meet these demands. For this reason, 
journalists often inadvertently make frequent use of public relations departments and government 
agencies (the political elite) for readily available material at a low cost. Public relations consultants 
outnumber journalists at a ratio of three to one.48 Therefore, the use of such easily sourced material is 
unavoidable. As the demand to minimise costs intensifies, and the reliance on inexpensive foreign and 
international news declines, seeking the opinions of prestigious inexpensive sources is even more 
appealing to journalists. In turn, the political elite can then control the flow of information to create a 
platform where issues relevant to their interests can be framed and heard in a favourable way. This 
creates what Herman and Chomsky refer to as a symbiotic relationship between journalists and the 
political elite.49 The media’s use of Australian and New Zealand political sources when reporting 
foreign affairs is a constant. During the 1996-1999 East Timorese crises, for example, Australian and 
New Zealand government sources gave detailed accounts of the progress its troops were making, 
while at the same time rationalising and justifying the reason for such involvement.50  
 
The ideology filter is seen as a western reaction against ideological threat and was originally 
based on anti-communism.51 In the present age, anti-communism has been largely replaced by the fear 
of the ‘other’, more pressing, ideological threats such as terrorism or ideas that threaten to the free 
market system. An ideological threat can be shaped, reinforced and packaged by the elite in such a 
way as to support its own ideological agenda, whilst at the same time labelling all opposing views as 
constituting a threat in themselves. The dominant ideology filter increases control of media content 
and opinions by, and in favour of, the dominant elite. The ideological threat of terrorism became 
prominent following the 9/11 attacks. At this time the US and its coalition of the willing (including 
Australia) asserted the imperative of pre-emptive action against global threats of terror.52 Howard 
adopted this frame, placing Australia as the US deputy in the Pacific.53 While sourcing and ideology 
are readily observable filters in the Australian and New Zealand context, the other three - ownership, 
advertising, and flak - are outside the scope of this research and are therefore less relevant to this 
research.  
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The Indexing Hypothesis was developed from Herman and Chomsky’s proposition of the 
media-elite relationship.54 The Indexing Hypothesis moderates the way the relationship was previously 
viewed by proposing that it is structured on mutually beneficial grounds.55 This relationship provides 
benefits for both parties, rather than full elite control. Robinson describes this relationship as “the 
ability of governments to influence the output of journalists and the tendency of journalists to both 
self-censor and perceive global events through the cultural and political prisms of their respective 
political and social elites.”56 The Indexing Hypothesis works in daily media operations whenever it 
reports the current debates within elite forums. Often this is not intentional news bias but rather a 
consequence of the ‘transactional’ relationship that media and government share.57 By considering 
daily government activities, journalists and editors can make swift decisions as to what issues make 
the daily news. This can be described as an Indexing norm, where Journalists ‘just know’ what 
qualifies as newsworthy and ‘just know’ how each story should be covered.58 
 
In the decades following the Vietnam War there has been a vast array of literature from a 
number of authors on the subject of the Indexing Hypothesis; with some supporting it and some 
challenging it.59 Much of the research is based on the analysis of media framing within news stories, 
and whether it correlated to elite opinion. The exact extent of the media-elite relationship varies 
markedly between these authors; however, they all embrace the essence of Indexing which is that the 
elite tend to sway the media-government relationship, but that deviations from the elite opinion can 
and do occur in specific circumstances.60 
 
Daniel Hallin’s work The “Uncensored War”61 is an expansion of his article The Media, the 
War in Vietnam, and Political Support.62 Although Hallin does not refer to the media-government 
relationship in terms of an Indexing Hypothesis, he does build the theoretical foundations that Bennett 
later employs. These works propose that the political elite drives the news agenda by shaping news to 
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match the opinions expressed within political forum debates, such as the United States Congress.63 
Hallin’s study on US media coverage of the Vietnam War challenges conventional wisdom that 
“American news media shifted towards an oppositional role” and thus influenced political authority.64 
Hallin asserts that, “the thesis of an oppositional media begins to fall apart…[as] the media 
continued…to rely heavily on official information to avoid passing explicit judgement on official 
policy and statement.”65 This shows that media content was not as much of an influencing factor as 
previously theorised. Media coverage of the time was based on ‘facts’ sourced by journalists from 
Congressional debates, from which it is clear that both consensus and conflict were already present 
within political forums.66 
 
In order to identify US journalistic newsgathering routines and practises when covering the 
Vietnam War, Hallin conducted a quantitative content analysis of news coverage over a seven-year 
period.67 The codebook for the content analysis of news stories is extensive and considers 49 different 
variables.68 From August 1965 until January 1973 a random sample of news stories totalling 779 
television broadcasts from ABC, CBS, and NBC, and print coverage from the New York Times were 
examined.69 The period was divided into three phases of media coverage, pre-Tet Offensive, Tet 
Offensive, and post-Tet Offensive, to signify the rise and fall of reportage in relation to specific 
political and military actions.70 
 
From this study Hallin formulates A Model of Objective Journalism 71  to explain the 
dynamics of journalism and the changes in critical media coverage. The model explains 
how and why media coverage imitates the levels of consensus and dissensus of the political 
elite. As described by Hallin the model emphasises “the response of an objective media to 
the degree of consensus or dissensus that prevails particularly among political elites.”72 The 
model is designed to explain what issues the media cover, how they are covered and what is 
not covered. This is achieved by creating three spheres of objective journalism to 
demonstrate the varying levels of consensus or dissent within elite forums, and the effect 
this has on media reporting. The configuration of the model is displayed in Figure 1.73 
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Figure 1: Three Spheres of Objective Journalism 
 
 The model is divided into three spheres: the sphere of consensus, the sphere of legitimate 
controversy, and the sphere of deviance.74 The sphere of consensus is the region described by Hallin’s 
empathetically as “motherhood and apple pie” where journalists and society regard issues with 
collective agreement and media coverage reflects it.75 Because the majority of the populations within 
the mainstream are thought to agree on an issue or subject, Hallin claims “journalists do not feel 
compelled to present opposing views, and indeed often feel it their responsibility to act as advocates or 
ceremonial protectors of consensus values.”76  
 
Outside the sphere of consensus sits the sphere of legitimate controversy where journalists 
reflect the political contests and debates within the American two-party system. 77  In this sphere 
“objective journalism reigns supreme: here neutrality and balance are the prime journalistic virtues.”78 
On the exterior of the sphere of legitimate controversy lies the sphere of deviance. This includes views 
that journalists and the majority of society perceive as unworthy of attention.79 Consequently, the 
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media is the filter that sidelines the views of those who challenge the consensus opinion. Hallin 
describes how the three spheres function: 
“internal graduations and the boundaries between them are fuzzy. Within the sphere of 
legitimate controversy, for instance, the practise of objective journalism varies 
considerably. Near the border of the sphere of consensus journalists practice the kind of 
objective journalism that involves a straight recitation of official statements; farther out in 
the sphere of controversy they become more willing to balance official statements with 
reactions from the opposition or with independent investigations of controversial issues.”80 
The media shift their coverage between the three spheres of objective journalism depending on the 
degree of consensus or dissent the political elite is expressing within its forums at the time.  
 
 Findings from Hallin’s research indicate that during the Vietnam War the institutional aspect 
of the US media did not change as the media remained committed to functioning within the 
“professional ideology of objective journalism” and upheld previous newsgathering procedures.81 The 
media remained predominantly impartial when reporting the War and “most coverage fit the 
traditional ‘who, what, when, where’ model of objective journalism”82 This finding is supported by the 
low level of coverage (8%) containing explicit comments from journalists.83 
 
 Applying the three spheres of objective journalism to the study of the Vietnam War explains 
the changes in media reporting. As opposition towards the war increased, the media moved the critical 
debate from the “fringes of society” into the mainstream, the sphere of legitimate controversy.84 
Opinions considered controversial in the earlier stages of the war became increasingly legitimate, and 
media coverage adjusted to reflect the shifting opinions. This was evident in 1968 when a Presidential 
candidate expressed opposition to the War during the New Hampshire primary. After this event, media 
coverage of opposition was “not only respectable but an obligatory subject for news coverage.”85 
Critical or supportive media coverage of official policies “depends on the degree of consensus those 
policies enjoy, particularly within the political establishment.”86 Therefore, Hallin’s findings suggest 
that media coverage of the war reflected the opinions voiced within elite forum debates.87 As the war 
progressed and elite opinion became divided, so too did media coverage of the conflict.88 
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Expanding on Hallin’s ideas of the media-government relationship Lance Bennett coined the 
Indexing Hypothesis in the article Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States.89 
This article claimed that the “news is ‘indexed’ implicitly to the range and dynamic of government 
debate.”90 The media and political elite have a long-standing relationship that aids each party to reach 
its objectives and circumvent time and resource constraints. Bennett suggests that “indexing can be 
observed best in patterns of journalistic content and formal rationalization that points to the existence 
of an underlying normative order.”91  
 
Theoretical findings were based on empirical research of the New York Times coverage of the 
1980s Nicaragua crisis.92 During President Ronald Reagan’s time in office the White House began a 
campaign for “congressional authorization and funding” of the Nicaraguan Contra’s, a group opposing 
the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua.93 Congress exposed a scandal in which the US was 
found to be selling weapons to Iran through Israel and then diverting the funds to the Contras. 
Subsequently the White House tried to legitimise these activities by requesting official congressional 
approval and funding. 94   As a consequence, a great divide was created between the House of 
Representatives, Congress, and the White House. Using televised media coverage the White House 
launched a pressure campaign against Congress with a  “barrage of intimidating political rhetoric, 
unleashed against vulnerable House members up for re-election, charging the legislators who opposed 
administration contra police were soft on communism.”95 This resulted in an effective “opposition 
bloc” and the eventual authorization of military aid to the Contras.96 
 
Bennett operationalized the Indexing hypothesis by measuring the types of sourced opinions, 
the frequencies of these sourced opinions, and the direction of the opinions on stories concerned with 
the Nicaragua crisis from January 1 1983 to October 15 1986.97  The sample of media coverage 
included 2,148 news abstracts and editorials, with 1,177 voiced opinions.98 The opinions were divided 
into non-opinionated and descriptive. The descriptive opinions were further categorized into groups: 
editorial and op-ed, administration source, congressional source, judicial source, or popular (non-
governmental) source, foreign opinions of US allies, and interest groups and polls.99  The voiced 
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opinions were coded to distinguish the direction of the opinion: support, opposition, or a divided 
opinion of policy.100 
 
Voiced opinions in the media were analysed to identify correlations between media content 
and government actions, statements or debates. To verify this, Bennett explores the patterns of voices 
applied by the media, and how this relates to the actions of governmental institutions over 17 key 
intervals.101 Bennett specifically considers the level of oppositional voices within political institutions 
to see how this correlates with oppositional voices within the media. When opposition decreased 
within political institutions, the media would then imitate this and decrease its use of oppositional 
voices. Bennett compared congressional opinion to the official administration opinion to measure 
media indexing in the Times. As the opinions between congress and the administration were divided 
on how to address the crisis, key votes within congress were measured against media indexing. 
Bennett identified patterns within news stories and editorial opinions that consistently demonstrate the 
media Indexing coverage to government opinions. The opinions presented in the Times were primarily 
from government sources, with 15% coming from non-government sources.102 A key finding from the 
editorials suggests: 
“when the ratio of voices in Congress opposing administration policy went up, so did the 
ratio of opposing New York Times op-ed opinion. When the ratio of congressional 
opposition went down, so did the ratio of Times opposition-to-support on its op-ed page... 
the editorial voices in the Times op-ed pages rise and fall as if ‘indexed’ to the tides of 
congressional opposition.”103 
The sequence of political action with media coverage demonstrates that the elite influence media 
content when reporting responses to foreign crises. Once the White House won the pressure campaign 
and an oppositional Congress was silenced, the Times editorial reflects this change and reported 
virtually no opposition towards the official policy.104 
  
Another writer who supports the key findings of the Indexing Hypothesis is Jonathan Mermin 
in the 1997 article Television, News and American Intervention in Somalia.105  Mermin uses the 
Somalia crisis to evaluate the media-government relationship and suggests that the media indexed its 
coverage to elite opinions.106 To verify this, Mermin analyses sources and framing of televised media 
coverage from January to November 1992. In addition, he investigates the volume of media coverage 
compared to key policy activities over the same period to determine who set the media agenda. This 
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was designed to identify whether or not the media pushed the crisis onto the political agenda. Mermin 
concludes that the political elite initially addressed the crisis, indicating media Indexing.107 He goes on 
to further clarify the Indexing Hypothesis by differentiating between two versions of Indexing: 
marginalization and correlation. The correlation version theorises that in a situation when there is 
bipartisan support towards a policy, critical perspectives in the media reflects this.108 Any critical 
perspectives would be ‘outweighed’ or ‘overshadowed’ in news coverage by the official opinion.109  
Such correlation is evident in Bennett’s 1990 study where the Times indexed its critical coverage of 
the Nicaraguan crisis to the opinions expressed within Congressional debates.110 Alternatively, the 
marginalization version suggests that the critical perspectives not first articulated by the political elite 
are either “ignored or relegated to the margins of the news.”111 Here the views from the political elite 
expressed in forum debates dominate the media’s agenda; and the media offer limited, if any, 
acknowledgement of views outside official opinion. This marginalisation version of the Indexing 
Hypothesis is similar to Hallin’s sphere of deviance, where opinions that do not conform to the 
governing elite are sidelined in both the elite debates and in the media. 
 
An expansion to Mermin’s 1997 work is found in his book Debating War and Peace.112 Here 
Mermin contributes to the theoretical and empirical framework through the analysis of eight US 
military interventions. The analysis evaluates the source and volume of critical perspectives in the 
media in relation to Washington consensus or conflict. This research identifies the different versions 
of Indexing present within these case studies. A comparison is made between the level of critical 
paragraphs in the news and the total number of paragraphs during the first two weeks of the 
interventions.113 These findings are supplemented with a qualitative analysis to identify when the 
critical perspectives arose, and how this compares to the debate in Washington. Mermin asserts 
“critical perspectives do not just increase from a reasonable baseline in the news when there is debate 
in Washington, but instead are ignored or marginalized in the news if not first expressed in 
Washington.”114 Mermin goes on to argue that “if politicians are in consensus, the indexing rule 
reproduces and reinforces their consensus; the press does not offer critical analysis of government 
policies unless actors inside government have done so first.”115 This analysis demonstrates that when 
there is consensus on policy within the political elite, critical perspectives become marginalised in the 
news.  
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 Additional Indexing research offered in Zaller and Chiu’s work Government’s Little Helper 
analyses media reportage of 42 different foreign policy crises between 1945 and 1999 and finds 
inconsistent results of Indexing. 116  This inconsistency compelled the authors to reconsider the 
fundamental, but uncertain, question of ‘who leads whom’, media or government. Zaller and Chiu 
propose the possibility of a ‘third factor’. The ‘third factor’ argues that journalists and the elite are 
prone to respond similarly as a result of shared cultural conditioning. Thus, the culture within which 
the political elite and journalists both operate results in similarly timed responses.117 The social context 
provides an agenda; and policy-makers and the media address these same issues within a similar time.  
For these reasons, the importance of public opinion to policy-makers, along with the possibility that 
media slant stories towards public opinion, cannot be overlooked.  
 
 Zaller and Chiu’s analysis of Bennett’s work concludes the presence of a ‘third factor’. They 
claim:  
“[t]he empirical results are equally consistent with the thesis of press dependence on 
Congress, with a thesis of congressional dependence on the press, and with a thesis that 
some ‘third factor’ causes both press slant and congressional opinion, thereby inducing a 
spurious correlation between them.”118 
Bennett’s work can be considered innovative, as it was one of the first to systematically test the media 
and foreign policy relationship. However, as shown by Zaller and Chiu, it is not without its 
limitations. The most notable claim against Bennett’s work is that he neglected to measure 
congressional debate outside what was evident within the limited sample of media coverage. 119 
Fundamentally, Bennett’s failure to accurately measure the level of consensus and dissent of official 
government policy within political institutions challenges his overall finding that the media index 
coverage to the elite opinion. This failure reinforces the possibility of the ‘third factor’.  
 
The final author this dissertation reviews, contributing to the Indexing literature is Scott 
Althaus. Althaus uses a quantitative content analysis to investigate press-state independence by 
applying the Indexing norm to the case study of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis. Althaus 
investigates critical discourse of news stories to identify instances when journalists instigate 
oppositional voices.120 The analysis of full text media coverage of all evening news broadcasts on 
ABC, CBS, and NBC relevant to the crisis provides a more comprehensive approach to the analysis of 
critical news content.121  The use of full text media is significant as previous studies often base 
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investigations on headlines or selected section samples, limiting the complete spectrum of opposition 
views.122 The coding scheme divides media content into three kinds of textual elements related to 
policy discourse – Means, Ends, and Context discourse. Means discourse identifies themes that 
advocate for or against a policy or particular government action.123Ends discourse identifies themes 
that justify or intend a particular policy outcome.124Context discourse locates themes relating to the 
larger political context or problem which policy is intended to solve.125 The three kinds of discourse 
are given an ‘invoke/pro’, ‘criticize/con’, or ‘neutral’ value. Therefore, there can be multiple 
discourses and values accorded to any complete story rather than one only classification. The sources 
that express ‘pro’ and ‘con’ discourse are divided into Congress, foreign leaders, administration, US 
citizens, experts, Iraqi leaders, Iraqi citizens, foreign citizens, or journalists.126 
 
Althaus concludes his work on the 1990-1991 Gulf War by claiming “[j]ournalists frequently 
presented competing perspectives and were often the instigators rather than merely gatekeepers of 
critical viewpoints.”127  This challenges mainstream Indexing findings as, by addressing the three main 
limitations to previous research, Althaus found more evidence of independent reporting of critical 
perspectives. Overall, though, coverage was supportive of government actions.128 
 
 Current Indexing literature by Hallin, Althaus, Bennett, Mermin, and other researchers reveals 
an additional limitation: most research narrowly focuses on American media-policy relations, with few 
case studies outside of the US.129 Research on the Indexing Hypothesis and other media effect theories 
over-relies on case studies involving US media outlets, with little consideration of the possibility that 
other western news media outlets can influence national foreign policy.  
  
 Considering the limits of current Indexing literature, key methods have become apparent. 
These methods contribute to the formation of a research approach in order to answer the central 
research question of this research: to what extent did the Australian and New Zealand print media 
content follow or challenge government agendas and framing prior to RAMSI in 2003? This research 
uses a comprehensive design to include the use of all full text media coverage and government actions 
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and communications, rather than selective random sampling. This is designed to address the 
limitations of previous studies where there is inconsistency in the overall analysis of the media. 
Previously, some studies have used random samples over an extensive period,130 some apply proxy 
data that risks the possibility of misinterpreting the overall tone or other significant information;131 
while others investigate a comprehensive and complete data set over the entire period of the 
investigation.132 The analysis of full-text media coverage is vital to drawing accurate similarities and 
differences between media and government.  
 
 Another fundamental method of this research includes three distinct sets of content analyses to 
comprehensively investigate how the media and political elite addressed the Solomon Islands crisis. 
To conduct the content analysis this study considers all frames within media content and political 
debates in order to avoid limiting the research to one overall tone or frame of media and political 
content, and missing the overall picture. This has been noted as a limitation to previous works.133 The 
three content analyses of this research investigate the range of media and political debates, the use of 
sources in the media, and the critical debates taking place.  
 
 Firstly, the range of debate applied by the media and government will be investigated to draw 
connections between the two. Consideration will be given to the entire range of debate on the crisis 
including the problems of the crisis, possible solutions, and the wider context in which the crisis is 
taking place.134 Some studies investigate only limited parts of the media-government debates, such as 
the critical debate.135 While these aspects are important, the entire political debate provides a greater 
scope for analysis of the media-government relationship.  
 
 Secondly, consideration to the use of sources in the media will investigate both local and 
foreign sources and these will be compared to contributions within political forums. It is important to 
consider the range of sources in the media, rather than focusing solely on the local perspectives in 
order to comprehend the perspectives that are relied on more heavily and those perspectives that are 
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marginalised.136 Failing to do so, as evident is a number of studies, limits the overall picture of the 
media-government relationship, as government ally’s can contribute to framing news content.137  
  
 Finally, the analysis of critical perspectives expressed in political forums and media content 
provides grounds to differentiate between debates occurring within each circles. The definition of 
‘critical coverage’ in the media is ambiguous and varies between authors.138 However, given this 
research focuses on foreign policy and intervention, any critical perspective relating to Solomon 
Islands policy and intervention should be included in this investigation. All of these methods will be 
discussed in greater detail at the end of this chapter, and outlined in depth in chapter four.  
  
The CNN Effect 
The CNN Effect emerged from round the clock coverage of the 1991 Gulf War. The newly 
established Cable News Network International (CNNI) produced 24hour coverage of the unfolding 
events when other news broadcasters lost the communication networks in the initial combat.139 The US 
intentionally destabilised media networks during the early stages of the intervention to prevent local 
Iraqis from reporting and to gain control of media output.140 These events revealed that the globalised 
nature of the media, as an instantaneous distributor of the news and current events, under the right 
conditions might influence policy. Considered negatively from the policy maker’s perspective, the 
CNN Effect broadly contends that instantaneous media coverage brings crisis events rapidly into the 
public’s attitude resulting in a loss of control of policy. 141  Former Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger describes the changing nature of foreign policy decision-making in the current media 
environment: 
“[t]he public hears of an event now in real time, before the State Department has had time 
to think about it. Consequently, we find ourselves reacting before we’ve had time to think. 
This is now the way we determine foreign policy – it’s driven more by daily events 
reported on TV than it used to be.”142 
The CNN Effect however, is not exclusively related to CNN or even 24-hour coverage but rather an 
overwhelming level of transnational media coverage in relation to an event. There are a variety of 
workable definitions of the CNN Effect. For example, Livingston defines it as “the impact of new 
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global real-time media on diplomacy and foreign policy.”143 While Joseph Nye describes it as, the 
“impact of the increased free flow of broadcast information and shortened news cycles on public 
opinion in free societies.”144 As there is not one single workable definition applied by academics and 
authors alike, this could help to explain why the debate over the CNN Effect is still widely contested. 
If a range of authors apply a range of definitions when testing a CNN Effect, potentially inconsistent 
results may be inevitable.  
 
CNN Effect research by Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus takes a more systematic and 
comprehensive approach than previous works.145 These authors assess connections between media 
coverage and the US foreign policy decision-making process during the 1991-1992 humanitarian crisis 
in Somalia and seek to investigate who influences the media agenda to establish if a CNN Effect 
occurred. The authors’ in effect, attempt to determine who is the first to address the crisis. Those 
advocating a CNN Effect argue that the media pushes issues onto the policy-makers’ agenda, and this 
puts pressure on them to respond. A comprehensive understanding of the time-sequence of media 
coverage and political actions, as Livingston and Eachus illustrate, can highlight when and how crises 
are brought to the attention of both the media and policy-makers.  
  
Livingston and Eachus produce a quantitative research approach in their 1995 article 
Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Foreign Policy.146 This research utilises two methods to determine who 
was the first to address the 1991-1992 Somalia crisis. Firstly, a content analysis of the New York Times 
and Washington Post coverage establishes the article and word frequency, source, and dateline.147 
Secondly, interviews with the US, United Nations (UN), non-government officials, and journalists 
qualitatively establish the “temporal ordering of official decision in relation to changes in media 
content.”148 In order to determine a CNN Effect from these two research methods, Livingston and 
Eachus present a principle rule to measure the events:  
“If key decisions follow surges in media content of brief but highly dramatic single news 
episodes…then the CNN Effect is real: Shifts in policy come in response to media content, 
and policy-makers, in some measure, have lost control of policy-making to the news 
media.”149 
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Here the key indicator of a CNN Effect is the loss of control to the media over the policy-making 
process. Comprehending who places the crisis on the agenda is achieved through the analysis of the 
time-sequence of the official government policy with the level of media coverage. This begins to 
reveal if the media ‘gain control’, in some sense, of the policy-making process. Combining this with a 
qualitative description strengthens the overall findings by providing a detailed account of how events 
unfold and how news content accounts for this, compared to the actions of policy-makers.  
 
Findings from Livingston and Eachus’ research revealed that a small group of middle ranking 
government officials began to push the Somalia crisis onto US policy-makers’ agenda.150 While the 
crisis was not essentially different from other contemporary African crises, USAID official Andrew 
Natios created a platform to differentiate Somalia as the worst humanitarian crisis of the time.151 The 
US government proceeded to relieve humanitarian suffering with disaster relief funds and this, the 
authors argue, is the point (after the relief efforts began) at which media coverage began to increase.  
These findings show no CNN Effect, as it was government officials, not the media, who were pushing 
the crisis onto the government agenda.152 On the other hand, it could be argued that the group seeking 
to influence the political agenda were using the media to gain greater awareness of the crisis. The use 
of the media to bring attention to the Somalia crisis indicates the media did have an effect, although a 
more limited one.  
 
In his 1997 article, Clarifying the CNN Effect, Livingston distinguishes between three 
different types of CNN Effect that affect all participants in the news media sphere: an accelerant to 
policy decision-making; an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals; and the policy 
agenda setting agent.153 The accelerant effect reduces the reaction time for decision-makers by placing 
pressure on policy-makers to rapidly respond to potential security risks or threats.154 Governments 
need to appear well organised to the media and public, so as to maintain confidence during such risks 
and threats. However, when decisions are made in haste, they may not be formed with rational 
evaluation or long-term strategies.155 The impediment effect generally occurs in two forms. The first is 
as “an emotional inhibitor” to nullify the realities of war.156 Emotive images or negative framing can 
undermine public or political support for an operation thus challenging the overall policy. Using this 
technique, the media raise concerns about military operations and challenge aspects or possible 
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outcomes of policies. The second scenario is “a threat to operational security” where foreign 
adversaries use information gained by the media to their advantage.157 
 
The agenda setting effect is possibly the most important and influential of the effects. As 
Livingston and Eachus’ earlier work demonstrates, the timing of political action compared to media 
coverage is fundamental to the impact the media and government potentially has.158 The agenda 
setting effect suggests that the media place issues on their agenda and, in turn, foreign policy agendas 
imitate them.159 This could be demonstrated by the priority or level of coverage a crisis receives. For 
example, a crisis may have been on the media agenda for some time but as the issue intensifies (from 
the media’s perspective), the amount of coverage increases. As a result, increased attention also 
becomes evident within government. An issue or crisis that would have been addressed by ‘middle-
ranking’ officials is then transmitted to ‘high-level’ decision-makers.160 
 
Livingston employs two primary methods to investigate the agenda setting effect. The first, 
making use of data from previous research on the Somalia crisis, uses the level of news coverage from 
a range of televised broadcasts between July and December 1992161 to chart key events. Here the time-
sequence and volume of media coverage, in comparison to significant political actions, identifies, to a 
degree, the agenda setting agent. The second method investigates the 13 most serious humanitarian 
crises from January 1995 to mid-May 1996. This investigation considers whether the seriousness of a 
crisis, in terms of the number of people at risk, has any relation to the level of media coverage a crisis 
receives. Findings reveal disproportionate levels of US coverage to the worst humanitarian crises; 
emphasising that media coverage of humanitarian crises differs and from human suffering.162 Thus, 
there was no uniform rule to what type of crisis could receive media coverage and at what level. 
Additionally, a number of humanitarian operations have occurred without any media attention at all. 
The level of media coverage is often associated with the presence of US or Western troops.163 Virgil 
Hawkins contributes to this idea in The Other Side of the CNN Factor: the media and conflict.164 This 
article argues that concentrated attention of one crisis comes at the expense of limited attention of 
other crises, and limited media attention contributes to limited policy debate.165  
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Critics of the CNN Effect suggest that there is an over-emphasis on the impact media have on 
foreign crises.  This is due to a number of factors including the type of crisis, the presence of US or 
Western militaries, the location of the crisis, and related geopolitical interests. The case of the 1991 
Gulf War and subsequent Northern Iraq crisis reinforces the idea that geostrategic incentives and the 
presence of Western troops influence the degree of media scrutiny.166 At the time of the crisis, Turkey 
was facing its own guerrilla war with Kurds in Turkey’s east, and the influx of Kurdish refuges from 
Iraq was an immense threat to the Turkish government. Turkey, as a loyal ally of the US, requested 
that the US implement a policy to return the Kurdish refugees to Iraq and reintegrate them back into 
the North.167 It was these factors, and not the saturated sympathetic media coverage, that appear to 
have had the greater influence, and pushed the US into action.  
 
The clear distinction between Livingston’s three CNN Effects is constructive for identifying 
the many factors influencing the media-government relationship during foreign crises. The formation 
of a matrix to understand the complex nature of foreign policy formation, particularly geostrategic 
incentives, military involvement, type of intervention, and how the media acts, sets the foundations for 
future studies.  
 
 An alternative approach to measure the media-government relationship is offered in Martin 
Shaw’s book Civil Societies and Media in Global Crises.168 Shaw analyses British media reporting of 
the Northern Iraq crisis and government response. Unlike Livingston and Eachus’ research, which 
considers who set the agenda, Shaw investigates the media’s representation of the crisis and how the 
media became gradually critical of Western inaction. The case study analyses official government 
statements within the media, together with a survey and interviews with the British public, in order to 
establish if public opinion varies depending on where the media source their information. Public 
opinion plays an important role in the political sphere, as it can influence the actions and decisions of 
the political elite. This research identifies the “relationships between different aspects of attitudes to 
the war, and between these attitudes and a range of social variables, rather than to engage in precise, 
predictive opinion polling.”169 Shaw argues that Western leaders refused to intervene in the crisis until 
pressure from critical media coverage changed British, and subsequently US, policy towards 
intervention.170  
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 Shaw analyses print news coverage to explore the range of ideology and representation of the 
war in major British newspapers. The newspapers included The Sun, Star, Sport, The Daily Mirror, 
Daily Express, Daily Mail, Today, Daily Telegraph, Guardian, and The Independent. 171  The 
newspapers are divided into different ideological camps and include those displaying: expressions of 
patriotism (The Sun, Star, and Sport); slightly fewer expressions of patriotism (Daily Mirror); 
restrained nationalist ideology (Daily Express and Daily Mail); conservative ideology with varied 
information and opinions (The Telegraph and The Times); and liberal ideology with wide variations of 
coverage (The Guardian and The Independent).172 
 
 To investigate the range of British public opinions and attitudes towards the crisis, Shaw 
analyses diaries from individual respondents and survey responses from two different phases of the 
1991 Gulf War.173 Participants’ attitudes towards the crisis are compared with the ideology of the 
newspaper they source information from. Findings suggest that public perceptions of war are not 
directly formed by the ideological perspective of the newspaper a person reads, but rather the 
newspaper indirectly reinforces the consumer’s ideology and this therefore contributes to shaping 
perceptions and attitudes to war.174 
 
 Shaw also considers media framing and how the media represented the victims of violence. 
Framing shapes people’s opinions and attitudes towards the war, and findings suggest that news 
coverage sympathetically framed the refugee movement of two million Kurdish people. Similarly, 
media scholar Susan Curruthers suggests that the media applied sympathetic frames as the Kurds 
“were more easily filmable, and, as homeless refugees in a snowy wasteland, were susceptible to 
being cast as pitiable victims rather than fanatical Muslims.”175 However, the humanitarian crisis 
occurring with the Shi’ite rebellion in southern Iraq received less media attention, even though there 
were many similarities to the Kurdish rebellion. The representation of the Shi’ite rebellion in the 
media did not provoke any sympathetic framing to inspire foreign intervention.176  The use of media 
framing in a sympathetic and emotionally moving form is useful when understanding how the media 
can at times influence foreign policy decision-making leading to intervention.   
 
 A major limitation to Shaw’s media based research is the narrow scope of information 
gathered, and the exclusion of government sources.177 By only considering the media’s portrayal of 
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British foreign policy and how an audience responds to it, the significance of the policy itself is 
marginalised. As a result, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to understand whether the media 
accurately present the policy, or whether an audience’s response to the policy relates to the media. The 
inclusion of alternative government sources to comprehensively understand policy, are vital in 
establishing the range of factors that potentially influence foreign policy decision-making.  
 
 Additionally, the internal and external political affairs of a state fundamentally contribute to 
the formation of foreign policy, such as the politics and policy issues during national elections. Shaw’s 
research fails to recognise the significance of the internal nature of British political culture, which 
fundamentally shapes its foreign policy and other related decisions. It has been argued that domestic 
political issues played a role in British Prime Minister John Major’s decision to intervene, and that it 
was a means for him to avoid opposition criticism during the early stages of his first term as Prime 
Minister.178 Additionally, Shaw also overlooked the geopolitical incentives for British involvement in 
the Kurdish refugee crisis as discussed earlier. It is possible that Britain felt compelled to intervene to 
prevent the spread of refugees into Turkey because of a prevailing sentiment that Western 
involvement was responsible for the crisis. The lack of similar attention to the Shi’ite rebellion, it 
could be argued, arose from limited media access to southern Iraq. Furthermore, when the media did 
cover the crisis, the use of distancing terminology, portraying the crisis as an internal conflict, did not 
connect the Shi’ite rebellion to US and Western interests or responsibilities.179 To provide greater 
analysis of media effects on policy decisions towards intervention, the need for a more inclusive data-
gathering method, one that draws on additional sources, is necessary.  
 
 Another media scholar, Nik Gowing, utilises interview-based methods in the article Real-time 
Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises.180 This research investigates a number 
of armed conflicts during 1990-1995, although Bosnia encompasses much of the investigation.181 By 
interviewing over one hundred key government officials and politicians in a number of countries, 
Gowing attempts to “unravel the precise impact of real-time television on their work.” 182  The 
interview process operates without any consistent method. Some interviews occur under informal off 
the record conversations, while others receive extensive transcription and are quoted directly within 
the analysis. The analysis of the interviews is considered in relation to specific actions and events. 
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From this Gowing concludes that “[r]eal time TV coverage of armed conflicts … helps those people 
know a little more but not enough to persuade governments to show greater will.”183 
 
 Gowing’s research, however, presents ‘analytical confusion’ arising from the shortfalls of a 
systematic method designed to measure media impact on policy.184 The lack of precision in Gowing’s 
work often results in overstated findings, and makes it difficult to verify any direct relationship 
between media and policy. Another issue arising from Gowing’s interview-based research is the 
failure to clarify the fundamental questions and definitions that are regularly applied throughout the 
investigation. For instance, what determines policy certainty and uncertainty? Furthermore, interview-
based research often involves specialists, such as political players, who are instinctively biased due to 
the self-interested nature of the political arena. Interview-based research is inconsistent when 
determining media-government relations, as memory is not a reliable source of information. 185 
Memory can change depending on the context it is remembered in, and pieces of information are often 
forgotten. 186  Lacking any specific logical structure, this method of research inevitably creates 
discrepancies in the discussion.  
 
 Regardless of the countless studies on the impact of the CNN Effect on humanitarian 
interventions, findings remain inconsistent and often contradictory, as shown in the works of 
Livingston and Eachus, Livingston, Shaw, and Gowing. The literature from these authors claims that 
the media can have some effect on foreign policy but when, why, and to what degree remains 
disputed.187 Nevertheless, these works are important when considering to what extent the Australian 
and New Zealand print media content led or challenged government agendas and framing prior to 
RAMSI in 2003. The inconsistency of interview based research shows that it is an inadequate means 
for demonstrating the media-government relationship. Framing, however, has been shown to be a 
reliable and necessary avenue of research into if and how media actually do influence foreign policy 
decision-making. The literature identifies agenda setting as a fundamental method for verifying 
whether or not the media initially covered a crisis and, as a consequence, created the ensuing political 
interest. However, both agenda setting and framing require qualitative analysis to identify the presence 
of alternative geopolitical influences. The significance of these methods to this research are discussed 
in greater detail later in this chapter.  
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Robinson’s Policy-Media Interaction Model 
Piers Robinson’s Policy-Media Interaction Model draws from the existing theoretical 
literature to bridge the ideas proposed in the Indexing Hypothesis and CNN Effect, and establishes a 
framework for understanding media-government relations.188 Robinson’s model is a comprehensive 
approach that systematically accounts for any cases where the media has influenced foreign policy. 
The model is aligned with the Indexing Hypothesis. However, it is also designed to give insight into 
situations where media coverage varies from elite viewpoints and challenges official opinions; in this 
way it identifies the presence of a CNN Effect. By applying the ideas from Bennett and Hallin - that 
media challenge official government policy at times of ‘elite dissensus’ or ‘legitimate controversy’ - 
Robinson develops the model to contribute to the wider media effects debate.189 
 
In relation to the CNN Effect, Robinson differentiates between a strong and weak effect, an 
expansion of Livingston’s three types of CNN Effects. 190  A strong CNN Effect is to a degree 
comparable to the agenda setting effect.191 However, a strong effect argues that the media not only 
place the crisis on the agenda but can also influence government whilst debating appropriate response 
options.192 Both of these approaches can ‘pressure’ or influence policy-makers into action. The weak 
effect is understood to have less influence over policy-makers, as “media reports might incline policy-
makers to act rather than create a political imperative to act.”193 Therefore, a weak effect could occur 
when policy-makers are  ‘personally affected’ by an issue in the media.194 The weak effect is therefore 
equivalent to the accelerant and impediment effects presented by Livingston.195 
 
Robinson establishes three key factors necessary to identify when the media influence 
government policy formation: times of policy uncertainty; elite dissensus; and the use of empathy and 
critical framing.196 When these three factors occur it allows the media to oppose government policy 
and influence a new approach. Conversely, when there is policy certainty, elite consensus, and 
distance and support framing, a CNN Effect is unlikely, and the media will tend to index coverage to 
the opinions of the political elite. Robinson identifies these factors by examining press statements, 
interview data from decision-makers in a range of government departments, and additional secondary 
sources.197 
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Policy certainty is based on the policy of the executive, which in the US includes the White 
House, Department of Defense, and State Department.  The executive is usually responsible for 
making foreign policy, and the different executive departments are what Robinson calls 
subsystems.198  Policy uncertainty, therefore, happens when: situations occur and there is no policy; if 
the subsystems are ambiguous and unclear; or if there is disagreement between the subsystems,199 e.g., 
if the State Department and Department of Defense had a different policy or approach on the same 
issue. Robinson makes this determination by looking at press statements and releases on the issue 
from these different executive departments to see if the policy is consistent amongst them.  
 
Elite dissensus relates to disagreement within the legislature, which in the US is 
Congress.  The level of agreement or disagreement on an issue between the major parties in Congress 
is the basis for measuring the level of media criticism.200  If there is disagreement then the media is 
more critical of foreign policy. If there is unity, the media is less critical.201 Therefore, subsystem 
disagreement relates to the executive and is what Robinson coins ‘policy uncertainty’. Consensus and 
dissensus, on the other hand, relates to how it is discussed in the legislature. 
 
The process of media framing is described by Robinson: “this concept [media framing] 
enables us to understand how news media texts do not simply replicate reality, but can actually be 
constructed so as to produce a particular understanding or perception of a problem.”202 This allows one 
side of the debate to have an advantage in the media. The media are a source of information for the 
general populace and the media can often be powerful or damaging to the elite depending on the 
frame.  The type of frame applied to media coverage is essential in determining the opportunity for the 
media to influence policy. Robinson identifies four framing categories that are applied to debates 
relating to a crisis: empathy and distance frames, and support and critical frames.  
 
Sympathetic framing, as a requirement of the CNN Effect, refers to how the government 
policy of non-intervention is presented, and therefore encompasses empathy and critical 
framing.203Empathy frames empathise with a group of people involved in a crisis, and identifies them 
as victims using key terms such as, ‘women’, ‘children’ or ‘elderly’.204 Critical frames suggest a 
policy is inadequate or failing. On the other hand, distance framing uses terms such as ‘fighters’, 
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‘soldiers’ and ‘men’ to empathise the emotional distance between the crisis and the reader.205 Support 
frames, meanwhile, refer to terms that are supportive and encourage a policy approach. However, it is 
difficult to set out terms or phrases that identify critical or support frames since they invariably 
depend on the context of the crisis. For example, if a nation already has troops present in a crisis zone, 
then the context and debate would differ if the troops were not yet present.206 
 
Robinson’s model relies heavily on policy uncertainty, which is difficult to successfully 
measure. When policy change occurs the variables that lead to the change are not incorporated in the 
model. Therefore, the model fails “to systematically account for policy change (or the “effect” on the 
CNN Effect) within the model.”207 Furthermore, the case studies which Robinson investigate analyse 
relatively short periods, potentially missing the bigger picture or significant information.  
 
The Policy-Media Interaction Model connects the theoretical ideas of the Indexing Hypothesis 
and the CNN Effect, both of which will be considered during this investigation of the Australian and 
New Zealand media coverage of, and government debate on the 2003 Solomon Islands crisis. 
Robinson’s research demonstrates the difficulties of determining policy certainty and uncertainty. 
However, the model reiterates the importance of government policy, and media and government 
framing. These factors are fundamental to the methodological approaches utilised in this research.  
 
 
The Formation of a Research Method 
 By reviewing the current literature on the media government relationship a number of 
primary, but not conditional, requirements are necessary for the Indexing Hypothesis or CNN Effect to 
take place. These principles are offered in Table 1 on the following page.  
  
 Given that these principles are necessary for the theories to operate, this research has designed 
a number of areas to investigate the media-government relationship in Australia and New Zealand. 
Furthermore, the research techniques applied by the various authors all have limiting factors and 
highlight the fact that one single approach is inadequate to measure the media-government relationship 
during foreign crises. For this reason it is necessary to combine a number of methodological 
approaches to coherently demonstrate the theoretical explanation and to address the primary research 
question: to what extent did the Australian and New Zealand media lead, challenge, or alternatively 
follow government agendas and framing prior to RAMSI in 2003. 
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Table 1: The Primary Principles of the Indexing Hypothesis and CNN Effect  
 
 
 
Indexing Hypothesis 
 
 
CNN Effect  
 
Agenda setting 
 
Political Elite are the agenda 
setting agent  
 
Media coverage follows 
poltical activity 
 
Media are the agenda setting 
agent 
 
Media coverage leads political 
activity 
 
Framing – Range of Debate 
 
 
Media and Political Elite offer 
a similar range of debate 
 
Media use sympathetic 
(empathy) framing  
 
Critical Framing 
 
 
Critical frames are similar 
between media and Political 
Elite 
 
 
The media challenges 
Government  
 
Media sourcing 
 
 
Primarily Government sources 
 
Sources are primarily 
supportive towards 
Government 
 
 
Varied sources 
 
Sources offer a range of 
opinions - critical, mixed or 
neutral  
 
It has been demonstrated within the literature that a number of content analyses are suitable 
for the investigation of the Indexing Hypothesis and the CNN Effect. There are three content analyses 
applicable for the study of the Australian and New Zealand media-government relationship. These are: 
evaluating the range of debate in the media and government through a framing analysis; investigating 
the media’s use of sources; and identifying critical perspectives towards government within the media 
and elite forums. In addition to these content analyses, an investigation of the sequence in which 
media coverage and government activities occurred clarifies who initially placed the crisis on the 
agenda.  
 
Investigating the Range of Debate 
In the works of Bennett, Mermin, Althaus, and Livingston and Eachus, content analysis is 
used to identify the spectrums of debate on foreign crises. The range of debate can also identify if 
certain issues or policy options have been sensationalised in the media. One of the most notable 
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studies came from Althaus who considers not only the critical or supportive frames (what he calls 
means discourse), but also additional themes that arise in the media when reporting foreign policy 
(ends and context discourse). This is particularly necessary when establishing the entire range of 
debate on foreign crises. This can include justifications for foreign involvement or intervention by 
outlining the problems within the crises area; and the possible foreign response to such problems. The 
entire range of debate also permits the identification of possible sympathetic and distancing frames; 
what Robinson defines as empathy, distant, support, or critical frames. Sympathetic or distancing 
framing can move an audience and policy-makers into action or inaction and is relevant when 
determining the presence of a CNN Effect or Indexing Hypothesis.  
 
The Media’s Use of Sources 
The investigation of sources in the news is found in Althaus, Bennett, and Mermin’s research. 
One aspect of these investigations establishes which sourced opinions support and which challenge the 
perspectives and policies of the political elite. Bennett conducts a content analysis of ‘voiced opinions’ 
within news stories by analysing the frequency, direction, and source of the ‘voices’ to verify 
journalistic routines. Additionally, Althaus uses content analysis to demonstrate the significance of all 
sources in the media, rather than uniquely focusing on American sources. Mermin focuses on the 
source of critical opinions in the news to determine where these originate, and if they correlate to 
critical perspectives within the elite forum. These findings verify the importance of a content analysis 
to identify the use of sources in the media when evaluating the media-government relationship.  
 
Critical Perspectives Towards Government 
The level of dissent within the elite forum has proven difficult to measure accurately. 
However, it is imperative to attempt to assess this to weigh the impact media can have over executives 
involved in foreign policy decision-making. Hallin, Bennett, Mermin, Althaus, and Robinson 
acknowledge that the degree of consensus or dissent within the elite forum can determine the critical 
and supportive frames those policies will receive in the media. Thus, one area of content analysis on 
which Althaus and Mermin focus is the number of critical frames presented in the media that 
challenge government policy, or certain aspects to it. Mermin’s study proves the most significant in 
this regard. Mermin argues that when Indexing is evident the number of critical perspectives 
determines whether the marginalisation or correlation version is taking place. This is important as it 
can give greater insight into the media, particularly in its role as the fourth estate of democratic 
society. To accurately comprehend the media-government relationship, a similar content analysis 
needs to be conducted, investigating framing in news articles, and establishing whether or not they 
originate from elite forum proceedings.   
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Timing of Political Elite Actions and Media Coverage 
A quantitative time-line review of media coverage and government actions verifies who 
placed the crisis on the agenda. A fundamental aspect of a CNN Effect is the political elite losing 
control of the policy-making process to the media. This is what Livingston refers to as the agenda 
setting effect and Robinson calls the strong effect. The investigation into the agenda-setter is an 
approach employed by Mermin, and Livingston and Eachus. While this test alone is insufficient to 
distinguish the relationship between these groups, it does provide the basis for understanding media-
government relations. It therefore becomes necessary to establish if media coverage precedes 
government actions, or vice versa, to determine who first placed the foreign crisis on the agenda. In 
addition to this, the volume of coverage and action from the media and political elite signifies which 
group was more heavily engaged with the crisis during particular periods. Providing a time-sequence 
and volume analysis of media reporting and government actions further clarifies whether the media or 
government first covered the crisis. As previously stated, to understand who first placed the crisis on 
the agenda, a qualitative analysis must supplement such a sequential analysis.  
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Chapter 3: Australia, New Zealand, and the Solomon Islands 
 
Chapter one introduced the focus and rationale of this research. Chapter two set out the 
theoretical explanation, as well as the framework designed to test the Indexing Hypothesis and CNN 
Effect. These theories are relevant, as they attempt to explain the role the media play in foreign policy 
decision-making. More specifically for this study, these theories guide analysis and allow us to 
compare Australian and New Zealand media relations with other regions.  
 
Foreign policy decision-making is a complex process that involves the assessment and 
analysis of the regional and international environment in relation to national interests. 208  The 
underlying domestic and regional political environments are crucial to the investigation of the media 
during foreign crises. For this reason, it is essential to reflect on the political factors that influenced the 
Australia and New Zealand governments to intervene in the Solomon Islands at the time they did. This 
chapter will first discuss broadly the relevant regional and international political factors. This will be 
followed by a detailed account of Australian and New Zealand foreign policy, as well as a review to 
the Solomon crisis and initial intervention.  
 
Australian and New Zealand policy towards the Solomon Islands shifted from non-
intervention in 2002 and early-2003, to intervention in mid-2003. While the incentives for intervention 
differed slightly between the two, both countries responded collectively when addressing the issue of 
Solomon Islands instability. Pursuing a regional multilateral approach was necessary, as it was clear 
that a unilateral approach was unfeasible and unlikely to bring successful results.  
 
The Regional and International Setting 
The Pacific region faces a wide range of challenges regarding development and security. 
These issues are primarily the result of poor governance and endemic economic problems.209 While 
Australia and New Zealand do not face the same challenges as their Pacific islands neighbours, the 
close proximity to PIC’s and their potential to pose security threats to the wider region has drawn the 
attention of policy makers in Canberra and Wellington over a number of decades.210 Entrenching the 
region’s economic problems is the increasing dependence on foreign aid.211  This issue has been 
exacerbated by the over-exploitation of natural resources, which has created a bleak future for 
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countries that rely on foreign investment for economic stability.212 A mixture of political, cultural, and 
developmental problems in recent times has caused instability and internal conflicts in Fiji, Tonga, and 
the Solomon Islands.  
 
Within the Asia Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand have learnt lessons from peace 
missions in the Papua New Guinea (PNG) province of Bougainville, and subsequently East Timor. 
During engagements in Bougainville, Australia and New Zealand were present in a primarily 
peacekeeping capacity.213 With the independence of East Timor in 1999, Australia and New Zealand 
increased their level of engagement by contributing large military, police, and logistical support forces 
in a nation-building capacity.214  However, long-lasting peace was not achieved in East Timor as 
tensions remained high and fighting between different fractions recommenced in 2005. 215  This 
example highlights the challenges facing peace missions with nation-building objectives in deeply 
troubles areas, as it requires long-term focus and support to adequately address entrenched discontent.  
 
The Pacific Island Forum (PIF) is the political organization formed for greater regional co-
operation between the 16 member states, including Australia and New Zealand. The forum is the body 
for regional discussion, decision-making, and the expression of collective views.216  As a method for 
effective regional conflict prevention and resolution, the PIF adopted the Biketawa Declaration in 
2000.217 The Declaration focuses on the rising number of internal conflicts in the region, and asserts 
that these should be addressed through the collective action of states, while respecting the principle of 
non-intervention.218 However, the process that leads to regional assistance is often slow as consensus 
is difficult to achieve. The PIF incorporates a range of nation-states, each with its own agenda. This 
can sometimes lead to conflict within the forum, similar to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC). As a result, reaching consensus can be time consuming or in some cases impossible.  
 
Beyond the region, the increasing number of international threats to peace and security 
resulted in a new pattern of security initiatives. In 2001, the 9/11 terrorist attacks highlighted 
vulnerabilities in the international security system and resulted in the implementation of mandatory 
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security measures by the UNSC.219 Part of the newly established global security initiative and the 
Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ discourse was centred on weak states, due to Afghanistan’s role 
as a state considered weak for being a safe haven for Al Qaeda. Mandatory anti-terrorism security 
measures after 9/11220 put more pressure on the scarce resources of the PICs, already struggling with 
“fish and rice.”221 
 
The demand for a stronger international security system derives from the key issues 
recognised by foreign powers relating to failing states. These include weak border security, 
underdevelopment, and corruption; all of which create desirable environments for international 
criminal activity such as money laundering, drug trafficking, and terrorism. 222  These issues are 
considered key impediments to stability and development throughout the Pacific region; attitudes 
which were reinforced when significant threats occurred, such as 9/11 and the Bali Bombing.223 
 
For Australia and New Zealand, the October 2002 Bali Bombings were further proof that the 
somewhat geographically isolated nations of the region were not immune to international security 
threats. This was the largest terrorist attack that Indonesia and the Asia-Pacific region had 
experienced, killing 202 foreign nationals, including 88 Australian and 3 New Zealand citizens.224 The 
attacks heightened the need to address lax security systems within the region. It was these regional and 
international security issues that prompted Australia and New Zealand to take a lead in Pacific affairs 
by providing assistance to strengthen security and address instability.225 
 
Australia and New Zealand: Different Agendas Operating Collectively 
 At the time of the Solomon Islands crisis, Australia and New Zealand held relatively different 
foreign policy agendas. New Zealand, under the direction of Prime Minister Helen Clark and Foreign 
Affairs and Trade Minister Phil Goff, took a multilateral approach towards international relations with 
a focus on supporting the legitimacy of the UN. On the other hand, Australia, under Prime Minister 
                                                     
219
 United Nations Security Council, (United Nations). United Nations Security Council Resolution 15450: Non-
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004 
220
 Ibid. 
221
 ‘Fish and rice issues’ is the term to describe “the provision of basic health and education services, the 
prevention of civil unrest and the management of environment and resource needs” In Tanya  Ogilvie-White, 
"Facilitating Implementation of Resolution 1540 in South-East Asia and the South Pacific," in Implementing 
Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, ed. Lawrence Scheinman (Geneva, Switzerland: United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2008), 85. 
222
 Hoadley, "Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New Paradigm ", 
6. 
223
 George Bush, "A Central Front in the War on Terror: President's Speech to the Nation," The White House, 
(2003)  http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030909.html. Accessed April 16 
2010; Joan Fitzpatrick, "Renditiion and Transfer in the War against Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond," Loy. 
L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 25, no.  (2003): 459-460.  
224
 New Zealand Herald, "New Zealander Killed in Jakarata Blast," New Zealand Herald,  July 17 2009. 
225
 Hoadley, "Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New Paradigm ", 
5-6. 
  
41 
John Howard and Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer,226directed its foreign policy on idealist 
principles and on strengthening bilateral relations with the US.  
 
Despite initial assumptions by Australia and New Zealand, Pacific leaders did not maintain an 
adequate level of security and development. 227  This indicates why Australian and New Zealand 
policies “moved from optimism and generosity to doubt adjustment, and reassessment and finally to 
activism and occasional intervention.”228  It is this policy change that established the grounds to 
analyse the relevance of Australian and New Zealand foreign policy approaches towards the Pacific 
region and the wider international setting. Particularly in relation to whether the media led or 
challenged government agendas and framing, or whether they followed the already established ideas 
of the political elite.  
 
 Australian Foreign Policy during the Howard Years 
Howard gained coalition power in 1996, establishing a foreign policy focused on a state-
centric view of security through military advancements, strengthening power alliances, and scepticism 
towards the ability of international institutions to adequately manage security issues. 229  During 
Howard’s time in power his policy evolved to respond to a new regional and global security agenda 
centred on reducing the threat of intrastate conflict and terrorism. Key events in this period included 
East Timor in 1999, the 9/11 attacks in the US, the Bali Bombing of 2002, and the war in Iraq.230 
 
During Howard’s first term, a close alliance with the US was identified as the cornerstone of 
Australia’s economic and foreign policy. 231  As declared by Howard in his address to the Lowy 
Institute for International Policy: “from the moment of our election in 1996, as a deliberate act of 
policy, my government intensified Australia’s post-Cold war relationship with the United States.”232 
The alliance was one of shared interests and values. The Australian, New Zealand, United States 
Security Treaty (ANZUS) became a channel to strengthen relations with the US post 9/11. As the 
events and effects of 9/11 unfolded, and the Bush administration declared it’s ‘war on terror’, 
Australia followed by contributing troops to the distant wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and justifying 
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their involvement within the same discourse.233 The Australian commitment was made despite initial 
public opposition to its involvement in the non-UN authorised invasion of Iraq in 2003.234 
 
The formation of the US-Australian Free Trade Agreement was US compensation to Australia 
for its on-going loyalty and commitment to the ‘war on terror.235 This verified the bilateral approach to 
international affairs that these administrations embraced. Australia’s support for the ‘war on terror’, as 
well as its increasing focus on, and engagement in, Pacific affairs, also indicated an attempt to protect 
and control its back yard from Chinese political and military expansion in the Pacific.236 
 
Australia’s regional security consciousness is driven by the country’s long-standing public 
concern over illegal immigration. This concern was a significant reason behind the government’s 
increased focus on advancing regional engagement and it was also seen as a potent polling advantage 
during the 2001 federal election.  
 
Howard’s actions were at times contradictory to the intentions expressed by his government. 
In Howard’s early years his attendance at annual PIF meetings was infrequent, reflecting his marginal 
interest in Pacific affairs. This was at odds with his growing acceptance of the region’s strategic 
significance to Australia. Australia slowly came to recognise the implications of the events taking 
place in the region due to the instability in Indonesia and East Timor. This eventually shaped the 
Australian foreign policy vision of 1999, referred to as the ‘Howard Doctrine’, that saw Australia 
embrace the role of regional leader.237 The US labelled Australia the ‘deputy’ in the region, a term that 
was reapplied to Australia’s role in the Solomons. 238  This view of Australia was strengthened 
following 9/11, when Australia further altered its foreign policy to align itself with the US.  
 
Regardless of US influence on Australian foreign policy, responsibility for the Pacific was 
largely left up to Australia. The Australian 2003 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s White 
Paper, entitled Advancing the National Interest, demonstrated the beginning of a change in policy 
towards the Pacific. The 2003 White Paper emphasised the security threat of global terrorism.239 The 
Paper also drew on American hegemony and the ANZUS treaty more so than any Australian White 
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Paper in the treaty’s 25-year history.240 What is most significant about the 2003 White Paper however, 
is that it highlighted a new focus on the Asia Pacific region.241  More importantly Elsina Wainwright’s 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute report, Our Failing Neighbour, applied the ‘failed state’ reasoning 
for Australian intervention. In this report Solomon Islands instability was linked to the global ‘war on 
terror’.242 Our Failing Neighbour offered Australia the grounds to prioritize the Solomon Islands crisis 
as part of the global ‘war on terror’.  This also illustrates the political factors shaping Australian 
foreign policy throughout 2003.  
 
New Zealand Foreign Policy during the Clark Years 
Despite the historically close relationship between New Zealand and Australia during the late 
1990’s and early 2000, their foreign policy approaches were significantly different due to ideological 
differences between the governments. From 1999, New Zealand foreign policy was formed under 
Clark’s Labour government. Foreign Policy analysts identified New Zealand foreign policy as 
operating under the principle of being a ‘model international citizen’; focusing on the promotion of 
human rights, democracy, and the commitment to international institutions. 243  This differed 
significantly from Australia’s commitment to its bilateral relationship with the US.  This approach led 
to the restructuring of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and a shift away from the security 
perspectives of Australia and the US.244 By focusing on peacekeeping and regionalism, New Zealand 
limited the expansion of its armed forces.245 Furthermore, the Labour government endorsed a strong 
connection to PICs, reinforced by its large Polynesian population and a commitment to assisting close 
neighbours and friends. New Zealand’s commitment and strong connections with the Pacific stemmed 
from constitutional relationships, trade, and migration.246 
 
Human rights have played a fundamental role in shaping New Zealand foreign policy; an 
agenda avidly embraced and endorsed by Clark. Within the region, New Zealand was one of the 
initiating forces behind the Biketawa Declaration which promoted democracy, human rights, and 
peace throughout the Pacific. The Labour government recognised the significance of democracy and 
human rights as interdependent and mutually reinforcing fields, essential to sustainable 
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development.247 The promotion of human rights by New Zealand, combined with its multicultural 
identity, allowed New Zealand policy to incorporate sensitivity towards minority groups, particularly 
in the Pacific.248 Due to New Zealand’s receptiveness to cultural diversity, it was welcomed as a 
player in regional affairs, often more so than Australia.249 
 
New Zealand has an enduring commitment to multilateral institutions, particularly the PIF and 
the UN. This was particularly evident during the 1999 Labour government, which supported and 
encouraged the use of multilateral cooperation to bring peace and stability. A good example of New 
Zealand’s commitment to international institutions is reflected in its response to UN initiated 
assistance to East Timor. During the late 1990s New Zealand held minor strategic interests in East 
Timor. However, New Zealand avoidance of the East Timor independence issue changed direction 
under the Clark government. This was substantiated when New Zealand acted on its moral 
consideration towards human rights and acknowledged that it had overlooked Indonesian occupation 
for over two decades.250 With the government’s increased commitment to peacekeeping operations, 
East Timor was the perfect opportunity to demonstrate a willingness to contribute to international 
peace and development operations.251 
 
The emergence of wider global security issues afforded New Zealand further opportunities to 
demonstrate its commitment to international institutions. One of the most notable demonstrations of 
the government’s commitment to the UN was in the case of the Iraq war where it was at pains to act in 
the absence of UN authorisation.252  Strongly supportive of UN authority, New Zealand’s policy 
differed from key allies Australia, the US, and UK. Its position often attracted criticism and claims 
that New Zealand was not ‘pulling its weight’ in defence and in the ‘war on terror’.253  
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Clark restructured the NZDF in 2001,254  to better meet the demands for international UN 
peacekeeping missions.255 This was highlighted in 2003 when, “New Zealand ranked first in financial 
and personnel support for UN peacekeeping operations (relative to size of its population and GDP), 
with over 800 military personnel serving in 13 UN-authorized peace support or humanitarian 
missions.”256 Regardless of US and Australian criticism, Clark was not concerned with strengthening 
relationships with these countries when its own strategic outlook was starkly different.257 
 
 Given New Zealand’s commitment to international and regional institutions that urged other 
nations to support the Solomon Islands, particularly the UN and PIF, its engagement with the Solomon 
Islands was noted from 1999 in a number of capacities. However, rather than focusing on the global 
‘war on terror’ and other international security threats, New Zealand turned its attention to the internal 
instabilities in the Pacific. In a speech entitled The Pacific – Where to From Here? Goff clearly noted 
that New Zealand was only one sovereign nation in the Pacific and that “[w]e cannot assume our 
viewpoint will always be that of other countries in the region.”258 This highlights a contrast between 
Australian policy makers, who embraced the role of regional leader.  
 
 The most notable contribution New Zealand made to the Solomon Islands preceding RAMSI 
was 10 advisory police officers to reform SIPF in early July 2002. While Australia maintained its 
position of non-intervention at this time, it did provide funds for the reform programme. It is evident 
from this that New Zealand’s stance towards the Solomon Islands was different from Australia. While 
Australia asserted superiority in its role as regional leader in the global ‘war on terror’, New Zealand’s 
more low-key approach involved working closely to assist its Pacific neighbors.  
 
Crisis in Paradise - Background to the Solomon Island Crisis 
 The crisis that led to RAMSI began in 1998, although ethnic tensions dated back to World 
War Two.  The Solomon Islands gained independence in 1978, but struggled to develop a stable 
social, political, and economic environment.  Primarily, ethnic tensions between two military forces, 
the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA) and the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), intensified in late 
1998.259 However, ethnic tension is an oversimplification of an extremely complex situation.  
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 At the heart of the on-going tensions in the Solomon Islands were the consequences of a 
poorly functioning government, deeply corrupted and divided by the traditional Wantok system.260 
Land ownership issues, the exploitation of natural resources, the breakdown of social stability, and a 
rise in crime further complicated the situation. The economy struggled to keep up with flourishing 
global markets, and was impacted by rising poverty conditions as well as the spill-over effects from 
the Bougainville conflict.261 Furthermore, because the Solomon Islands stretch across 992 atolls, with 
six main islands and over 80 spoken languages and dialects, an effective central government and 
national sentiment were inherently difficult objectives to achieve. 262  All of these issues were a 
reminder that independence had not delivered what many expected. 
 
Adding to Solomon Islands pressures was a vastly growing population, increasing at a rate of 
3.3% annually.263 At the same time “growth in real GDP dropped from positive 10% in 1995 to 
negative 10% in 2001.”264 Weakening this economic situation further was a ‘marked demographic 
youth bulge’ reaching dangerous heights of around 50% of the population under the age of 20 years.265 
With few employment opportunities, rising poverty, crime, lawlessness, and little confidence in the 
government’s ability to control the situation, instability reached critical levels throughout 1999 and 
2000.  
 
When the crisis began to escalate in 1999, the Solomon Islands government requested 
Australian assistance.  This request was denied. A number of attempts were made to form a peace 
agreement between the GRA and MEF during 1999 and 2000.266 However, for a variety of reasons, 
these agreements failed to maintain peace and did not address all the issues that were fragmenting the 
country and its people.267 On June 5th 2000 the MEF led a coup, seizing Parliament until an interim 
government was installed in late June.268 The coup was an attempt to gain retribution for the damages 
caused by Guadalcanal militias who raped, killed, and pillaged throughout 1999.269 However, this 
action further destabilised the economy and heightened ethnic hostility. The rising concerns from 
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international observers over the sovereign coherence of the Solomon Islands led Australia to reopen 
peace talks which had stalled. In October 2000 there was a more comprehensive and legitimate 
attempt by Australia to stabilise the Islands in the form of the Townsville Peace Agreement. As a 
result, an International Peace Monitoring Team was formed and began immediately to ease tensions.270 
However, peace talks again broke down due to the continuing spill-over effects from the Bougainville 
conflict, the failure to adequately collect arms, and the continuing, widespread and ‘endemic’ 
corruption. Inevitably the Islands experienced increasing instability and eventual violent conflict.271 
 
The total number deaths from the outbreaks of violence were relativity small compared to that 
of other international conflicts. However, the total estimate of displaced people in 1999 reached 
35,309 out of a population of just over 400,000.272  The effects of displaced people saw an extremely 
large number move into squatter shelters in the capital, consequently creating more problems from 
rapid urbanisation. International commentators began to label the country a failed state, and this 
discourse created a changing political context to the conflict.273 Solomon Islands Prime Minister Allan 
Kemakeza made a second request for assistance to the Australian government in April 2003. Australia 
and New Zealand began to change their respective positions of non-interference in Solomon Islands 
affairs and by June 24th 2003 the first stages of RAMSI were deployed. A timeline of key Australian, 
New Zealand, and Solomon Islands government actions is displayed in Table 2 on the following page.  
 
The Initial Intervention 
Generally, Australia’s and New Zealand’s foreign policies were shaped by the two countries’ 
differing relationships and internal priorities. Australia was reluctant to respond to the first request for 
assistance as the instability of Solomon Islands’ affairs seemed beyond the capabilities of the small 
assistance force Australia was capable of supplying. The initial unwillingness to assist in January 2003 
was due also to more fundamental concerns. Both Australia and New Zealand were apprehensive 
about becoming entrenched in a costly, long-term development project, and the likelihood of having to 
endure criticism for what could well turn into yet another example of neo-colonial mistakes.  
 
After the second request for assistance, and the rising level of regional security threats, 
Australia, with the support of New Zealand, committed to these requests. The formation of a regional 
taskforce was coined RAMSI or Operation Helpem Fren, Melanesian for ‘helping a friend’.274 On July 
24th 2003, the Australian-led RAMSI taskforce landed in the secured Honiara airport, coinciding with 
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the arrival of the Australian naval vessel HMAS Manoora. The assistance mission was unanimously 
mandated through the Solomon Islands National Government and endorsed by the PIF, UN Secretary-
General, and Commonwealth Secretary-General, with contributions from 15 PICs.275 
 
Table 2: Key Australian and New Zealand Government Actions on the Solomon Islands 
April 22 2003  Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza informally 
requests Australian assistance to address Solomon Islands instability.  
June 5 2003  Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza visits Australia 
for discussions with Australian Prime Minister John Howard and 
other senior ministers.  
June 10 - 13 2003 A team of Australian and New Zealand officials visit Honiara to 
investigate options for assistance. 
June 25 2003  Australia and New Zealand announce the likelihood of intervention in 
the Solomon Islands on the condition of PIF approval.  
June 30 2003  PIF unanimously endorse the collective action of PICs in assisting the 
Solomon Islands.  
July 4 2003 Official invitation made by the Solomon Islands Parliament to 
Australia, New Zealand, and other PICs.    
July 15 2003  New Zealand officially agrees to contribute to the comprehensive 
assistance package to the Solomon Islands.  
July 17 2003 Solomon Islands National Parliament granted unanimous support for 
foreign intervention and comprehensive assistance package.  
July 22 2003  Australia officially agrees to contribute to the comprehensive 
assistance package to the Solomon Islands. 
July 24 2003 Australia, New Zealand, and the other PICs participating in RAMSI 
sign the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003, in 
Canberra.276 
July 24 2003  Intervention forces arrive in the Solomon Islands. 
 
The operation was implemented in two distinct phases. The first phase was a military 
operation to restore law and order. Once law and order was established, the second phase was 
implemented. The second phase consisted of an active policing role to strengthen the rule of law, and 
the restructuring of governmental institutions for economic recovery.  
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The initial taskforce consisted of 2,225 personnel, including 1,800 military in the Combined 
Task Force from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, PNG, and Tonga.277  The same five nations, along with 
Samoa, Vanuatu, Kiribati, the Cook Islands, and Nauru, contributed 230 police.278 The size of forces 
and assistance on the ground on arrival was necessary to emphasize the seriousness of the intent to 
stabilise the islands.  
 
The pre-emptive narrative used by Howard and Bush post 9/11 caused critics of the 
intervention and drew similar parallels between Australian intentions in the Solomon Islands and the 
US invasion of Iraq.279 Criticisms were also directed towards the possible benefits the Australian 
government had in gaining greater control over the delivery of aid.280 This criticism however, could be 
disputed as Pacific leaders had requested greater regional assistance for some time, unlike the Iraq 
intervention that lacked regional support or an invitation for the local government.281  
 
The parallels between the Solomon Islands intervention and Iraq were often viewed as too 
close for comfort for New Zealand, making the government question its involvement in RAMSI. New 
Zealand did not want its outlook on Pacific affairs to be viewed as part of Australia’s reserved position 
towards the ‘arc of instability’. This created a cautious response from the Labour Government as it 
wished to avoid connecting New Zealand with these perceptions of Pacific affairs. Australian 
assistance, too, was hedged with caution; it was wary of attracting any accusations of neo-colonial 
posturing.282 Nevertheless, it was clear that in order to achieve long-term success a significant force 
was needed to stabilise the Solomon Islands, re-establish law and order, and strengthen government 
institutions through the distribution of aid and the placement of defence personnel.283 
 
While Australia and New Zealand were fully committed to assisting the Solomon Islands both 
countries had reservations as to how this foreign intervention might affect political issues at home. As 
mentioned previously, Australia understood all too well the domestic political issues surrounding 
illegal immigration and used this platform to gain public support for intervention. On the other hand, 
New Zealand faced an actively discontented opposition government. The opposition highlighted 
concerns that further pressures on police and defence forces would increase the burden of already 
stretched resources. Having sent a small police force to the Solomon Islands in 2002, the proposal to 
make additional contributions raised objections. However, when it was acknowledged that this kind of 
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civil unrest, failing government structure and bitter discontent could potentially spread throughout the 
region, the New Zealand and Australian governments felt obliged to act, regardless of their differing 
foreign polices and domestic issues.   
 
The experiences of East Timor reminded Australia and New Zealand that peace-keeping and 
nation-building require extensive commitment to achieve long-term success. Regardless of the lessons 
learned from East Timor, and the additional deep-rooted problems of the Pacific, many within 
Australia and New Zealand felt a responsibility to assist the Solomon Islands when that state was on 
the brink of collapse. Although RAMSI was formed by the collective actions of 15 PICs, Australia and 
New Zealand recognised that they had the principle role to play. 
 
From this review of the current literature on the formation of Australian and New Zealand 
foreign policy regarding the Solomon Islands, it is clear there has been little attention paid to the role 
of the media.  This thesis seeks to address this shortfall, to explain the Solomon Islands intervention, 
and the role of the media in the foreign policy formation.   
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
 
Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the methodological approaches designed to answer the 
primary research questions, which will be reiterated later in the chapter. The previous chapters 
described the media-government relationship and the Australian and New Zealand foreign policy 
environment. The current literature on the media-government relationship during crises demonstrates 
the complexity of this relationship, as there are a variety of possible variables and explanations of how 
interactions between the two may occur. For these reasons, the necessity of using a range of methods 
to test the relationship is thoroughly discussed and outlined in this chapter.  
 
Before the methods for analysis are set out, it is essential to define elite forum, government, 
and action. Elite forum is defined as the combination of the executive and legislative branches of the 
political system. The executive is defined as government and legislative refers to Parliament. In 
Australia the elite forum includes the governing party, or coalition parties, as the executive, and The 
Senate and House of Representatives as the legislative. In New Zealand, the executive branch includes 
the majority party or majority coalition parties, while the legislative is the House of Representatives. 
The term action or activities is used to describe political communication. This includes, but is not 
exclusive to, press releases, speeches, Parliamentary proceedings, joint standing committee transcripts, 
attendance at national and international meetings, and diplomatic interactions. 
 
There are three contrasting hypotheses as to how the Australian and New Zealand media-
government relationship operates during the formation of foreign policy supporting military 
intervention in the Solomon Islands. The first hypothesis suggests that in the year preceding the 2003 
RAMSI intervention, the Australian and New Zealand local media followed political elite activity and 
perspectives. This is termed the Indexing Hypothesis and argues that the news media ‘index’ their 
coverage to the perspectives of the political elite that have been articulated within political institutions 
and forums, and published through political communication and activity.284 To test this, a content 
analysis evaluates the range of debate to verify if the frames used in media coverage and elite forum 
activity are comparable. To demonstrate media indexing coverage to political elite perspectives, the 
timing of media coverage would follow political activity. Most significantly, the narratives between 
the media and political elite would be similar, with limited coverage of alternative perspectives. Thus, 
when the media use government sources excessively, the interaction between the two demonstrates a 
closer, more cooperative relationship.  
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The second hypothesis proposes that in the year preceding the 2003 RAMSI intervention, 
Australian and New Zealand media led government agendas, and this resulted in the policy receiving 
attention. This is referred to as a CNN Effect and specifically relates to Livingston’s Agenda setting 
Effect.285 The Agenda setting Effect assesses who was first to cover the issue and focuses on the factors 
considered important to a policy receiving attention, while not necessarily focusing on policy change 
itself. For a CNN Effect to occur, the media cover a crisis ahead of elites. The media perform as the 
agenda setting agent and this propels the political elite into action, particularly on foreign policy 
makers. A quantitative time-sequence analysis of the volume of media coverage and political elite 
communication over the year before the intervention can identify who led whom.  
 
The third hypothesis suggests that Australian and New Zealand journalists present frames and 
perspectives different from those offered by the political elite. There may be some similarity in the 
agenda and timing of the agenda; however, the way the agenda is defined and presented may vary 
between the media and elite. When the media report crises independently from the perspectives of the 
political elite it demonstrates greater media independence. When applying the principles of 
Robinson’s Policy Media Interaction Model, journalists have the most influence over policy formation 
when they offer different perspectives using empathy and critical frames, at times of elite dissensus 
and policy uncertainty.286  
 
Part of understanding which hypothesis best explains the media-government relationship is 
through the analysis of critical media content. Critical media framing sees the media challenge or 
delegitimize government policy. The media disputes the government’s overall approach in dealing 
with the crisis and suggests alternative remedies. Critical framing can operate in two ways. It can 
either be critical of a government’s failure to act in times of crises, or it can challenge a government’s 
intention to intervene in another nation’s affairs. In each of these cases, the media are challenging the 
government’s policy position and urging them to move towards an alternative approach. When the 
media challenge the government’s response, they are pushing the government to alter its policy 
relating to the crisis. This deals with framing and relates to Livingston’s impediment effect, where the 
media challenges to policy occur after an intervention, or Bahador’s challenging effect, where media 
challenges to policy occur before an intervention.287  
 
The methods to test these hypotheses and describe the Australian and New Zealand media-
government relationship are based on Robinson’s Media-Policy Interaction Model. The model 
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encompasses both the CNN Effect and Indexing Hypothesis. For the purpose of this research, the 
model has been altered to include supplementary methods applied by alternative authors, such as a 
more advanced content analysis of framing and media sourcing.288 Adapting the model ensures a more 
comprehensive investigation of framing, as well as an analysis of the sequence within which media 
articles and government actions occur to provide more data for a detailed analysis. The adaptations to 
Robinson’s approach ensure that the seven research questions listed below are comprehensively 
addressed. These seven research questions will be addressed by investigating four key areas: the 
sequence between media coverage and political elite actions; the range of debate used by each group; 
the use of sources in the media; and criticisms expressed by the political elite and reported by the 
media. By addressing these areas, inferences can be made to explain the media-government 
relationship in Australia and New Zealand. The rest of this chapter describes the samples used, the 
selection process for the tests used to address the central questions, and the reliability test used.  
 
Research Questions 
The central question of this thesis is: 
1: To what extent did the Australian and New Zealand print media content lead, challenge, 
or follow government agendas and framing before the 2003 RAMSI intervention?  
 
Other questions that contribute to answering the central research questions are: 
2: Did Australian and New Zealand government actions, regarding the Solomon Islands 
crisis, precede or follow print media coverage?  
2.1: Did print news media coverage of the Solomon Islands crisis in the year 
preceding the 2003 RAMSI reflect the range of debate in the elite forum?  
3: How and to what degree were various sources used in the media when covering the 
Solomon Islands crisis and subsequent intervention? 
4: How were criticisms of the governments response to the crisis presented in the media 
compared to the critical perspectives expressed within elite forums?  
4.1 Did the critical perspective in the media originate from the critical perspectives 
expressed by the political elite?  
 
Sample and Criteria for Collecting Data 
The central focus of this research addresses Australian and New Zealand print newspaper 
coverage and elite forum activity regarding the Solomon Islands crisis. Print newspaper coverage of 
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the Solomon Islands crisis was most suitable for this study as it provided greater volume and detail for 
analysis. Televised coverage of the crisis was limited and failed to provide sufficient data for a 
comprehensive analysis. Print media offers greater depth and detail in the analysis of underlying 
messages and media processes to clarify the media-government relationship.  
 
The top three national newspapers of each country are investigated in this study. These 
newspapers tend to have a large circulation, demonstrate a range of reportage on the Solomon Islands 
crisis, and provide an adequate level of coverage. The Australian newspapers used were the Sydney 
Morning Herald, Herald Sun, and Daily Telegraph. These papers had a combined circulation average 
totalling 1,183,515 during 2002 to 2003.289 The New Zealand newspapers used were the New Zealand 
Herald, Dominion Post, and The Press. The New Zealand newspapers had a combined circulation 
average totalling 415,323 during the same period.290 It is important to note in 2002 the Dominion Post 
was made up of two separate papers: Dominion and The Evening Post. It became the Dominion Post in 
2003, and any reference to the Dominion Post includes the transition of both these newspapers into 
one.  
 
The Dow Jones Factiva database was the search engine used for the collection of media data. 
Factiva provided a comprehensive record of full text media articles from the six papers investigated 
and was available online. In order to find articles, the term Solomon Islands was entered into the 
search engine, with the search period July 25th 2002 to July 24th 2003. Many irrelevant articles were 
part of this search and were manually filtered out. To filter irrelevant material, the news articles that 
did not address the Solomon Islands crisis were removed. If an article discussed a social issue that 
made no direct reference to the crisis, but discussed issues of law and order, the article was included in 
the data set.291 In total, the Australian media data set included 74 articles, and the New Zealand media 
data set included 76.292 
 
Elite forum activity relating to the Solomon Islands crisis consisted of official government 
actions and publications. The activity comes in a variety of forms, such as Parliamentary transcripts of 
debates and questions and answer sessions, speeches, press releases, joint standing committees, and 
official statements. Such material ranges from extensive pieces to broad or vague references to the 
crisis. Political elite publications and activity are a key source of information on policy positions and 
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changes, as well as the decision-making process. Publications from the political elite are direct sources 
of information for the media and are essential to understanding the dynamics between the media and 
government.  
 
The Australian and New Zealand government archives websites, Hansard and the Beehive 
respectively, were used to collect the elite forum data set.293 The method for collection and the criteria 
for inclusion and exclusion are similar to the process for gathering the media data. The search term 
Solomon Islands was used in the aforementioned archives during the period July 25th 2002 to July 24th 
2003.  
 
The methods to collect elite forum activity are selected with the same criteria as the media 
articles gathered through the Factiva search engine using the search term Solomon Islands. The items 
were manually filtered through to ensure the Solomon Islands references are in a political context or 
make a reference to the crisis. Identifying references to the crisis was straightforward; any reference to 
social, political, or economic instability indicated the relevance of the material. 294  In total, the 
Australian elite forum data set included 54 items and the New Zealand data set had 24. For one of the 
four tests, the elite forum is divided into government (executive) and Parliament. The Australian data 
set for this test includes 43 government items and 15 Parliament items. The New Zealand data set for 
this test includes 21 government items and five Parliament items. The elite forum is separated into 
government and Parliament due to nature of the investigation. In tests one, three and four however, the 
groups are left as the elite forum due the limited number of items in the data set. Had the groups been 
separated in tests one, three, and four, the analysis would yield debatable findings from overreliance 
on data that does not provide sufficient evidence of the media-government relationship.295 
 
Research Methods and Related Tests 
Chapter two identified the following tests to assess the media-government relationship using 
methods successfully applied within the media-government literature follows.296 The basis of these 
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methods utilises both content analysis and quantitative techniques. To conduct the content analyses for 
this research the media and government data sets were manually coded. Manual coding was necessary 
to ensure the codes were applied within the context intended. After which, the data was entered in to 
the SPSS computer software program for quantitative analysis. Coding is completed within the context 
of the most recent crisis, July 25th 2002 - July 24th 2003. Previous crises or government assistance 
from outside of the year period of analysis is not coded.  
 
Test One: The Quantitative Test 
Test one is designed to address the question: did Australian and New Zealand government 
actions, regarding the Solomon Islands crisis, precede or follow print media coverage? Reviewing the 
dates the Australian and New Zealand media covered the Solomon Islands crisis in comparison to the 
dates government addressed the crisis can identify trends and patterns in the volume and sequence. 
The quantitative test aims to identify a time-sequence pattern of dialogue around the situation in the 
Solomon Islands to determine who initially placed the crisis on the agenda. To supplement the 
quantitative examination, an analysis of the content focuses on the language and issues raised over the 
year period. The qualitative analysis considers if the issues raised and discussed by the media and 
political elite were similar, or if one group presents different issues from the other.  
 
The procedure to conduct the time-sequence test and analyses the data is as follows:  
 Every media article and government activity is charted over the year period. The 
timeframe for analysis is July 25 2002 – July 24 2003.  
 The data is analysed in days, weeks, and months to clarify trends and patterns.  
 The weeks were analysed Monday to Sunday with the first week commencing 
Monday July 22nd 2002, and the last week commencing Monday July 21st 2003.  
 The months commenced from the first day until the last day of the month.  
 The analysis is broken into two key phases of activity: the first ranging a 10-month 
period from July 2002 – May 2003, the second ranging two months: June – July 2003.  
 
A quantitative time-sequence review cannot categorically prove which hypothesis describes 
the Australian and New Zealand media-government relationship on its own. Consequently, the 
alternative tests include three content analyses and an analysis of the data to further validate the nature 
of the media-government relationship in Australia and New Zealand.  
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Test Two: Framing test 
Test two is designed to address the question: did print news media coverage of the Solomon 
Islands crisis in the year preceding the 2003 RAMSI reflect the range of debate in the elite forum?  
Using a content analysis, the framing test determines how the Solomon Islands crisis was framed in 
the year that led up to the RAMSI intervention. The framing test measures the range of debate utilised 
by the media, government, and Parliament. Analysing the media’s range of debate against government 
and Parliament’s explains any connection between the three groups. The range of debate is divided 
into three framing categories to include: the problems of the Solomon Islands crisis; the solutions 
proposed to address these problems; and criticisms towards government response.  
 
The elite forum is separated into government and Parliament in this test, as the range of debate 
can differ between the two. Identifying the differences and similarities between the way government 
and Parliament frame a crisis to identify if there is any dissent within the political elite. Dissent is 
significant to understating the media-government relationship as media coverage often reflects the 
debate within political forums; in this case Parliament.  
 
As there can be a range of frames or codes within a text, the procedure for analysis must be 
methodological and systematic. The codebook used for test two’s content analysis is displayed in 
Table 3 on the following page and definitions of the codes are offered in Appendix 3. The procedure 
to operate the content analysis is as follows:  
 In order to operate this content analysis, the data sets for media, government, and 
Parliament are coded manually.  
 The categories for coding include the date, medium, problem frames, solution frames, 
and critical frames.297  
 To identify codes, the data sets are manually filtered through sentence by sentence, to 
ensure the frames are coded within context.  
 When coding the solutions category, only a direct reference to a proposed solution is 
coded. Therefore, the Scoping Mission to the Solomon Islands, which took place 
between June 10th – 13th 2003 when a team of Australian and New Zealand police, 
military and civilian officials visited Honiara to investigate the options for assistance, 
are not a category for coding. This is because no decisions or proposals were made 
during this mission, as the overall intention of the mission was to come to a decision 
as to what the final intervention force would involve.  
 If more than one consecutive sentence requires the same code, then the total 
consecutive sentences are given one code, not one code for each sentence.  
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 The coded data is entered into the computer software program SPSS.  
 A new SPSS ‘sheet’ is used for each media, government, and Parliament data sets. 
The coded data is entered in chronological order.   
 
Table 3: Codebook Test Two 
 Medium  
Date News Agency Government Parliament 
25.06.02  1 = Herald Sun 1 = Prime Minister 1 = Government 
24.06.03 2 Daily 
Telegraph  
2 = Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade / 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
2 = Coalition 
Government  
 3 = Sunday 
Morning Herald  
3 = Other 3 = Opposition Parties 
 4 = New 
Zealand Herald 
 4 = Other 
 5 = Dominion 
Post 
  
 6 = The Press    
Range of Debate 
Problem Frames Solution Frames Critical Frames 
1 = Economic 1 = Aid 1 = Impact on Police & Defence 
2 = Security Threat 
AUNZ 
2 = Non-Intervention 2 = Should Have Acted Sooner 
3 = Security Threat 
Region  
3 = Non-Armed Police 3 = Aid is Ineffective 
4 = Failed State 4 = Intervention 
Unspecified  
4 = Lack of Public Debate 
5 = Humanitarian  5 = Macro Reform 5 = Inflame Situation  
6 = Lawlessness 6 = Armed Police & 
Defence 
6 = Alienate PIC 
7 = Ethnic Violence 7 = Assistance Package 7 = Re-Colonise & Control 
8 = Terrorism  8 = Other 8 = Questionable Purpose of Deployment  
  9 = Bogged Down in Operation  
 
SPSS measures two areas of framing. The frequency each frame was used and the time when frame 
categories were used. The first area of analysis considers the frequency each group used each frame 
within the range of debate. The range of debate is made up of three frame categories being the 
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problems of the Solomon Islands crisis, solutions to these problems, and criticisms towards 
government’s action or inaction relating to the crisis. The three categories are compared to identify 
similarities and differences in frequencies between media, government, and Parliament.  
 
The second area of analysis revolves around the time-sequence of media, government, and 
Parliamentary for each frame. This time-sequence analysis determines which group initially uses each 
frame. Analysing the sequence that frames are used will be measured in relation to key government 
actions. The purpose of this is to determine if key government activities influence the way the media 
frame their range of debate, or if media framing influenced government or Parliamentary activity.  
 
There are three possibilities of what the findings from this test demonstrate. Firstly, an 
Indexing Hypothesis would be evident when government or Parliament uses similar frames and 
narratives before the media. When the media appear to follow Parliamentary debates, rather than the 
government perspective alone, it builds an even stronger case supporting the Indexing Hypothesis. 
Secondly, the findings may demonstrate the media setting the range of debate before government or 
Parliament, or offer a different range of debate altogether. When the media set the agenda and debate, 
it begins to build a case supporting the possibility of a CNN Effect. The third explanation to what the 
findings may demonstrate is that the media and government offer a similar range of debate, but 
sensationalise different aspects of the debate. This would indicate that the media are reporting 
somewhat independently from the elite.  
 
Test Three: The Media’s Use of Sources 
Test three is designed to address the question: how and to what degree were various sources 
used in the media when covering the Solomon Islands crisis and subsequent intervention? Using 
Bennett’s investigation in “Towards a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States” as a 
guide, test three evaluates the media’s use of sources.298 Similarly, a content analysis will be used to 
investigate the use of sources in the media compared to key government activity to enlighten our 
understanding of the media-government relationship.  
 
The media’s use of sources is significant to this investigation as the media frequently use 
reputable sources to substantiate news content. For this reason, the use of political sources in the 
media fit this purpose well. Different sources such as a Prime Minister, member of the opposition 
government, or academics can provide different perspectives and narratives to a news story. What is 
most significant is when journalists continuously use the same source is this strengthens the 
relationship between the journalist and that source. To correspond with the Australian and New 
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Zealand political systems, the source categories in this investigation vary from Bennett’s 
categorisation to include Government, Opposition Government, Independent, and Foreign sources.299 
The codebook used for test three’s content analysis is displayed in Table 4 on the following page and 
definitions of the codes are offered in Appendix 3.  
 
Table 4: Codebook Test Three – The use of sources in the media 
Date News Agency Sources Direction 
25.06.2002 - 1 = Herald Sun 1 = Government 1 = Support 
24.06.2003 2 = Daily Telegraph  2 = Opposition  2 = Opposition 
 3 = Sunday Morning 
Herald  
3 = Independent 3 = Mixed 
 4 = New Zealand Herald 4 = Foreign Government. 
Australia or New Zealand 
4 = Neutral 
 5 = Dominion Post 5 = Foreign Government 
Solomon Islands 
 
 6 = The Press   
 
 
 The first area for analysis considers the type of source used by the media and the frequency in 
which sources are used. The frequency of sourced opinions in the news is important to show if the 
media rely on a particular type of source more so than other sources. Bennett’s examination found that 
when Indexing occurred the Times reporting on the Nicaragua crisis used only 15% of sources outside 
of the political elite. However, placing a numerical value on media sourcing is generally indicative, 
and thus needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In order to provide a thorough examination, 
analyses of political elite sources are measured against key government activities to identify patterns 
in journalist behaviour.  
 
 The second area of analysis considers if sourced opinions were supportive, opposing, mixed, 
or neutral towards government policy.300 While the use of sources is important to validate the news 
story, determining the direction of a source is just as significant. The direction can add weight to the 
frames that the media are presenting. However, over-relying on particular sources can also skew or 
misrepresent particular perspectives. For example, when one source presents negative opinions to 
government on a regular basis with few alternative critical sources, this can make it appear that such 
criticisms is greater than it actually may be. Particular attention to critical or oppositional perspectives 
from within political institutions will be measured against media sourcing.  
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 A large number of media sourcing from the government (possibly more so than any other type 
of source) potentially signifies an Indexing Hypothesis. While predominant sourcing from government 
would be likely because government may tend to provide up-to-date information for the public on a 
regular basis, the media should also source from the opposition in government to reflect the entire 
political debate. When consensus within the political elite declines and dissent becomes apparent, then 
it is expected that the media source more heavily from government to reflect this shift in the elite 
debate. However, when there is a very low level of government dissent (political agreement on issues 
or policy) and the media are using a range of sources with a range of opinions, then this tells us 
something quite striking about journalistic behaviour. It suggests that the media are sourcing a range 
of opinions in its content, even when the range of political debate is smaller and in agreement. For this 
to occur, the media are moving beyond Indexing content to the perspectives of the political elite and 
are independently sourcing and reporting on the crisis.  
 
 On the other hand, findings may demonstrate a large degree of non-government sources 
critical of government. This could occur before policy decisions had been finalised, as the sources 
would be trying to place the crisis on the political elite agenda to push for policy attention. 
Government sources used by the media may offer mixed or neutral perspectives in dealing with the 
crisis. However, critical perspectives from non-government sources may also be evident after a policy 
decision to demonstrate the sources discontent. When the media are not offering sources that present a 
range of the debate similar to that on the elite forum and instead offer a range of sources, this suggests 
that the media are independently sourcing various opinions that challenge government. When this 
occurs, and sources in the media challenge government policy and action, the media could be 
operating within the principles of the CNN Effect. It is possible that the media and government are 
concentrating on what the public are concerned about. If this were the case, then the media would 
offer a range of sources, both from the political elite and the non-government sources that are 
generally supporting government.  
 
Test Four: Critical Perspectives toward Government 
Test four is designed to address the questions: how were criticisms of the governments 
response to the crisis presented in the media compared to the critical perspectives expressed within 
elite forums, and: did the critical perspective in the media originate from the critical perspectives 
expressed by the political elite? Test four utilises Mermin’s Debating War and Peace as a guide to 
measure the significance of critical perspectives presented by the media and the political elite.301 In 
doing so, test four operates a content analysis by which critical paragraphs towards government in the 
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Australian and New Zealand media are compared to the critical paragraphs presented by the political 
elite.  
 
Test four develops on test two, by comprehensively analysing the origin of all critical 
perspectives. The purpose of this investigation is to identify whether critical perspectives originate 
from members of government or Parliament, or if they originate from someone different altogether. 
For the media to index their coverage to the perspectives of the political elite, the level of critical 
perspectives in each group, the media and government, would be similar between the two. If the media 
appear to index their range of critical debate to what was expressed by the political elite, then there 
will be a high degree of correlation between the two debates. Alternatively, indexing could show the 
media following elite debate while marginalising alternative perspective. If either of these possibilities 
occurs, then Mermin’s guide distinguishes between the marginalisation and correlation versions of the 
Indexing Hypothesis.302  
 
The codebook used for test four’s content analysis is displayed Table 5 on the following page 
and definitions of the codes are offered in Appendix 3. The procedure to operate the content analysis 
is as follows:  
 In order to identify the volume of critical perspective paragraphs in the media, the 
critical frames towards government are identified, categorised, and tallied.  
 Categories for coding are date, medium, source, and direction. 303 The categories for 
direction include critical, supportive, mixed, and neutral frames.  
 The critical frames are statements that challenge the way the government addresses 
the Solomon Islands. Therefore, the statements do not necessarily oppose intervention 
outright but rather criticise aspects of the government’s response.  
 The coded data is entered into SPSS in chronological order.  
 The data is then analysed to determine the volume of critical frames in each data set, 
and the timing each critical frame is used in each data set.  
 
The total numbers of paragraphs are counted in the media and government data sets and 
compared to the total number of critical paragraphs. Due to the way Factiva structured its articles, 
paragraphs are defined as a cluster of sentences ranging 1-5. Often one sentence appears by itself, and 
to ensure consistency, this is classed as a paragraph. The volume of critical, supportive, neutral, and 
total paragraphs are analysed in percentage and ratio values.    
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Table 5: Codebook Test Four – Measuring Critical Perspectives  
Date  Medium Source Critical Frames 
25.06.02  1 = Newspaper 1 = Herald Sun 1 = Impact on Police & Defence 
24.06.03 2 = Government 2 = Daily Telegraph  2 = Should Have Acted Sooner 
 3 = Parliament  3 = Sunday Morning Herald  3 = Aid is Ineffective 
  4 = New Zealand Herald 4 = Lack of Public Debate 
  5 = Dominion Post 5 = Inflame Situation  
  6 = The Press 6 = Alienate PIC 
  7 = Government 7 = Re-Colonise & Control 
  8 = Coalition Government 8 = Questionable Purpose of 
Deployment  
  9 = Opposition Government 9 = Bogged Down in Operation  
  10 = Foreign Government  
  11 = Other  
 
 Analysing critical perspectives from Parliament will begin to identify instances of dissent 
within the elite forum. There are a number of possible outcomes to this analysis. Firstly, the media 
could correlate their coverage to the critical perspective debate of the political elite. This would show 
parallels in the way the media and elite debates develop, along with similarities in the timing of these 
debates. If the media index their coverage in this way, there would be a high level of media sourcing 
critical government opinions. Mermin defines this as the correlation version of the Indexing 
Hypothesis. This is not the only form Indexing as Mermin proposes the marginalization version. The 
media can present critical perspectives under the guide of the political elite debate, while 
marginalising alternative critical perspectives. The media would either present critical perspectives at 
extremely low levels and within overwhelming supportive frames, or ignore these perspectives 
altogether. As this research investigates the debates in Australia and well as New Zealand, this gives 
insight to the range of debate emerging in each country and therefore helps to determine if one 
country’s media ignores part of the debate or not. On the other hand, the media could use critical 
perspectives not articulated by the political elite. This would suggest the media diverge from political 
elite debate and act more independently then Indexing would suggest. The larger the level of critical 
perspectives, without obvious dissent within the political elite, indicates greater degrees of media 
independence. Media independence is also evident in the origin of the source; if the perspective did 
not follow political elite activity or there were delays, a low level of critical perspective would still be 
possible if the critical perspective in the media were from sources outside of the political elite.  
 
  
64 
Testing Reliability 
Checking the reliability of coding procedures is essential to the validity of the results. Content 
analysis should be replicable to ensure the method is reliable. To ensure reliability, in this instance a 
second coder coded 10% of the data.  This was done for every 11th article, and coding was done on the 
first three units of analysis of each item. The results were tested using Scott’s Pi, Cohen’s Kappa and 
Krippendorff’s Alpha formulas. The level of agreement between the two coders on Scott’s Pi was 94% 
for unit one, 92% for unit two, and 85% for unit three. Cohen’s Kappa test proved 94% for unit one, 
92% for unit two, and 85% for unit three. Krippendorff’s Alpha test presented 94% for unit one, 92% 
for unit two, and 85% for unit three. This demonstrates a sufficient level of reliability for the 
replication of the coding for the content analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Findings 
 
Introduction  
Four tests have been used to analyse the Australian and New Zealand media-government 
relationship during the Solomon Islands crisis. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the data from 
those tests. The chapter is divided into four sections. Each discusses a separate test. The first, the time-
sequence test, explores the sequence and volume of media coverage relative to government actions in 
the year preceding the Solomon Islands intervention. Test two, the framing test, explores the range of 
debate within both media and government to identify the relationship between the two. The range of 
debate is investigated in three parts: problems presented by the Solomon Islands crisis; solutions to 
those problems; challenges to government action and policy. Test three investigates the sources used 
by the Australian and New Zealand media to establish the degree to which they used government 
sources as opposed to alternative ones. The media’s use of sources can support or oppose frames, and 
help to determine the sequence in which frames and sources occur in the media. For this reason, the 
investigation of sources is appropriate to supplement the findings from the first two tests. The fourth 
and final test, the critical perspectives test, investigates the media’s use of critical perspectives towards 
government policy in relation to government actions. This test is designed to establish whether the 
media present critical perspectives towards government independent of those expressed within the 
elite forum. However, this test differs from test two in that it considers where the perspectives 
originated (within government or outside it) and the degree to which critical perspectives in the media 
relate, if at all, to the degree of attention that policy receives. Identifying the origin of critical 
perspectives can further clarify whether the media follow government opinions, or whether they 
incorporate critical perspectives of government and relegate alternative perspectives “to the margins of 
the news.”304 
 
Test One: The Time-Sequence Test – Who leads Whom? 
Test one determines the volume and time-sequence the media and government address the 
Solomon Islands crisis during the twelve-months preceding RAMSI. Comparing media coverage with 
government reactions to the crisis will show which group led the other in placing the crisis on its 
agenda. This examination is discussed in two phases. The first phase encompasses a ten-month period, 
from July 2002 until the end of May 2003, when attention on the crisis was at lower levels. The 
second phase includes the two-month period of June and July 2003, directly before RAMSI, when 
attention on the crisis increased markedly. The build up of media and government attention in the two-
months preceding the intervention, is the central focus of this section.  
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Australian Time-sequence of government Activity and Media Coverage    
During the 12 months preceding RAMSI, the volume of Australian media coverage and 
government activity remained at relatively low levels until early June 2003, two months before the 
intervention. Figure 2 displays the levels of media coverage and government activity over the 12-
month period from July 2002 until July 2003.  
 
Figure 2: Australian Media and Government Activity Over 12 Month Period 
 
 
From July 2002 until the end of May 2003, there were relatively lower levels of Australian 
media coverage and government activity relating to the crisis. The media published 19% of its articles 
during this period. Government activity on the other hand was at 42% during the same period, double 
the level of media coverage. During this ten-month period, media coverage and government activity 
occurred somewhat sporadically; although, there were a number of instances where government 
activity appeared to lead media coverage.  
 
From September 2002 until April 2003, there were numerous instances where media coverage 
followed government activity. On September 25th 2002, Minister of Defence Robert Hill conducted a 
speech, Asia-Pacific Security After September 11, highlighting calls for regional countries to intervene 
in the Solomon Islands.305 Hill maintained Australian commitment to reform the SIPF, yet concluded 
that the “responsibility for ending the spiral of violence must rest with the people of the Solomon 
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Islands and their leaders.”306 The following week, on October 2nd 2002, the Herald Sun ran an article 
quoting Hill’s speech, summarizing the problems of the Solomon Islands within the same narrative.307 
 
Another example of media coverage following government activity occurred on October 2nd 
2002308 when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, stated that officials from Australia 
and New Zealand were to visit the Solomon Islands.309 Again, media coverage followed government 
activity.310 In December a similar instance occurred after Downer conducted a press release declaring: 
“Australia would not intervene directly [in the Solomon Islands] but would make every effort to help 
the leaders and people find lasting solutions.”311 Articles from the Sydney Morning Herald and the 
Daily Telegraph on December 24th reiterated Downer’s statement. However, these articles did not 
report Australia’s non-intervention position. 312  Prior to these government statements, no media 
coverage had occurred since October 2002.  
 
During April 2003, when the Solomon Islands government requested Australian assistance to 
restore stability, there was discretion around the Australian and Solomon Islands discussions. This 
discretion meant there was no government activity during this time and the media published only one 
article.313 However, one media article in April quoted Downer claiming Australia is “not about to get 
involved militarily in the Solomon Islands. We will continue through the Australian aid program to 
help bolster law and order.” 314  This was a confirmation of his statement from December 2002. 
Following this media article, the Solomon Islands remained relatively unaddressed by both the 
government and media until mid-May 2003.  
 
Two-Month Period of Increased Government Activity and Media Coverage 
By the beginning of June 2003, a substantial increase in media coverage and government 
activity was evident.  This two-month period of substantial increase, directly before the RAMSI 
intervention, is shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Australian Media and Government Activity Two Months Preceding RAMSI 
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During the two-month period, government conducted 58% of its actions and the media 
published 81% of its total coverage, signifying concentrated attention on the crisis and the impending 
intervention. During 2002 and early 2003 the crisis was already on both groups’ agendas, at relatively 
lower levels.  
 
In June 2003, the first notable occurrence of increased government activity came during a visit 
by the Solomon Islands Prime Minister to Canberra. On June 4th the Australian government confirmed 
the proposed visit for the following day. On the day of the visit the Australian and Solomon Islands 
Prime Ministers declared greater cooperation in addressing the Solomon Islands crisis.315 The media 
published articles on both the 4th and 6th of June316outlining the possibility of increased Australian 
assistance to the SIPF.  This was the first time the media published Australian contributions of police 
assistance; however, the government had raised the option as early as September 25th 2002.317 From 
these events it appears government actions occurred before media coverage. 
 
Following consultation with the Solomon Islands, Australia and New Zealand formed a 
Scoping Mission to visit Honiara from the 10th–13th of June 2003. On the day of the Mission’s 
departure Downer gave a speech at the launch of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Report. For 
the first time the possibility of “direct engagement, including security assistance… such engagement 
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[involving] cooperative intervention” was offered.318 The next day the media reported this proposal.319 
During and following the Scoping Mission, between June 13th-25th 2003, there was no media coverage. 
This was the only interval during the two-month period in which the media did not cover the Solomon 
Islands. The government discussed the issue once.320 
 
The largest increase in government activity occurred on June 25rd 2003. It came after the 
Solomon Islands National Government passed legislation providing Australia, New Zealand, and other 
PICs with the formal instruments for armed intervention and institutional reform.321  From June 25th-
29th there were eight government actions, a considerably high number for a five-day period. The first 
action came on June 26th when Downer publicly outlined the particulars for a comprehensive 
assistance package for the first time. 322  Following these actions, relatively high levels of media 
coverage began on June 26th, continuing until July 3rd2003. 
 
A further example of government activity appearing to lead media coverage is found in the 
sequence of specific narratives used by each group. In four media articles on June 26th 2003, Prime 
Minister John Howard is quoted as saying “it is not in Australia’s interest to have a number of failed 
states in the Pacific.” 323  Four subsequent media articles on June 27th and 28th offered similar 
justifications for Australia’s involvement in the Solomon Islands, demonstrating similarities between 
media coverage and government discourse.324 The ‘failed state’ narrative was also used by a number 
of Australian officials in early June 2002 and subsequently used by the media.325 
 
Heightened government activity again occurred after the PIF meeting of June 30th 2003. The 
increase was due to the crisis and proposed intervention being top of the meeting’s agenda. Most 
importantly, the PIF granted approval for regional intervention, citing the 2000 Biketawa Declaration, 
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and supporting the newly established regional approach to Pacific crises. 326  Following the PIF 
meeting, Downer and his New Zealand and Solomon Islands counterparts offered a statement 
confirming a regional military intervention.327 
 
On the day of the PIF meeting The Daily Telegraph released one article and, while there was 
no reference to the scheduled meeting, it affirmed Australian support for armed intervention. 328 
Following the PIF meeting, and the subsequent government statement, media coverage spiked. Three 
media articles on June 1st 2003, and two additional articles, each published on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of 
June 2003, all noted the PIF decision to support foreign intervention.329 In total, this was the largest 
number of media articles published over a four-day period for the entire twelve months.330 
 
The next increase in media coverage occurred during July 10th-12th 2003,331 corresponding 
with the passing of Solomon Islands’ official legislation allowing intervention. The day before the 
surge in media coverage, the Australian government discussed the necessity of Solomon Islands 
Parliamentary approval for RAMSI to proceed.332 For this reason, the actions of the political elite 
appeared to lead media coverage during the passing of the legislation.  
  
It is necessary to reiterate the purpose of the time-sequence test: did Australian government 
actions, regarding the Solomon Islands crisis, precede or follow print media coverage? From the time-
sequence analysis of both media coverage and government activity over the year period, it appears 
media coverage overwhelmingly followed government activity. The government set the media agenda 
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by commencing dialogue on the Solomon Islands crisis throughout late 2002 and early 2003, which 
the media subsequently reported.  
 
 There are two key findings that further validate this sequence of events. Firstly, there is a 
similarity in the narrative employed by both government and media content. The analysis of quotes 
used in the media, from members of the government, reveal that the media often sourced government 
officials and applied those perspectives and narratives in numerous articles. This will be explored in 
depth in test three. The second key finding reveals that when government took action, media coverage 
subsequently increased in volume. However, there are also instances when the media reported 
independently of Australian government actions, although these are less common. An example of 
independent media reporting occurred when Australian National University Professor Emeritus Helen 
Hughes claimed that Australian aid was ineffective and contributed to many of the Solomon Islands’ 
problems.333  
 
 Nevertheless, the Australian time-sequence and volume investigation of media coverage and 
government activity presents greater evidence to support that the media followed government actions 
rather than the media independently setting the agenda. For these reasons, the analysis shows that a 
CNN Effect is unlikely in this case, as the government raised the Solomon Islands issue and the media 
largely reacted to policy attention.  
 
 There also appears to be no instance of increased media coverage prompting policy makers to 
respond.  However, the possibility of either an Indexing Hypothesis or a ‘third factor’ influencing 
Australian media reporting of the crisis is inconclusive. While there is evidence to suggest the media 
followed government activity - which would appear to support the Indexing Hypothesis - this alone 
does not verify it. For this reason, deliberation on the range of debate used by the media, government, 
and Parliament, follows in test two of this chapter.  
 
Time-sequence of New Zealand Government Activity and Media Coverage    
New Zealand media coverage and government activity in the year preceding RAMSI is shown 
in Figure 4. The New Zealand analysis is divided into two distinct phases. The first phase focuses on 
the 10-month period of June 2002-May 2003, and the second phase concentrates on the two-month 
period of June and July 2003. The sequence of events will be discussed to ensure a comprehensive 
understanding of how the events unfolded, and whether or not media coverage followed government 
activity, or pushed the elite into action.  
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Figure 4: New Zealand Media and Government Activity Over 12 Month Period 
 
 
While the period for this investigation begun on July 25th 2002, relevant government activity 
occurred before this date. On July 19th 2002, Foreign Affairs Minister Phil Goff gave a speech called 
The Pacific – Where To From Here?334 The speech outlined the long-term plan to address Solomon 
Islands instability and revealed a change in the way New Zealand would assist.335Instead of solely 
focusing on financial aid contributions, Goff signalled that New Zealand would prefer to move 
towards involvement in the institutional reform of the SIPF.336 On two occasions in July 2002, once 
the timeframe for this investigation commenced, the media reported this policy shift. 337  The 
government did not raise the subject again until September 2002 when it reaffirmed its position.338 
While Figure 4 does not demonstrate the events before the 25th July 2002, it appears the media 
followed government actions as the policy was in its early stages of formation. However, this point 
needs further investigation to accurately determine, as the information is limited at best.  
 
During the ten-month period of July 2002 until May 2003, low levels of government activity 
and media coverage occurred. On October 29th 2002, New Zealand released a statement confirming 
the departure of 10 police officers to the Solomon Islands in order to conduct a three-year program to 
reform corrupt elements of the SIPF.339  The following day The New Zealand Herald reported the 
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deployment of police officers, citing Goff from the day before.340   This is an early example of 
government action appearing to lead media coverage. From October 2002 until May 2003 limited 
media coverage of government activity occurred. When there was no specific event or government 
activity, media coverage was limited.  
 
Two-Month Period of Increased Government Activity and Media Coverage 
A substantial increase in government activity and media coverage occurred at the beginning of 
June 2003 and remained at relativity high levels until RAMSI departed on June 24th 2003. During this 
period, New Zealand government activity totalled 70%, and the media released 85% of its articles, 
representing three major spikes in discussions. The two-month period is displayed in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: New Zealand Media and Government Activity Two Months Preceding RAMSI 
 
A fundamental question that needs answering is: why did the volume of media coverage and 
government activity increase at the beginning of June 2003? It appears that, like Australia, New 
Zealand indicated its willingness to assist in the Solomon Islands through armed intervention. The first 
government activity to have sparked media’s interest was the June 4th and 5th meeting in Canberra with 
the Solomon Islands government. While no New Zealand representative was at the meeting, it was 
reported Goff and Downer were in direct consultation.341 This led to Goff confirming New Zealand’s 
participation in the Solomon Islands Scoping Mission, on June 6th 2003. 342 Media coverage 
subsequently increased with one article on June 4th 2003, and two more articles on June 5th and 6th.343 
This illustrates how and when media coverage appeared to follow government action in both timing of 
coverage and content.  
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Media coverage from the days before June 7th indicates there were additional factors 
influencing it. Fundamentally, the major influences were the actions of the Australian media and 
government. For example, the New Zealand Herald published an article titled Australia said yesterday 
that no decision had been made on whether to send troops or police.344 In this article Howard stated: 
“I would expect that next week a group of officials from Australia would go to the Solomon Islands to 
have further discussions about not only the security situation but also economic issues.”345 This article 
was one of a number that extensively discussed Australian actions at that time.  
 
On June 9th, the day before the Scoping Mission’s departure, Prime Minister Helen Clark 
discussed New Zealand involvement in the mission but gave no indication of military intervention.346 
The media reported the government’s actions by extensively quoting Clark and Goff from their 
statements on the 6th and 9th of June. The media also sourced Goff from an unofficial statement, which 
indicated New Zealand was considering sending armed troops to the Solomon Islands.347 The Scoping 
Mission took place during June 10th–13th and the government did not release a statement until the 
following week. The limited flow of government activity during this time saw the media follow with 
limited attention. There were only two media articles during the week beginning June 16th, a massive 
decrease from the seven articles in the previous week.  
 
In the week beginning June 23rd 2003 media coverage increased substantially, coinciding with 
the first major spike in government activity. On June 26th a government statement confirmed that New 
Zealand was strengthening defence relations with Australia. This was expressed in the scheduled six-
monthly New Zealand-Australia talks, which also placed the Solomon Islands crisis high on the 
agenda. 348  However, an additional factor, besides New Zealand government activity, that could 
possibly have influenced media coverage was Downer’s June 26th statement proposing military 
intervention in the Solomon Islands in conjunction with New Zealand.349 
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The day following Downer’s announcement, and before the planned Australian meeting, Goff 
conducted a speech on New Zealand foreign policy and the Solomon Islands crisis.350 On the same day 
Goff also proposed that the Solomon Islands be placed on the PIF meeting agenda for the following 
week.351 In this statement Goff declared: “outside assistance will be considered under the auspices of 
the Forum’s Biketawa Declaration” although it was not specified what this would involve.352  While 
the government avoided committing to an intervention in the Solomon Islands, media coverage 
reported that New Zealand involvement was to be expected; New Zealand was strengthening defence 
relations with Australia at the same time as priming external actors such as the PIF, various PICs, the 
media, and the public into accepting the need for armed intervention. The media implicitly 
acknowledged these intentions and continued to report government actions after they had taken place.  
 
The PIF meeting took place on June 30th. Following the meeting, Goff took part in a joint 
press conference with Downer and Solomon Islands Foreign Minister, Laurie Chan. During this 
conference Goff validated New Zealand’s intention to join Australia in a “police-led deployment…for 
the restoration of the rule of law…by trained police officers – but with a contingency that there will be 
military protection.”353 At this point, the details of the comprehensive assistance package involving 
military and civilian officials were not publicly discussed. The day after the PIF meeting the New 
Zealand Parliament held an extensive debate on the crisis to discuss its involvement in the proposed 
intervention. While this debate demonstrated unanimous support for assisting the Solomon Islands, it 
was the first time that the Opposition government was seen to challenge aspects of the policy.  
 
Throughout June and July 2003 the media consistently reported - quoting Goff - that New 
Zealand’s involvement in the armed intervention was conditional on the approval of the PIF. By 
basing its Solomon Islands coverage almost exclusively on government activity and quotes from Goff, 
it appears that the media followed government actions rather than initiating its own. This is 
particularly evident when one notes that, although government actions subsided throughout the week 
of July 7th, the continuing high level of media coverage invariably repeated the same coverage and 
government activity from the previous week. Within media articles during the week beginning July 
7th, a large number of government sources were used. For instance, Goff and the Defence Minister 
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Mark Burton are repeatedly cited saying New Zealand intended to contribute to the intervention while 
the size of its force had not yet been decided.354 
 
Government activity intensified in the week beginning July 15th 2003, when New Zealand 
passed legislation for its involvement in the regional intervention. Two government actions were 
conducted on that day and in one of these items Goff stated: “Ministers with Power to Act…approved 
a New Zealand contribution to meet the Solomon Islands’ request for outside assistance to restore the 
rule of law and help it get back on its feet.”355  While the media did not specifically cite these 
activities, coverage confirmed New Zealand’s involvement in the intervention and the detailed 
mandate.   
 
The last spike in government activity came in the week beginning July 21st 2003, the week the 
intervention commenced.  This was anticipated as New Zealand, along with the other participatory 
countries, signed the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 in Canberra.356 Additionally, 
Clark and other senior ministers expressed best wishes to the departing troops.357 The deployment of 
military personnel to a foreign crisis zone typically provides more fruitful opportunities for heightened 
sensationalism and clarifies why media coverage was sustained at high levels during this week.  
 
The purpose of this test is to determine whether New Zealand government activity regarding 
the Solomon Islands crisis preceded media coverage, or media coverage preceded government 
activity. During the year preceding RAMSI the New Zealand media closely followed government 
activity. However, this was more apparent during the two-month period of increased activity directly 
before the intervention. The time-sequence of media coverage and government activity reveals more 
occurrences of government activity preceding media coverage, than media coverage leading 
government reaction. The volume of media coverage also increased sequentially to government 
activity. There were also occasions when the New Zealand media responded to the activities of the 
Solomon Islands and Australian governments. During such times, the New Zealand government did 
not appear to be much affected by local media coverage as dialogue with Australia and the Solomon 
Islands had already begun. Intervention was on the New Zealand government agenda already, and the 
media merely reported what it presumed to be the likely outcome of this discussion.  From these 
processes it appears that the government placed the Solomon Islands on the agenda and addressed the 
crisis independent of the media.  
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One of the most striking findings during the two-month period of increased activity is that a 
spike in media coverage often mirrored a spike in government activity. While on the surface this 
pattern alone does not indicate that the government influenced media coverage or media Indexing, it 
does draw attention to media content, which in turn clarifies the sequence in which issues and events 
were covered. Furthermore, the media sourced the opinions of government, predominantly Clark and 
Goff, in 59% of all sources used during the year period.358 In many cases quotes are drawn directly 
from prior government activity and the media reported directly on these. This demonstrates that the 
media relied heavily on government actions and information for its coverage, and appeared to follow 
the opinions of the political elite in many instances.  
 
The time-sequence and volume of media coverage clearly indicates that it was the New 
Zealand government that pushed the Solomon Islands onto the agenda after expressing a willingness 
to bring stability to that country. It was only then that the media saw the issue as newsworthy. The 
media only increased its attention at the beginning of June 2003, once the Solomon Islands had 
approached Australia for help, and the New Zealand government had confirmed that it was open to 
dialogue. It is this overall finding that begins to exclude the possibility of a CNN Effect having 
occurred in the New Zealand case. The media do not appear to have instigated policy attention; it was 
the policy makers who addressed the crisis first. However, the fact that policy makers placed the crisis 
on the agenda does not verify Indexing. The range of debate, particularly the range of Parliamentary 
debate, needs to show similarities for Indexing to occur. A ‘third factor’ remains a possibility due to 
the similarities in coverage and government actions. There is also the possibility that while 
government highlighted the Solomon Islands crisis, the media were still able to report independently; 
this will be investigated in greater detail in the remaining three tests.  
 
 
Test Two: The Spectrum of the Debate 
To determine if the media framed the Solomon Islands crisis within a similar narrative to 
government, the narrative is divided into three sections for investigation: problems of the crisis; 
proposed solutions to these problems; and criticisms towards government response. Identifying how 
the media, government, and Parliament discussed these three areas clarifies the question of whether 
the three groups utilised similar frames or whether one group discussed the crisis using a different 
narrative. This structure is aimed at facilitating analysis and discussion concerning whether or not 
media coverage of the crisis reflected the range of debate in the elite forum and so building on an 
understanding of the extent to which Australian and New Zealand media led, challenged, or followed 
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government perspectives. To analyse the problems, solutions, and criticisms, the Australian case is 
considered first, followed by the New Zealand case, and will conclude with a summary of events in 
each country.  
 
Crisis in Paradise – Defining the Solomon Islands Problems 
In the year leading up to the RAMSI intervention, the Australian and New Zealand media, 
government, and Parliament defined the problems of the Solomon Islands crisis within eight primary 
frames.  These eight frames determined the spectrum of the debate and will be analysed by the 
frequency and the overall percentage value.359 
 
Australia’s use of Problem Frames  
The spectrum of the Solomon Islands problems debate in the Sydney Morning Herald, Herald 
Sun, and Daily Telegraph, appears to reflect a similar debate used by the Australian government and 
Parliament. The frequencies and percentages of each frame used by the media, government, and 
Parliament are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Australia Problems Frames 
Type of Problem  Media Government Parliament 
 Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Economic 36 13% 23 17% 11 18% 
Security Threat (AUNZ) 15 6% 10 7% 3 5% 
Security Threat Region 7 3% 9 6% 3 5% 
Failed State 27 10% 8 6% 4 7% 
Humanitarian 9 3% 4 3% 2 3% 
Lawlessness 129 48% 79 57% 30 50% 
Ethnic Violence 24 9% 2 1% 4 7% 
Terrorism 21 8% 4 3% 3 5% 
Total  268 100% 139 100% 60 100% 
 
The most frequently used problem frame is Lawlessness, with the media’s frequency at 48% 
(129 of 268), the government’s at 57%, and Parliament’s at 50%. A distant second and third to this 
was the Economic and Failed State frames. The Economic frame reveals a relativity low disparity of 
4-5% between the media and government, and the media and Parliament. A higher level of 
consistency between the three groups is evident in the Failed State frame. All three groups 
consistently apply these three frames, and more often than other problem frames. This shows that 
while there are other ways to describe the Solomon Islands problems, all three groups offered a similar 
narrative.  
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The Security Threat to the Region frame revealed a 2% difference between media and 
Parliament, and a 3% difference between media and government. The Humanitarian and Security 
Threat AUNZ frames were used at lower levels, although both frames reveal some consistency 
between all three groups. The low use of this frame suggests there was little sympathetic framing 
around the crisis. As sympathetic framing is needed for a CNN Effect this is a significant finding since 
the media do not appear to have used emotive messages to motivate an audience or to influence policy 
makers to respond.  
 
Overall, there appears to be a greater level of consistency in the range of debate used by media 
and Parliament, than by media and government. The greater consistency is demonstrated by the 
average percentage difference between the two groups. The media and government revealed a 4.25% 
difference, whereas media and Parliament showed a 2.25% difference. The lower percentage 
difference the greater the consistency. More specifically, the similarity between the media and 
Parliament is evident in the Security Threat AUNZ, Security Threat Region, Humanitarian, 
Lawlessness, and Ethnic Violence frames with between a 0-2% difference between the media and 
Parliament, whereas media and government present two frames with a 0-2% difference.  
 
The consistency between media and Parliament support the Indexing Hypothesis, since the 
range of debate in media coverage falls within the range of the entire political debate rather than 
government debate alone. It is natural for the government to present the terms of its involvement in 
foreign crises by defining the issues and how it proposes to address them. Parliamentary debates on 
the other hand, focus on the practical feasibility of the government’s cause, and consequently produce 
more comprehensive and critical debates. This begins to explain why the tone and character of media 
coverage often depicts similarities, to a degree, in the perspectives within Parliament; more so than 
those in government. The consistency between media and Parliament builds a case supporting 
occurrences of the Indexing Hypothesis because the range of debate reflects debates within the 
political forum. Furthermore, the media do not appear to be challenging the government’s 
interpretation of the crisis. Had the media suggested there was a dire humanitarian situation, whilst at 
the same time urging government to intervene more rapidly, this would indicate a CNN Effect. This 
does not appear to have occurred.   
 
New Zealand’s use of Problem Frames  
The examination of problem frames utilised by The New Zealand Herald, The Press, and 
Dominion Post present some similarities in the range of debate used by the New Zealand government 
and Parliament. On the following page Table 7 displays the overall frequencies and percentages of 
problem frames used by the media, government, and Parliament.  
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The most frequently used problem frame in the New Zealand media, government, and 
Parliament is Lawlessness with the media’s use at 58%, Parliament’s at 53%, and government’s at 
45%.  This frame presents the largest disparity between media and the other two groups. However, 
there is a reasonable level of consistency between the media, government, and Parliament as 
Lawlessness is the most frequently used frame overall. The Economic frame is the second highest-
ranking frame used by the three groups, followed by the Failed State frame. Ranking the three most 
frequently used frames demonstrates consistency in the way the media, government, and Parliament 
framed problems relating to the Solomon Islands crisis.   
 
Table 7: New Zealand Problem Frames 
Type of Problem  Media   Government Parliament 
  Frequency %   Frequency  % Frequency  %  
Economic  27 12%  10 25% 11 17% 
Security Threat (AUNZ)  3 1%  1 3% 2 3% 
Security Threat Region  9 4%  2 5% 1 2% 
Failed State  18 8%  5 13% 9 14% 
Humanitarian   11 5%  2 5% 2 3% 
Lawlessness  131 58%  18 45% 35 53% 
Ethnic Violence  16 7%  0 0% 3 5% 
Terrorism  10 4%  2 5% 3 5% 
Total   225 100%  40 100% 66 100% 
 
The media and Parliament offered the Ethnic Violence frame with a 2% difference, while the 
media and government present a larger 7% difference. The remaining four frames, Security Threat 
AUNZ, Security Threat Region, Humanitarian, and Terrorism, appeared at lower frequencies to the 
aforementioned frames. However, these four frames generally demonstrate a high level of consistency 
between each group. These findings reveal that while there are minor differences in the frequency 
levels of each group, there are no major variances to indicate that the range of debate employed by the 
media, government, and Parliament was vastly different. Additionally, the low frequency of the 
Humanitarian frame in the media builds a case against a CNN Effect, as the media do not appear to 
use emotive frames to describe the situation.  
 
From an analysis of the overall average percentage difference between the media and the other 
two groups, it appears there is a greater level of consistency between media and Parliament, than 
between media and government. The media and government reveal a difference of 5.25%, whereas the 
media and Parliament reveal a lower 3.125% difference. This lower percentage demonstrates that, on 
average, the consistency between media and Parliament was greater than between media and 
government.  
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The New Zealand case, similar to the Australian case, shows that when media coverage 
appears to reflect a similar range of debate to Parliament it begins to support claims of an Indexing 
Hypothesis as it represents the entire political debate, not just that of the governing elites. This is 
because the media are more inclined to use Parliament as a cue to the range of perspectives relating to 
a crisis because Parliament provides a more comprehensive debate outside the parameters of 
government.  However, the solution response and critical perspectives categories are where the debate 
takes shape by considering how each government should respond. Greater insights are therefore 
offered.  
 
Responding to a Struggling Solomon Islands 
Proposed solutions to assist the Solomon Islands provide the second area with which to 
investigate the range of debate used in Australia and New Zealand. Foreign policy evolves to meet the 
demands of the changing international environment, while taking into account the domestic political 
landscape. This section will investigate the range of options considered by the media, government, and 
Parliament on how to respond to the Solomon Islands crisis.  The Australian case presents eight 
solution frames in the year before RAMSI, whereas New Zealand offered seven.360 
 
Australia’s proposed solutions to the Solomon Islands Crisis 
During 2003, Australia dramatically altered its hands-off approach towards the Pacific region 
with its newly found interest in the Solomon Islands. From as early as 1999 financial aid contributions 
were the most direct form of assistance offered by Canberra to mitigate the on-going instability.361 
However, in the year before RAMSI Australian foreign policy-makers began to shift towards a more 
active role in assisting the Solomon Islands. Table 8 on the following page presents the frequencies 
and percentages of the eight proposed solutions in the Australian media, government, and Parliament 
during this year period.  
 
The Australian Parliament most frequently used the Aid frame (46%), although this frame 
occurred at substantially lower levels in the media and government. Alternatively, the media and 
government presented the Armed Police-Defence frame most frequently, with 69% in the media and 
42% in government. Parliament used this frame at a much lower level.  
 
  It appears the media were more persistent in discussing the Armed Police-Defence aspects of 
Australia’s response. Parliament, on the other hand, and to some degree government, focused on the 
Non-Armed Police and Macro Reform aspects of the response. An example of how the political elite 
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discussed the non-armed options was at a Joint Standing Committee hearing when AusAID Assistant 
Director General, Margaret Thomas declared: 
“In a country like the Solomon Islands we need to be pretty upfront that we need to provide 
assistance to help them take those steps [progress in law and order and economic 
management], and that is something that we have been willing to do, provided the 
momentum continues to be positive. It is much more of a closer partnership where we have 
to get very engaged with helping the government start to identify and set out some of those 
priorities and provide technical assistance to enable them to do so.”362 
Thomas was not the only individual to express support for non-armed efforts in the Solomon Islands. 
The Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kevin Rudd, and other members of Parliament, made similar 
statements as early as October 2002. However, the media seldom published these and instead applied 
the Armed Intervention frame more frequently. Government was the first to present Armed Police-
Defence as a possible response option on June 10th in a statement by Downer, and the following day 
the Sunday Morning Herald reported this.363From then on media reportage appeared to incorporate 
more dramatic solutions than government. This might be because, from the media perspective, an 
armed military intervention is more sensational than non-armed police in an advisory role. 
Government and Parliament appeared to take a calmer and more comprehensive approach by 
discussing a range of solutions, such as Macro Reform, Non-Armed Police, Aid, Armed Police-
Defence, and Assistance Package.  
 
Table 8: Australia Solution Frames 
Type of Solution   Media  Government Parliament  
  Frequency %  
Frequen
cy % 
Freq
uenc
y % 
Aid  6 4% 16 15% 16 46% 
Non-Intervention   2 1% 1 1% 0 0% 
Non-Armed Police  4 3% 6 6% 5 14% 
Intervention   5 3% 16 15% 1 3% 
Macro Reform  6 4% 17 16% 9 25% 
Armed Police-Defence  102 69% 45 42% 4 11% 
Assistance Package  17 11% 4 4% 1 3% 
Other  6 4% 1 1% 0 0% 
Total   148 100% 106 100% 35 100% 
 
 As part of government discussion on the Solomon Islands crisis, the Opposition specified 
three areas that required deliberation if there was to be bilateral support for armed intervention. While 
two of these areas were addressed when the Solomon Islands government welcomed foreign troops, 
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and consensus among the PIF for foreign intervention was declared, the final issue of an exit strategy 
for the regional intervention was not discussed. The government and media ignored the issue of 
forming a well-defined exit strategy, which seems to indicate that not everything conducted by 
Parliament was worthy of media coverage.364 
 
The above analysis displays both consistencies in the use of solution frames, and a number of 
notable discrepancies. In most instances, all three groups have used each solution frame (with the 
exception of Parliament not using the Non-Intervention and Other frames) although each group uses 
each frame at varying levels. The differences between media and Parliament were the most notable, 
particularly as Parliament discussed Aid in much higher frequencies than any other category. 
Conversely, the media and government used the Armed Police-Defence frame at the highest 
frequency. However, the government also focused on the other aspects of the response such as Aid and 
Macro Reform, while the media only briefly addressed these. The analysis shows that Parliamentary 
debate was not used as a cue for the media coverage for possible response options. The government 
considered a range of response options when addressing the Solomon Islands crisis, whereas the media 
considered these at lower frequencies and generally focused its coverage on the Armed Police-Defence 
aspects of the response.  
 
The media’s use of the Armed Police-Defence frame shows that when a sensational response 
option such as military intervention is one of a number of options being discussed, the media are more 
inclined to report the most dramatic option. By defining the government’s response as predominantly 
Armed Police-Defence the media can break down multifaceted stories for ‘easy reading’ purposes. As 
the Armed Police-Defence frame was also used at a higher level by government, the media may only 
have reported comparable response options to government debate.  
 
Discrepancies between media, government, and Parliament are plausible when an issue is 
being debated. Nevertheless, the discrepancies between how the media defined solutions to the crisis 
compared to the other groups are too great to determine the possibility of an Indexing Hypothesis or a 
‘third factor’. If the media are not leading or following the perspective of the political elite, then what 
do their actions suggest? The findings from this case demonstrate that the media appeared to be 
reasonably independent in reporting solution options. While there are indications that the media 
followed government debate in some instances, overall they were not consistent in following either 
government or Parliamentary debates, and used the Armed Police-Defence frame at much higher 
levels than any other frame. This indicates that the media published a more sensational response 
option, rather than the full debate that was offered by government and Parliament. Nevertheless, the 
                                                     
364
 Kevin Rudd, (Shadow Minister for Foreign Minister and Trade). Sydney Meeting of South Pacific Foreign 
Ministers an Important Step Forward on Solomons Intervention, (Canberra: Hansard), June 30 2003 
  
84 
media did not apply sympathetic framing as a way to sensationalise the Solomon Islands crisis. The 
media sensationalises news stories to engage an audience’s attention. News stories are often reduced 
to short and easily consumable material, and journalists repeatedly using phrases such as ‘armed 
military intervention’ to present an appealing story. This is especially important when stories begin to 
‘fall-down or off’ the agenda, and are overtaken by emerging issues. Keeping the audience engaged 
over long periods requires sensational topics and frames. While the Solomon Islands crisis was not on 
the agenda for an excessively long period of time compared to other crises, it was on the agenda 
during other international crises such as the Iraq War. Therefore, the media had more incentive to 
sensationalise the possible intervention, to ensure audiences continued to read the ongoing events. By 
sensationalising issues the media present one policy option (armed intervention) more so than other 
options, such as financial aid contributions. Such media behaviour is one requirement for a CNN 
Effect; the media were urging Australian policy makers using repeated framing, to respond to the 
crisis with an armed military intervention.  
 
New Zealand’s proposed solutions to the Solomon Islands Crisis 
In the year preceding RAMSI, New Zealand assisted the Solomon Islands with on-going 
financial aid contributions and a small non-armed police force to reform the SIPF.  By providing this 
assistance, New Zealand confirmed the long-standing relationship between the two nations and its 
commitment to develop PICs. However, New Zealand’s approach in addressing the Solomon Islands 
instability changed over the 12 month preceding RAMSI. The New Zealand media, government, and 
Parliament applied seven proposed solution frames to the Solomon Islands crisis during this time.365 
The seven categories are analysed for frequency and percentage levels to clarify the range of debate 
used by each group, displayed in Table 9 on the following page. 
 
The government consistently applied six of the seven frames within similar frequencies. 
Conversely, the media and Parliament applied the Armed Intervention frame at the greatest frequency 
of 58% and 73% respectively. While a disparity of 15% between the media and Parliament appears 
somewhat wide, when you consider that both groups apply this frame at the highest frequency some 
consistency can be demonstrated. The difference between the media’s and Parliament’s extended use 
of the Armed Intervention frame, and the government’s use of a similar number of frames, 
demonstrates the varying focus of solution options used by the three groups.  
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Table 9: New Zealand Solution Frames 
Type of Solution   Media  Government Parliament  
  
Frequenc
y %  
Frequenc
y  % 
Frequenc
y  %  
Aid  7 4% 4 15% 2 5% 
Non-Armed Police  8 4% 5 19% 0 0% 
Intervention  31 17% 5 19% 1 2% 
Macro Reform  6 3% 3 11% 1 2% 
Armed Intervention  107 58% 4 15% 30 73% 
Assistance Package  22 12% 5 19% 7 17% 
Other  2 1% 1 4% 0 0% 
Total   
183 100% 27 100% 41 
100
% 
 
 It appears the government evenly discussed a range of response options in the year preceding 
the intervention as it utilised six of the seven solution frames evenly. This was different from the way 
Parliament and the media discussed the solution options. On June 25th 2003, the government indicated 
the possibility of military intervention in the Solomon Islands. As Parliament only raised the Solomon 
Islands crisis for debate on one occasion before the government’s announcement, the timing of that 
announcement could begin to explain why the Parliament used the Armed Intervention and Assistance 
Package frames at the highest levels. Parliament only discussed the Solomon Islands once before the 
government’s announcement and did not place the crisis on the agenda again until July 1st 2003.  
Furthermore, there appeared to be very low levels of opposition towards an intervention.366 If there 
had been significant opposition to the intervention, then alternative options would have been utilised 
within Parliament. This was not the case.   
 
The July 1st 2003 Parliamentary debate was the most comprehensive discussion on the crisis 
and possible response options.  While there was little opposition to the intervention overall, the debate 
demonstrated the different narratives used by the coalition government and the Opposition when 
discussing intervention. In this debate government members moderated their language around the 
military aspect of the intervention force by referring to the intervention as a police-led deployment, 
rather than an armed military intervention. 367  However, police-led deployment and military 
intervention denoted the same thing. Bill English, a member of the Opposition highlighted the 
inconsistency when he stated:  
“we should stop calling it a police-led deployment. We are sending 200 of our armed 
defence personnel – soldiers… There also happen to be 40 police going as well. The 
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Government seems very anxious to couch this whole deployment as simply a matter of law 
and order – dealing with criminals and getting a law and order system going”368 
The media infrequently used the term police-led deployment and opted for language such as soldiers 
or troops, the broad use of intervention, and armed or military intervention. The media in this instance 
appeared to employ the language used by the Opposition rather than the moderate language used by 
government. Yet, in all of the aforementioned frames the meaning is much the same and is framed as 
either Intervention or Armed Intervention.  
 
The most striking resemblance between media and Parliament are in the Aid, Macro Reform, 
Assistance Package, and Other frames with 1-2% difference. Despite the consistencies, there are a 
number of discrepancies, such as Parliament using the Intervention frame at only a 2% frequency 
compared to media’s 17% and government’s 19%. As Parliament did not discuss the crisis until July 
1st 2003, it is possible the media used a similar range of debate to that of government. The media’s 
behaviour indicates that the media operated independently in the way it framed solutions.  
 
The analysis demonstrates that the media reported somewhat independently of the political 
elite during the year preceding RAMSI. There are a large number of discrepancies in the way the 
media, government, and Parliament framed solutions to the Solomon Islands crisis. There does not 
appear to be a general pattern or rule that describes how the media framed the response options. The 
media used various solution narratives, although it framed the most likely response as Intervention or 
Armed Intervention. These two frames were also more sensational compared to the Aid or Macro 
Reform frames. Comparing the media’s range of debate to that of the government and Parliament 
reveals that in many cases the media reported independently from the perspectives of the elite. 
Although when government activity occurred the media reported this activity, which made it appear 
the media reported the perspectives of the political elite more often than was the case. On another 
note, it does seem likely that the media were pushing government for a particular response. The media 
used the Intervention and Armed Police and Defence frames most frequently. It appears the media 
reported the more newsworthy and sensational topic of intervention at a much higher frequency. 
Media coverage indicated a possible intervention after government indicated that a military response 
would be the most likely form of action. However, as the media continually reported the armed 
intervention policy option more so than other options, it was indirectly pushing government to respond 
in this way. Nevertheless, the overall impact of the media reporting Intervention as a solution to the 
Solomon Islands crisis is inconclusive. It appears the media did not push the government to act, but its 
reporting behaviour may have boosted public support for intervention and, in turn, possibly reduced 
the critical debate surrounding it. Even so, the public opinion and support aspect is not measured in 
this research, and therefore leaves an area for future examination.  
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Critical Perspectives towards Government Actions 
The manner a crisis is presented by the media can alter an audience’s interpretation and 
understanding of events “thereby helping or hindering an administration’s efforts to mo[u]ld public 
opinion.” 369  The media’s use of critical perspective towards government can support one policy 
approach while delegitimizing another. The Australian case used five critical perspectives towards 
government in the year leading up to RAMSI, whereas the New Zealand case used seven critical 
perspective frames.370 
 
Before completing the analysis, one further area that needs clarification is the inclusion of the 
Should Have Acted Sooner and Aid is Ineffective frames. The aforementioned frames criticize the 
Australian and New Zealand policy of financial aid contributions and non-intervention.  These two 
categories support intervention rather than challenge it, as they delegitimize the ‘hands-off’ approach 
and supportively frame an intervention. The way these frames challenged government’s hands-off 
approach to the Pacific created the platform to move towards a more involved role in the region.  This 
could explain why the Australian government offered only one critical statement, being the Aid is 
Ineffective frame, during the entire year leading up to RAMSI. However, the purpose of this section is 
to establish and analyse the range of debate between the media, government, and Parliament and 
therefore these categories fulfil this purpose.  
 
Critical Perspectives towards the Australian Government  
The range of debate on the Solomon Islands crisis used by the Australian media, government, 
and Parliament presents a number of critical perspectives towards the Australian policy in the year 
before RAMSI. While the Australian government and Parliament were united over military 
intervention in the Solomon Islands, it is natural that critical perspectives towards government should 
have arisen due to the social and economic costs of intervention and competing interests within 
government. The five critical perspectives from the Australian case study are displayed in Table 10 on 
the following page. 
 
The only critical frame that media, government, and Parliament each used was the Aid is 
Ineffective frame. This frame was first used by Kevin Rudd, Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 
September 2002 when he stated: “I regrettably conclude to the House that the use of $30 million of 
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Australian funds on the Solomon Islands police force has been a demonstrated failure.”371 The media 
did not present this frame until May 19th 2003, even though the Opposition had presented it on five 
occasions before this date. The government did not present the Aid is Ineffective frame until June 10th 
2003, after the Solomon Islands had commenced discussions for increased Australian assistance.372 
The government’s delayed criticism - that aid is an ineffective solution to the crisis - demonstrates that 
even though Parliament had expressed criticisms, these were largely ignored until the prospect of 
intervention was likely.  
 
Table 10: Critical Perspective towards Australian Government  
Criticism Media  Government Parliament  
 Frequency %  Frequency %  Frequency %  
Should Have Acted Sooner 0 0% 3 25% 1 33% 
Aid is ineffective 4 31% 9 75% 2 67% 
Lack of public debate 1 8% 0 0% 0 0% 
Inflame situation  2 15% 0 0% 0 0% 
Re-Colonize & Control 6 46% 0 0% 0 0% 
Total  13 100% 12 100% 3 100% 
 
The media did not apply the Should have Acted Sooner frame, although government used it at 
25% and Parliament at 33% frequency. These two frames are the only critical perspectives offered by 
government and Parliament. The Opposition proclaimed this failure in Parliament on June 10th 2003, 
while the government acknowledged this on June 26th, three days before the PIF meeting.  
 
The media utilised three critical frames that neither government nor Parliament discussed. The 
media’s use of the Re-colonize and Control, Lack of Public Debate, and Inflame Situation frames 
demonstrates independent media reporting, as the media moved beyond the debates of the political 
elite. These frames were sourced from individuals or groups independent of government, with the 
exception of one case. 
 
Critical frames from outside the political forum came from well-respected public figures, such 
as Archbishop Adrian Smith of Honiara. On July 7th 2003, after the PIF had approved regional 
intervention, Smith emphasised that internal resentment from Solomon Islands could come with 
foreign involvement: “Intervening in the Solomons without respect to social justice could make things 
worse … If it goes wrong, it could go very wrong. Feeling like ‘We’re being pushed aside’ or 
                                                     
371
 Australia, Ministerial Statements: Australia's Development Cooperation Program. (Canberra: House of 
Representatives, Hansard, 2002), 7097. 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Sol
omon%20Islands%20Kevin%20Rudd%202002%20Content%3A%22Solomon%20%22%20%20Date%3A01%2
F09%2F2002%20%3E%3E%2030%2F09%2F2002;rec=0;resCount=Default 
372
 Downer, "Our Failing Neighbor: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands." 
  
89 
‘Foreigners are taking out jobs’ can express themselves in ugly ways.” 373   This issue was not 
something the political elite had publicly deliberated on; however, public support within the Solomon 
Islands was fundamental to the success of foreign intervention.  
 
Regardless of the low levels of criticism towards government, in more cases then not the 
critical frames were presented within supportive frames. An example of this counterbalance is 
Professor Emeritus Helen Hughes who declared in the Daily Telegraph:  
There needs to be a lot more public debate about why Australia is sending police and 
soldiers to the Solomons to risk their lives… Are our troops to be peacekeepers of peace 
makers? How long will they stay? Unless we have an understanding of what needs to be 
done so our forces can one day be withdrawn they should not be sent.374 
However, Hughes followed this statement with “Australian troops have to go in.”375 This shows that 
there were divisions within the popular agreement outside government. Political forum debate failed to 
demonstrate such reservations to the intervention and, as the media reported perspectives from outside 
the political elite, it demonstrates that the media were moving beyond using the political elite as a cue 
for frames and perspectives.  
 
On two occasions the media sourced a Solomon Islands minister who opposed foreign 
intervention, demonstrating that the media did indeed source perspectives from outside of 
government.376 However, these received only a small level of attention in the media. Nevertheless, Mr 
Sogavare, the former Solomon Islands Prime Minister, expressed strong sentiments when he stated 
“[i]t’ll be nothing short of re-colonising this country... This honourable house is deliberately used as a 
puppet for overseas agendas.”377 What is interesting about Sogavare’s critical perspective is that it was 
not shared among many others. Nevertheless, the media were reporting beyond the debate within the 
political elite. Media behaviour shows that when there was consensus within the Australian political 
elite supporting foreign intervention, the media reported perspectives critical of government. This 
finding challenges previous arguments that media content reflected the level of criticism within the 
political elite, and provides an instance where the media can be shown to have independently reported 
alternative perspectives outside those in the political elite.   
 
 There is little consistency in the range of critical perspectives offered by the media, 
government, and Parliament, other than those that ultimately supported intervention by criticising 
previous responses.  There was only one critical perspective that was offered by all three groups. The 
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media went beyond the range of debate employed by government and Parliament by presenting three 
alternative perspectives. These do occur at low levels overall, but they do make up a large portion of 
all the critical perspectives.  
 
Critical Perspectives towards New Zealand Government Policy Action  
Critical perspectives towards the way government addressed the Solomon Islands crisis in the 
New Zealand media and Parliament demonstrates some consistency between the two, whereas 
government did not offer any critiques to current policy. The frequencies of critical frames are 
displayed in Table 11.378 Out of a total seven critical perspective categories that arose within the media 
and Parliament, the media published five and Parliament seven. 
 
Table 11: Critical Perspectives towards New Zealand Government  
Criticism Media  Parliament Government 
 
Frequency %  Frequency  % Frequency  % 
 
      
Impact on Police & Defence 3 20% 10 50% 0 0% 
Should Have Acted Sooner 0 0% 2 10% 0 
0 
0% 
Aid is ineffective 0 0% 1 5% 0% 
Alienate PICs 6 40% 4 20% 0 0% 
Re-Colonize & Control 2 13% 1 5% 0 0% 
Questionable Purpose  2 13% 1 5% 0 0% 
Bogged Down in Operation 2 13% 1 5% 0 0% 
Total  15 100% 20 100% 20 100% 
 
Three critical frames used by the media and Parliament show a greater degree of consistency. 
The Re-Colonise & Control, Questionable Purpose of Deployment, and Bogged Down in Operation 
frames each frequented Parliament at 5% (1 of 20), and 13% (2 of 15) in the media. These three 
frames indicate a similarity in the range of debate of critical perspectives used by the media and 
Parliament. There is also some consistency between media and Parliament in the way they used the 
negative Impact on Police & Defence and Alienate PICs frames. Regardless of the consistencies, 
variations between how and when the media and Parliament used critical frames are irrefutable.  
 
The three frames used by the media and Parliament show some similarity in the range of 
debate used by each. Parliament used the negative Impact on Police & Defence frame most frequently 
at 50%, while this frame was the media’s second most frequently used frame at 20%. On the other 
hand, the media published the Alienate PICs frame most frequently at 40%, and Parliament used it at 
20%, its second most frequently used frame. Thus, the frames Impact on Police & Defence and 
Alienate PICs were most commonly employed. However, the frequency of the employment varied 
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between the media and Parliament. The timing of media and Parliamentary use of these frames shows 
that Parliament used them well before the media. Parliament used 19 of its total 20 critical frames on 
July 1st 2003, when the House extensively debated the crisis and proposed solutions, whereas the 
media used 14 of the total 15 critical frames over July 9th – July 16th 2003. As Parliament utilised 
critical perspective over a week before the media this suggests that the cultural context did not 
influence simultaneous attention. As it was not cultural influences, such as public expectations for 
these critical perspectives to be discussed, the findings begin to eliminate the possibility of a ‘third 
factor’.  
 
The July 1st Parliamentary debate focused on the negative impact an intervention would have 
on the already strained police and defence force.379 However, when the media began reporting critical 
perspectives on July 9th 2003, its critical focus was on the possibility of an intervention Alienating 
PICs.380 It was not until July 16th that the media published the Negative Impact on Police and Defence 
frames.381 The media did not report the Negative Impact on Police and Defence frame until 16 days 
after Parliament had focused on it. This shows that the when the media finally began reporting 
critiques of government, the focus differed from Parliamentary debate.  
 
A consideration of the extensive July 1st 2003 Parliamentary debate in detail shows coalition 
government member Keith Locke bringing a number of criticisms to light. Locke raised the issue of 
whether New Zealand should contribute 2,000 military personnel to RAMSI and went on to say: “I 
think we have to be concerned that we could have too much overkill, in terms of military 
intervention.”382 Continuing from this, Locke cautioned that New Zealand “could draw hostility from 
the local population, which could make the situation worse.”383 Lastly, Locke stated “I have heard 
reports from Australia that it will put various Australians in the different ministries for the long term. I 
think we have to be a bit wary about being seen to dominate the Solomons.”384 Despite Locke’s 
concerns he was not quoted in the media. The only opposition minister quoted was Dr Wayne Mapp; 
although Mapp’s statement in the media occurred before the July 1st Parliamentary debate and was not 
critical of government.385 This demonstrates the media did not present alternative perspectives outside 
of government until after the intervention was informally confirmed by New Zealand and approved by 
the PIF. An examination of the use of these frames shows that there were other instances where the 
media reported critical frames a long time after the political elite expressed them.  
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The frequencies of critical frames applied by the media and government demonstrates that the 
media were focused on Alienating PICs, whereas Parliament was more concerned with what negative 
Impact on Police & Defence the intervention would have. Furthermore, the media did not present 
critical frames that justified government taking an increasingly forceful role in the Solomons. As the 
media avoided using the Should Have Acted Sooner and Aid is Ineffective frames, it shows that the 
media diverged from solely reporting on the perspectives of the political elite. Because media reports 
were on occasion independent of the perspectives of the political elite, the possibility of the media 
having indexed its coverage to the elite diminishes. These findings reject an Indexing Hypothesis. On 
the other hand, the media does not appear to report frames that challenge how government was 
addressing the crisis, outside of those already used by government. This diminishes the possibility that 
critical media coverage ‘pushed’ government into the Solomons more quickly than it would have 
desired, and removes any likelihood of a CNN Effect. Critical perspectives occurred in the media only 
after the political elite had used them first.  
 
Concluding the Australian and New Zealand Range of Debate 
 To summarise the range of debate, it is important to revisit the main purpose of section two: to 
determine if print news media coverage of the Solomon Islands crisis in the year preceding RAMSI 
reflected the range of debate in the elite forum. Problem frames in each of the Australian and New 
Zealand cases illustrate a high degree of similarity in the range of problem frames used by the media, 
government, and Parliament. When reporting problems regarding the Solomon Islands crisis, both the 
Australian and New Zealand experience demonstrate, to a degree, media indexing to the perspectives 
of the political elite. However, when considering the entire range of the debate to include the solution 
and criticism frames, the possibility of an Indexing Hypothesis diminishes.  
 
 Solution and criticism frames used in the Australian and New Zealand cases offer wider 
variance between the media, government, and Parliament than do the problems frames; however, some 
similarities in the frequencies of solution frame are still apparent. In the Australian case higher levels 
of consistency in the solution frames occurred between media and government. However, the critical 
frames used by the Australian media demonstrate a large degree of independent media reporting. The 
media did not appear to follow the political elite by avoiding critical perspectives. This action shows 
that when critical debate within political forums is limited or non-existent, the media offer alternative 
perspectives outside of political debate to provide a comprehensive and balanced picture of events.  
 
 The New Zealand use of solution and critical frames demonstrates some consistency between 
media and Parliament. However, the consistency does not entirely indicate that the media indexed its 
content to the perspectives of the political elite. In many instances, the media used frames long after 
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the political elite has used them, and the focus of particular solution and criticism frames differs over 
the year period. While some of the frequencies may demonstrate resemblances, the different timing of 
frames used shows that neither the media nor government entirely index its coverage to the other.  
Such a finding also eradicates the possibility of a ‘third factor’, where the cultural context influences 
the behaviour of the media and government.  
 
 In both the Australian and New Zealand studies greater media independence is evident than 
Indexing hypothesised. Even so, in both cases the media appear to have indexed their coverage to the 
perspectives of the political elite when describing the problem of the crisis. The debate takes shape 
when options are raised as to how a nation should respond, and when those options themselves are 
critiqued. This is where differences in the spectrum of debate is most importantly investigated. The 
reportage and coverage of the solutions and critical frames used by the media, government, and 
Parliament to address the Solomon Islands crisis, offer an interesting insight to journalistic behaviour 
in Australia and New Zealand. In the Australian case, the media selected solutions and government 
critiques that they considered important and worthy of acknowledgement. Thus, the media did not 
filter challenges to consensus opinion, and published critical opinions regardless of the exclusion of 
these opinions in political debate. The findings in both cases, question the use of dissent from, and 
consensus with, political institutions as an indicator of Indexing. In the Australian case consensus for 
intervention was apparent due to the one critical statement offered in Parliament, which ultimately 
supported the intervention. The New Zealand case on the other hand showed only minor levels of 
dissent around particular aspects of the intervention, such as the level of ground force. Regardless of 
these low levels of dissent, the Australian case showed a number of frames critical of government 
actions outside what was offered within the political elite forum. New Zealand presented similar 
frames, to a degree; however, there was greater focus on the possibility of New Zealand alienating 
PICs. Test four will consider further media critiques of government, focusing on the origin of the 
critiques in relation to sources.  
 
 
Test Three: The Media’s use of Sources 
The media use sources to legitimise the substance of a story, present alternative perspectives, 
and indicate where information is acquired. The media’s use of sources can influence the content of 
news articles and how an audience interprets issues. Test three considers the range of sources used in 
the Australian and New Zealand news media, together with the frequency and direction of the sources, 
in order to comprehend the nature of journalistic routines and practises in the year preceding RAMSI. 
Analysing the media’s use of sources can highlight whether some are relied on more than others. The 
level of government sourcing compared to alternative sources can identify the way the media-
government relationship operates. Consideration will also be given to the use of sources during times 
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of key government activity to help determine if certain ‘times’ call for certain opinions. For example, 
when government activity occurs does the media decrease the level of non-government sources and 
increase Government sources? Conversely, when government activity declines, does the media 
instigate alternative sources? The direction of the source – e.g. is it supportive, challenging, mixed, or 
neutral towards government policy - is vitally important to the way media frame news stories.386 
 
Sources in the Australian media 
The Australian media used five types of sourced opinions in the year preceding RAMSI. 
These include sources from the Australian Government, Opposition, Independent, the New Zealand 
Government, and the Solomon Islands Government. The frequencies and percentage values of the 
media’s application of these five sources are displayed in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Australian Media Sourced Opinions Frequency 
Source Frequency Percentage 
Government 69 59% 
Opposition Government 8 6.8% 
Independent 20 17.1% 
New Zealand Government 2 1.7% 
Solomon Islands Government 18 15.4% 
Total 117 100% 
 
Australian Government sources were the most frequently used in the media, totalling 59% of 
all sources.  A distant second to this was Independent sources at 17.1% followed by Solomon Islands 
Government sources at 15.4%. This shows that while Government sources were used at the highest 
frequency, alternative sources were also utilised. Below Table 13 illustrates the direction and 
frequency of the use of sources in the Australian media.  
 
Table 13: Australian Media Sourced Opinions and Direction 
 
Sourced Opinion 
Direction 
Total Support Mixed Opposition Neutral 
Government 65% 0% 0% 35% 100% 
Opposition Government 62% 25% 13% 0% 100% 
Independent 25% 10% 20% 45% 100% 
NZ Government 50% 0% 0% 50% 100% 
Solomon Islands Government 61% 0% 11% 28% 100% 
 
In the year preceding RAMSI the media relied heavily on Government sources. This is 
demonstrated in the frequency with which these sources were used. From July 2002 until late April 
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2003 the frequency of Government sourcing was lower than after April 2003. A large degree of 
Government sourcing appears to demonstrate a closer media - government relationship. This 
behaviour is not unusual as the government share information and perspectives for publicity, and the 
media utilise this readily available information. Yet, when there is an exceptionally high level of 
Government sourcing, as demonstrated in the Australian media, it is somewhat troubling. When the 
media is saturated with official Government sources, this encourages less demand for alternative 
voices. It also primes the audience to understand the crisis from the government’s perspective. Such 
instances of saturated Government sourcing have the effect of reinforcing government policy and 
building support for it.  
 
Test one and two argue that while there was some evidence of media indexing to political elite 
perspectives there are more instances of media independence. So, how does media independence occur 
when there is heavy Government sourcing? The media do apply Government sources at a high 
frequency, totalling 59% for the year. Of this 59%, one third was neutral and therefore do not support 
or challenge government policy. The media can select a more prominent way to frame a story, 
independent from government perspectives, while still using neutral government sources to provide 
information. For example, a Herald Sun article begins with “[a] team of officials will make an urgent 
dash to the Solomon Islands next week to pave the way for a possible Australian-led police 
operation”,387 while Downer is quoted as cautioning: “without action the Solomons could cease to 
exist as a functioning state.” 388  In this way the media is seen to use Government sources for 
information, while framing the story in a ‘newsworthy’ way. 
 
When the media source from the Opposition it shows them using a range of political elite 
sources to reflect the entire political debate. The media used Opposition sources at a low 6.8% of all 
opinions. The only period the media used Opposition sources was between June 12th and July 1st 2003, 
with the exception of July 23rd 2003 when Simon Crean offered his support for the intervention.389 
During this 19-day period key government activity occurred. This included: the Scoping Mission 
conducted to make an assessment of the Solomon Islands; the Australian government indicating its 
willingness to intervene in the Solomon Islands if it could gain regional approval; and the New 
Zealand government indicating its willingness to work with Australia. Significant government activity 
created an opportunity for alternative perspectives in the media, and the media utilised Opposition 
sources during this time. The timing of key government actions by both Australia and New Zealand 
appears to have influenced the use of sources in the media. However, Opposition sources do not 
appear to have increased, or even to have appeared in the media after debates within the House. Such 
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media behaviour shows that it was not necessarily political debate that influenced the type of sources 
used, rather it was government activity that was more sensational than the members debating in the 
House. For this reason, the media do not appear to have indexed their coverage to the perspective of 
the political elite and this reduces the possibility of an Indexing Hypothesis. So, what does appear to 
be occurring? By considering the media’s use of Independent sources we can provide a better 
understanding of this question.  
 
 The Australian media used New Zealand Government sources on two occasions, with one 
source opposing intervention and one supporting it. This was a very low level overall. New Zealand 
Government sources were not used in the media until New Zealand committed to the intervention on 
June 25th 2003. This shows that the timing of policy decisions – even if they were foreign decisions – 
appear to influence the level of sourcing.  
 
 The Solomon Islands Government was sourced on 18 occasions in the year period. During 
this time there were two sourced opinions that opposed the intervention and while that is not a large 
number, two whole stories were centred on this policy challenge. The sources that opposed the 
intervention came from a Solomon Islands Parliamentary member, Manasseh Sogavare.390 Sogavare 
was the only person unequivocally to oppose foreign intervention in the Solomon Islands.  This 
highlights an interesting point about the use of sources in the media. The media provides an individual 
with a platform to express an opinion that may not be the opinion of others or of a dominant group. 
This demonstrates the ambiguity of sourcing individual opinions, as one opinion can appear more 
‘valuable’ or to hold more ‘weight’ than it is actually worth.  The media is viewed as a source of 
information for the public and therefore the public or audience may interpret one person’s opinion as a 
dominant opinion, when it is not.  
 
The use of Independent sources would suggest that the media appear to seek alternative 
perspectives outside of government. As Independent sources were the second most frequently used 
source, this begins to demonstrate media independence. Once the decision to intervene in the Solomon 
Islands was reported in the media, confirmed by government, and granted approval by the PIF, 
Independent sources notably decreased in the media whereas government sources increased. Such a 
finding appears to demonstrate that before the decision to intervene had been finalised the Australian 
media reported more independently by offering sources outside of the political elite. Independent 
sources were more challenging against intervention, indicating a reverse CNN Effect. What is more 
interesting is that Independent sources were the most critical of government policy. One possibility for 
this type of media behaviour is that there was little criticism within political forums on the way 
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government was addressing the crisis, apart from frames that critiqued previous methods and therefore 
supported intervention. The media sought alternative perspectives that both offered a range of 
opinions and neutral information. It is evident that the media relied heavily on Australian Government 
sources in its coverage of the Solomon Islands during 2002 and 2003. The media and government 
demonstrated a closer relationship than the media and any other type of source. Nevertheless, media 
independence is evident during times of prevalent government activity.  
 
 When the media report autonomously, using a range of Independent sources, media 
impartiality is demonstrated. Given the level of Government sources in the media, there is a possibility 
of a CNN Effect, even if this possibility is mild. Nevertheless, in this instance, the media did not 
appear to be attempting to influence policy by using sources. Had journalists felt compelled to bring 
attention to the crisis and the government’s were handling of it, higher volumes of sources opposing 
government policy would have been apparent. Out of the total 117 sourced opinions, only 7 opposed 
government action or intervention; a very low number overall. Furthermore, the previous test shows a 
very low level of criticism within the political forum. For these reasons the possibility of a CNN effect 
having occurred decreases, since opposition or challenges to government policy did not appear to 
occur before government altered its policy. Test one demonstrates that it was the political elite that 
placed the Solomon Islands on the agenda. The media were not pushing the agenda by using 
Independent sources, but rather providing various opinions from outside the political forum. This 
shows that while the media relied, to a degree, on Government sources, it also made use of sources 
that reflected the debates both inside and outside the political elite.  
 
Sources in the New Zealand media  
The New Zealand media used five types of sourced opinions in the year preceding RAMSI. 
The types of sources were Government, Opposition, Independent, the Australian Government, and the 
Solomon Islands Government.391 The frequencies and percentage value that the media applied across 
these five sources are displayed in Table 14.  
 
Table 14: New Zealand Media Sourced Opinions Frequency 
Source Frequency Percentage 
Government 48 39% 
Opposition Government 4 3.3% 
Independent 18 14.6% 
Australian Govt.  31 25.2% 
Solomon Islands Govt. 22 17.9% 
Total 123 100% 
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The media used Government sources most frequently at 39%. While the majority of sources 
came from Government, this group does not entirely saturate the media as an additional 61% for 
sourced opinions come from the remaining four groups. Government sources are important in the 
media as they inform the public of significant issues, such as foreign crises and interventions. On the 
other hand, alternative opinions are just as important to legitimise policy. Table 15 on the following 
page illustrates the frequency and direction of sources in the New Zealand media.  
 
The New Zealand media used Australian sources between July 2002 and May 2003. They 
were most heavily used during June 2003 and began to decline during July 2003. The use of 
Australian sources in the New Zealand media demonstrates that the media utilised information on the 
crisis from Australia when New Zealand decision-makers were in the policy formation process and 
little government activity was occurring. It was logical for the media to source Australia, as decisions 
were made in Australia before New Zealand, and Australia publicly encouraged New Zealand to join 
its efforts. The Solomon Islands directly approached and held discussions with Australia, and 
Australia indicated that it would assist the Solomons earlier than New Zealand. 392  Furthermore, 
Australian sources were generally supportive of direct assistance in the Solomon Islands and first 
pressured, then reinforced, New Zealand’s commitment for intervention. The media’s use of 
Australian sources demonstrates independence from the New Zealand elite perspective; however, 
these sources supported direct assistance from New Zealand.  
 
Table 15: New Zealand Media Sourced Opinions and Direction 
Direction  
Sourced Opinions Support Mixed Opposition Neutral Total  
Government 59% 4% 0% 19% 100% 
Opposition Government 25% 0% 75% 0% 100% 
Independent 33% 11% 0% 56% 100% 
Australian Government 77% 3% 0% 20% 100% 
Solomon Islands Government  59% 0% 4% 37% 100% 
 
New Zealand and Australian Government sources in the media occurred at relatively 
consistent levels in the two months leading up to the intervention, as this was the period both 
governments indicated that intervention was probable. It was also the juncture when the media’s use 
of Independent sources began to decline.  Independent sources were the only source that remained 
consistent from July 2002 until May 2003. Yet, they occurred at a lower level than most of the other 
sources and higher than Opposition Government sources. The low frequency of Independent sources is 
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interesting, as it has been argued that Independent or ‘expert’ sources, such as academics, think tanks, 
and NGO’s, are often thought to exhibit less bias than sources from government, and legitimise news 
stories and perspectives.393  Yet, the high use of foreign sources, particularly Australian sources, 
reduces the demand for the media to use sources outside of the New Zealand elite. 
 
Opposition sources occurred at a staggeringly low level. Of the four sourced opinions in the 
media, one supported government policy and three opposed it. This is a high level of opposition from 
one group. The Opposition were sourced once, on June 30th 2003, the day of the PIF meeting, and 
again on July 16th 2003. Opposition sources were used at a surprisingly low level after the important 
July 1st Parliamentary debate. The Opposition represents a large portion of New Zealand society and 
its role is to challenge government on important issues. By ignoring the opinions of the Opposition, 
the media is failing to fulfil its democratic duty to represent the range of views within society. This is 
an example of how the media can control information in the news and as a result can include, or in this 
case exclude, particular opinions.394  When the media use vey low levels of Opposition sources, this 
offers two possibilities to the media’s behaviour. On the one hand, it could indicate that the media 
utilise its relationship with the government (executive) more so than the entire political debate. 
Alternatively, it could indicate that the media did not reflect the political forum, as it was limited. 
Therefore, the media used alternative sources from outside the New Zealand political elite to gather 
information and perspectives. Looking at the media’s use of sources during times of key government 
activity begins to clarify what best explains the media-government relationship.   
 
 Following a number of government actions the media sourced a range of perspectives. The 
day after Australia and New Zealand announced military intervention it appears likely that the media 
used Government, Independent, and Australian Government sources. Another key government action 
that appeared to increase sourcing from the Opposition was the government’s official announcement it 
would contribute to the regional intervention on July 15th 2003.395 The following day the media used 
Government, Opposition, and Independent sources. After key government actions such as the 
Parliamentary debate on July 1st 2003 that confirmed some dissent within the political elite, the media 
failed to source alternative perspectives other than those of government. When dissent within the 
political elite became apparent in the July 1st 2003 Parliamentary debate, the media failed to report this 
and instead increased Government sourcing. It appears that the media overlooked the perspectives of 
the Opposition during this time, and focused on the escalating law and order situation within the 
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Solomons, frequently sourcing from the Solomon Islands Government. The emerging dissent within 
the political elite compared to the use of sources in the media, shows that the media did not regularly 
index its coverage to the debates within political forums, and was more inclined to mirror government 
perspectives. When no, or low, levels of government activity occurred the media were more inclined 
to offer alternative perspectives.   
 
 The elite forum debate was limited, with four of the five Parliamentary debates, after the 
decision to intervene had been established. The media used Opposition sources in low frequencies. 
However, the direction of the sources reflected the Parliamentary debate by highlighting critiques to 
the intervention. New Zealand and Australian Government sources were most relied on in the New 
Zealand media. The limited political elite debate could also contribute to the explanation of the media 
frequently using Australian and Solomon Islands sources, which were not always supportive and, in 
many cases, were used for informative purposes by presenting neutral facts.  
 
The use of foreign government sources (Australian and Solomon Islands) could also demonstrate 
media independence from the perspectives of the political elite. The media were moving beyond the 
executive debate by sourcing information from alternative sources. The findings hitherto are not 
sufficiently substantial to indicate the presence of an Indexing Hypothesis and indicate a close media-
government relationship, with instances of media independence. This does not indicate the presence of 
a CNN Effect however; if this were the case there would be higher levels of sources challenging 
government in order to gain policy attention.  
 
 The media’s use of sources compared to test two’s findings gives greater understanding of the 
New Zealand media’s behaviour when reporting foreign intervention. The media predominantly 
framed the solutions to the crisis as Intervention or Armed Intervention, while government conducted a 
balanced debate over the range of solutions. Parliament also used the Intervention frame most 
frequently, although the political elite debate occurred after government indicated intervention was 
probable. So it must be asked, why did the media frame the solutions in a closer narrative to 
Parliament than to government, while sourcing more from government than Parliament? It appears 
that while the government did not use the Intervention frame most frequently, it did discuss this as an 
option to the crisis, and the media used these instances for direct quotes. Government actions produced 
more information that was readily available, and this information occurred in a greater volume than 
alternative sources. Thus, the media had a ready flow of information to source from. Test two also 
posits that the New Zealand media appeared to report the most dramatic response option, and could 
therefore select quotes that better framed Intervention as being the most appropriate response option. 
The media’s use of sensational frames could also begin to explain the high frequency of Australian 
Government sources. Australia indicated it would assist the Solomon Islands in a comprehensive 
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military intervention in mid June 2003, and the media used Australian Government sources most 
frequently throughout June. The media went to where current information originated, rather than 
relying solely on the perspectives of the New Zealand political elite, whilst independently selecting the 
narrative in which to frame possible solutions.  
 
Comparing Australian and New Zealand Media Sourcing  
Australia and New Zealand predominantly used five categories of sources, yet the levels of each 
varied considerably. The percentage of the Australian and New Zealand media’s use of sources is 
compared below in Table 16. While Government sources were the most heavily used in corresponding 
media, the Australian Government was sourced more frequently than the New Zealand government. 
The New Zealand media used Australian Government sources at a much higher level than the 
Australian media used the New Zealand Government sources. As Australian policy decision-making 
took place before New Zealand, it appears to have impacted on the use of foreign sources.  
 
Table 16: Comparing Australian and New Zealand Media’s Sourced Opinions 
Source AUS % NZ % 
Government 59% 39% 
Opposition Government 6.8% 3.3% 
Independent 17.1% 14.6% 
Corresponding Government NZ = 1.7% AUS = 25.2% 
Solomon Islands Govt.  15.4% 17.9% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Returning to the research question for this section: how and to what degree were various 
sources used in the media when covering the Solomon Islands crisis and subsequent intervention? Test 
three reveals some interesting findings. The Australian case indicates the media utilised its relationship 
with Government when sourcing opinions and information on the crisis. This is demonstrated by the 
high level at which Government was sourced in the media, compared to the low level non-government 
opinions were sourced. Consequently, the degree of opposition towards government’s direct 
involvement was marginalised and, in turn, allowed those government perspectives and opinions that 
supported direct involvement to take centre stage.  
 
The New Zealand media similarly sourced Government more often than any other source, 
although the Australian Government was sourced at a higher level than that at which the Australian 
media sourced the New Zealand Government.  As both governments were sourced with generally 
supportive opinions and no opposition to direct involvement, they mutually reinforced the perspective 
of the political elite within New Zealand. The use of Opposition sources supports this. The Opposition 
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in each country was sourced at the lowest frequency levels by both countries’ media, although the New 
Zealand media used it at an extremely low level of 3.3% compared to 6.8% in the Australian media. 
 
 The media of both countries relied heavily on Government sources, more so than any other 
source. This was more evident in the Australian media than the New Zealand media. On the other 
hand, the New Zealand media sourced a greater level of Australian Government sources than the 
Australian media sourced the New Zealand Government. Key government actions often prompt the 
media to source government opinions and perspectives. Australia is the largest nation in the Pacific in 
terms of size and wealth, and power-relations in the Pacific regions, and this has appeared to play out 
in the media. Australia declared its commitment of intervening in the Solomon Islands before New 
Zealand, and the New Zealand media reported the significance of this decision, knowing this could 
affect decision-makers. Thus, Australian sources were utilised in the New Zealand media. These main 
findings demonstrate that at times the media-government relationship operates closely, by using 
government sources to present current information. Nevertheless, there are instances of media 
independence, where the media do not have to use Governments sources, and gather information and 
perspective from those outside the political arena.  
 
 
Test Four: Critical Perspectives in the Media – Correlation or Marginalization? 
Democracy demands that journalists offer independent, objective, and balanced opinions.396 
However, when it comes to reporting issues that have had little or no debate within political forums 
due to bipartisan support, maintaining the appearance of balanced journalism becomes difficult. In 
such circumstances the media are more likely to report the ‘execution and outcome’ of a policy, rather 
than ‘wisdom and justification’.397  In these instances, and using the US as an example, Mermin argues 
that “[w]hen there is no policy debate in Washington, reporters offer critical analysis inside the terms 
of Washington consensus, finding a critical angle in the possibility that existing policy, on its own 
terms, might not work.”398 Media criticism is centred on the “ability of the government to achieve the 
goals it has set.”399 This shows why investigating critical perspectives in the media are imperative to 
the evaluation of the media-government relationship. This phenomenon is evident in both Australian 
and New Zealand reportage of the Solomon Islands crisis and intervention in 2003.  
 
The Australian and New Zealand Parliaments did not thoroughly debate the Solomon Islands 
crisis until after each government had indicated its willingness to provide direct assistance. When 
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debates finally did take place, each Parliament declared bipartisan support; however, there were low 
levels of criticism in the New Zealand government regarding the size of the taskforce (execution). The 
near unanimous support within each Parliament highlights the importance of origin and frequency of 
critical perspective published in the media, compared to that of the political elite. This section operates 
around Mermin’s guiding principle to test an Indexing Hypothesis, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 4: 
“critical perspectives do not just increase from a reasonable baseline in the news when there is debate 
in Washington, but instead are ignored or marginalized in the news if not first expressed in 
Washington.”400 To identify if the media independently report critical perspectives, or if they index 
these to the opinions of the political elite, critical perspectives in the news are analysed to identify the 
origin of these perspectives.  
 
It is routine for the issues raised by government to make news. This explains why the media 
tend to use government sources. Critical perspectives that first arise in the media when there is 
consensus within the elite, makes for interesting analysis. This section considers the relevance of 
origin and frequency of critical perspectives, compared to those in the elite forum. A descriptive 
analysis of tone and character of media reporting also requires consideration in order to best clarify 
critical perspectives. Table 17 on the following page presents the number and percentage of critical, 
supportive, neutral, and mixed paragraphs that occurred in the Australian and New Zealand media 
during the year period leading up to RAMSI in July 2003.  
 
Table 17: Critical Paragraphs within the Media 
Paragraph  Australia New Zealand  
Direction Frequency Percentage  Frequency Percentage  
Critical 13 1.6% 15 1.5% 
Supportive 139 17.5% 104 10.3% 
Neutral  623 78% 864 86% 
Mixed 23 2.9% 23 2.2% 
Total  798 100% 1001 100% 
 
 The number of paragraphs in all media articles that referred to the crisis equates to the total 
paragraphs. Within the total paragraphs the number of critical, supportive, neutral, and mixed 
paragraphs are identified.401  For a paragraph to be considered critical it must oppose government 
policy. Thus, a statement that has mixed (supportive and critical) opinions is not considered critical in 
this case. 
 
The Significance of Critical Perspective in the Australian Media 
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 In the year leading up to RAMSI the Australian media published five different critical 
perspectives paragraph categories. The critical perspectives are published in 13 paragraphs, out of a 
total of 798. 402  Therefore, critical paragraphs in Australian newspapers represented 1.6% of all 
paragraphs, a relatively low level. Previous studies on other interventions reveal that during times of 
Washington conflict, when there is a divide within the house over government policy, higher levels of 
critical perspectives, between 7 - 16.9%, occur.403 During times of Washington consensus (bipartisan 
support) lower levels of critical perspectives, between 1.6 - 3.2%, are revealed.404 This demonstrates 
that the low level of critical perspectives in Australian media is routine.  
 
 The first critical perspective towards Australian policy was directed at the former aid policy, 
rather than the armed intervention policy. Nonetheless, the critical perspective that implied Aid is 
Ineffective in addressing the Solomon Islands issues was raised in Parliament as early as September 
2002 and again on May 12th 2003. The media engaged the same critical perspective on May 19th 2003, 
after Parliament first expressed it. The similarities between the media, government, and Parliament 
depart here.  
 
 As test two demonstrates, problem frames (justification) for direct Australian assistance in the 
Solomon Islands were offered within a similar debate by the media, government, and Parliament. Law 
and order in the Solomon Islands began deteriorating in 2002 and early 2003, threatening the 
Australian national interest. The legal critique of Australian intervention was limited as the PIF 
granted approval citing the Biketawa Declaration, and the Solomon Islands National Government 
legally invited regional assistance. Nevertheless, there were three critical perspectives offered by the 
Australian media, but not articulated by the Australian political elite. These included the Lack of 
public debate, Inflame situation, and Re-colonise and control frames. The media’s use of these three 
frames reveals that the media reported perspectives outside of government, and most significantly 
outside of Parliamentary debate.  
 
The first and most predominantly used critique by the media that was not articulated by the 
political elite was the claim, on June 12th 2003, that armed intervention was a move to Re-colonise and 
Control the Solomon Islands.  This critical perspective suggested Australian policy embraced ‘neo-
colonial goals’ rather than indicating dissent within the political elite.405  However, the media claimed 
that, while the intervention could be perceived in this light, the request for assistance was initiated by 
the Solomon Islands rather than by Australia or New Zealand. Therefore, it was the ‘lesser of two 
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evils’.406The media positioned critical frames within supportive frames as justification for intervention 
was within legal boundaries and regional obligations. Thus, the media published frames generally 
supporting Australian government action. The ratio of critical to supportive frames was 1:11 and the 
ratio of critical to neutral frames was 1:49. This shows that the media used a relatively low level of 
critical perspectives towards government policy while covering the Solomon Islands crisis. The media 
were generally reporting neutral perspectives, followed by supportive, however, they moved beyond 
the debate of the political elite by presenting alternative critical perspectives and reporting 
independently.  
 
An additional example of the media using a critical perspective from outside elite debate is 
found in an opinion piece in the Sydney Morning Herald on July 7th 2003.407 In this article, Honiara’s 
Catholic Archbishop Adrian Smith, argued that intervention in the Solomon Islands could Inflame the 
Situation and possibly turn the crisis into a downward spiral of turmoil.408 However, as the article 
progressed, Smith stated that the urgent nature of affairs in the Solomons required foreign 
intervention, although extreme caution was needed. This is the only instance where the Inflame the 
Situation perspective was expressed. This was an opinion piece and shows that media reportage of a 
critical perspective within a supportive frame was not the result of indexing to the political elite, but 
part of the general debate on the crisis.  
 
Following Smith’s July 7th opinion piece, the media published four stories, three of which 
contained significant critical content. Of the 13 critical statements voiced in the Australian media over 
the year period, five occurred on July 10th2003. The five paragraphs all claimed armed intervention 
was a move to Re-colonise and Control the Solomons, the highest number of critical perspectives on 
any one-day. These five critical perspective paragraphs came from an Australian left wing socialist 
group. The group were publicly pressuring Australia to withdraw intervention commitments by 
claiming that such a move was in the business interests of Australia, rather than from a security or 
moral standing.409  This article could be seen as an example of the media seeking balanced opinions 
towards government policy, when little debate within the political elite is conducted. However, in this 
case it appears this critical perspective was indeed worthy of media attention as the article followed a 
march on the Department of Foreign Affairs in protest of government policy.   
 
The critical perspectives in the media depart from the perspectives expressed in the elite 
forum debates; however, the tone of these critical perspectives is often framed alongside more 
dominant counter frames, which lessen the significance of the critique. The media appear to present 
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critical frames outside those expressed by the political elite, and so demonstrate a degree of media 
independence from the political elite debate. Consensus within the political forum over armed 
intervention in the Solomon Islands indicates why these three frames occur at such low levels in the 
media. Had the media mirrored its coverage to the political elite then media content would have 
imitated the critical perspectives of the political elite; and therefore would have placed greater 
attention on the Should have acted sooner and Aid is ineffective frames. This does not appear to have 
occurred.  
 
Overall, the possibility of the media indexing its critical perspectives to the political elite is 
limited and indicates greater media independence.  However, it appears the media’s goal was not to 
undermine or contest government policy, but rather present debates around the intervention, regardless 
how limited some of them may have been. This is commensurate with the evidence from test two that 
supports media independence when critiquing government policy, and that appears to reduce the 
chance of media indexing to the perspectives of the political elite. Had the media been indexing its 
coverage, the media would have offered few critical perspectives in line with the political elite. While 
test two argues that the media offer more sensational responses to a crisis, such as Armed Intervention 
frames, the critique for such a response is not limited to the political elite. While the media-
government relationship does reveal some overlap, overall the Australian media do at times look 
beyond the political elite for alternative perspectives.  
 
The Significance of Critical Perspectives in the New Zealand Media 
New Zealand Parliamentary members claimed to be unanimously united over intervention, as 
expressed by opposition government member Dr Wayne Mapp: “it is a rare occasion when the entire 
House – certainly, it must be a first time in my experience – supports a deployment. Not a single party 
has said that this deployment should not take place.”410 However, members of the Opposition were the 
first to express critical perspectives towards the execution and outcome of government policy, with 
similar critical media coverage following this. The New Zealand media published 15 critical 
paragraphs towards government in the year leading up to RAMSI, representing 1.5% of all paragraphs. 
As discussed in the Australian case, this level of critical perspectives is reasonable when there is 
bipartisan support for intervention.411 An analysis of tone and character identifies the differences 
between media content and the critical perspectives in Parliament.  
 
Critical paragraphs in the media were used throughout July 2003, following an extensive 
Parliamentary debate on July 1st 2003. The debate was one of two where the government conducted 
critical perspectives. These included seven different critical perspective categories totalling 15 critical 
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paragraphs. While critical perspective in the media appeared to follow Parliamentary debate, the origin 
of these appeared to come from a range of sources, including a number from sources independent of 
the political elite.  
 
The media focused its critical attention on whether the policy was likely to work (execution 
and outcome) rather than justifying why the previous policy did not work, which was defined in the 
Should have acted sooner and Aid is Ineffective frames. The media first offered critical perspectives 
following the July 1st Parliamentary debate and the perspectives varied over four days and eight media 
articles. In eight of the 15 critical paragraphs published in the media, they were followed with more 
neutral opinions that altered the salience of the media article. This is not surprising as the ratio of 
critical to neutral paragraphs is 1:58. An example of how critical perspectives were published 
alongside more neutral statements comes from the first critical perspectives that occurred on July 9th 
2003. The article opened with, “Foreign Affairs Minister Phil Goff has acknowledged a risk of New 
Zealand and Australian forces alienating the Solomon Islands if their job restoring order drags on too 
long.”412 This was followed with a quote from Goff: “That’s why we’re not macho about it, we’re not 
gung-ho about it, we’re not rushing in.”413 The media published the impending intervention using 
similar critical perspectives expressed within the political forum. This differed from the far more 
measured and reserved way in which the government were describing the situation and its approach. 
Here the media appear to be reporting different sides of the debate within the norm of objective 
journalism.  
 
The level of critical perspectives in the media is relatively low compared to the total number 
of supportive paragraphs addressing the Solomon Islands crisis, with a ratio of 1:7. The critical 
perspectives that did arise in the media were not only similar to the critical perspectives made by the 
political elite, but were also primarily published within content which supported the intervention.  
 
In the 7 media articles offering critical perspectives, the perspectives originated from a variety 
of sources, including Government, Opposition, Foreign Governments, and Independent sources.414 
Goff expressed a number of concerns as late as July 9th, although he was not the sole critic. A PNG 
minister, as well as one Solomon Islands minister and an independent defence expert, also critiqued 
the impending intervention.415 The critiques used in the media were similar to the political elite debate. 
However, the media independently sought perspectives that challenged government policy from non-
government sources. Australian Strategic Policy Institute member, Aldo Borgu, argued “[e]veryone is 
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concerned about getting bogged  down in the operation, because once the troops are there it’s going to 
be a lot more difficult to withdraw them.”416In the July 1st debate the political elite expressed this same 
perspective. However, the main focus of the elite debate was on the impact the intervention would 
have on the domestic police force. Additionally, the media reported PNG’s warning to Australia that 
“any heavy-handed approach would alienate Pacific neighbours, jeopardising support for any 
intervention.”417 While the political elite debate covered a range of issues, the media were not confined 
to only the elite perspective, and possibly published alternative sources as a way to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of the elite debate.  
 
 Test two demonstrates inconsistencies between the media and Parliament in the way they 
critiqued government policy. While there were similarities in the range of frames applied by the 
media, government, and Parliament, there was a delay of up to two weeks between Parliamentary 
debates and these issues being published in media coverage. The government were more measured in 
offering detailed information to the media, whereas the media published a range of perspectives on the 
intervention. This supports the findings from test two, which argues that, while there were some 
similarities in the way government was critiqued the media were more independent in finding 
perspectives outside of government.  
 
The media do not appear to have published challenges to government prior to Parliament 
debating the crisis. From a theoretical standpoint the findings begin to reduce the occurrence of a CNN 
Effect, as the media do not push for policy attention or place the crisis on the agenda. It is the political 
elite that appears to do both these things, in addition to offering critiques to government action and 
inaction prior to media coverage. While many of the perspectives appear to be initially expressed 
within political forums, the media do not appear to have directly indexed critical perspectives to those 
of the political elite. There was delayed timing in the media’s use of these perspectives. Government 
actions did not directly initiate critical media coverage; it took public debates to press for a more 
comprehensive media story. This is evident in the media’s use of critical perspectives independent 
from the political forum, which demonstrates the debates taking place in the public sphere.  Such 
media coverage demonstrates greater media independence in its critical reporting of governments 
handling of the Solomon Island’s crisis. While the media do use government sources, these do not 
appear to concentrate the media coverage, nor do they appear identical in media coverage.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This research set out to analyse the extent to which the Australian and New Zealand print 
media led, challenged, or followed government agendas and framing in the year prior to the 2003 
RAMSI intervention. To demonstrate the media-government relationship, the Indexing Hypothesis, 
CNN Effect, and related theories and their operationalization were investigated. For an Indexing 
Hypothesis to occur, the media index coverage to the perspectives of the political elite. This results 
from the interaction and information sharing procedures between the media and political elite. 
Indexing could be described as a ‘mirror effect’ between media and government frames. To 
demonstrate an Indexing Hypothesis, there must be a high degree of similarity in the range of debate 
utilised by both media and government, as well as a high level of political elite sourcing by the media. 
On the other hand, a CNN Effect would show the media itself placing the crisis on the political 
agenda, ‘pushing for’ or urging policy attention; media coverage in such circumstances would precede 
political activity. A CNN Effect requires the media to either influence the political agenda or 
challenge the perspectives of the political elite with emotive framing, compelling audiences and 
political actors to act.  
 
Addressing limitations within the current media-government literature 
This research has attempted to address the limitations of previous research, by including the 
use of foreign sources, finding a way to compare critical debates, and comprehensively analysing the 
entire range of debate. The investigation of sources in previous media-government literature focused 
on particular aspects of sources in the media such as the frequency and direction of sources,418 the 
significance of foreign sources, 419  and the significance of critical sources. 420  This research has 
combined each of these areas for a more comprehensive approach to examining sourcing in the 
Australian and New Zealand media.  
 
Within current media-government literature the significance of elite dissensus and policy 
uncertainty of a potential CNN Effect is noted.421The ambiguity of these factors however, makes them 
difficult to identify, and problematic to measure or demonstrate. While this research does not attempt 
to measure elite dissensus, it does draw similarities in the range of critical debate used by media and 
the political elite to establish the media-government relationship. In doing so, a link is drawn between 
the level and type of criticism towards government in the media and political forums.  
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 While this study employs and amalgamates elements from different approaches for a more 
systematic method, it has its own limitations. Investigating the media beyond print to include televised 
or online publications, and considering the stages after the deployment of troops, could have allowed 
for a more diverse and deeper investigation. While comparing the Australian and New Zealand media-
government relationship has been useful to understand reporting in the South Pacific, more than one 
case study of a Pacific crises could assist testing the validity of the research, such as Australian and 
New Zealand involvement in the Bougainville or the UN-led deployment to East Timor. Additionally, 
the investigation of various types of crises in the Pacific, such as PNGs fight for autonomy, could 
develop a better understanding of media-government relations related to foreign policy issues. On a 
methodological level, this research has not systematically addressed the on-going issue of measuring 
consensus or dissent of the political elite or policy certainty. While this was not an issue this thesis 
attempted to address, it remains a fruitful area for future research.  
 
The media-government relationship in Australia and New Zealand  
What do the findings from the four tests tell us about this study’s research questions regarding 
the media-government relationship in Australia and New Zealand? The time-sequence of Australian 
and New Zealand media coverage and government actions reveals a clear pattern in which political 
elite activity precedes print media coverage. Both the Australian and New Zealand print news media 
appeared to follow the issues focused on by their respective governments in the year before RAMSI, 
as illustrated by the timing of media coverage. Media coverage followed the presentation of 
government communiqués employing similar narratives and media volume tended to follow increased 
government activity on the issue.  
 
The findings from the four tests used in this research identify similar instances and 
circumstances of Australian and New Zealand media indexing content to the opinions of the political 
elite (with some exceptions), when addressing the 2002/2003 Solomon Islands crisis. The news media 
have been shown to index stories ‘implicitly’ to the spectrum of debate, first articulated within the 
political forums.422 To demonstrate Indexing, the political elite must be seen to lead the media in 
addressing the crisis. By doing so, they set the range of debate that the media subsequently follow. 
Before the political elite placed the crisis on the agenda in mid-2003, the media infrequently paid the 
crisis low levels of attention only after government acknowledged rising problems.  
 
While the media followed government activity in terms of timing, the narrative on many 
occasions appeared to be independent of the political elite. This independence was greater than the 
Indexing Hypothesis in previous studies in the US indicate. It shows that the media used government 
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as an indicator of newsworthy topics, yet often independently used frames that are more sensational 
than those used by government and Parliament. Media independence was also evident in their use of 
critical perspectives, again selecting voices with more dramatic positions.  
 
The Australian Debate 
 The Australian media, government, and Parliament appeared to justify Australian involvement 
in the Solomon Islands within similar frames. Conversely, the three groups appear to behave 
differently in the way the solutions are discussed, and in the range of critiqued offered. The 
government tended to be far more cautious in presenting ideas to the media and public by taking the 
time to gauge possible options, whereas the media present more sensational response options. The 
media were quick to adopt military intervention as a possible response, following government’s 
indication that this option would be placed on the agenda; although the media used this frame at much 
higher frequency than government. Following this, the media presented frames that supported an 
intervention at a greater ratio than government or Parliament.  
 
 Most striking however, were the numbers of critiques towards the government in the 
Australian media that were not articulated within elite forums, signalling media independence in the 
way the crisis was published. Media independence was also evident in the source of the critical 
perspectives. There were two frames  - being the Should Have Acted Sooner and Aid is Ineffective 
frames - that the media, government, and Parliament all used; however, the media reported alternative 
critical perspectives outside the political elite debate. The media appear to have used the government 
as a cue for newsworthy issues, yet the media move beyond the political debate, signifying media 
independence in a number of instances. 
 
 In comparison to US research, Bennett’s study of Times reporting of the Nicaragua crisis 
showed only 15% of sources outside of the political elite,423 whereas the Australian media in this study 
offered 34% of sources outside of the political elite. Furthermore, much government sourcing 
presented neutral tones regarding the crisis, offering relevant information rather than an overtly 
political one. This media behaviour shows that, while the media still sourced the government, they 
also sought alternative perspectives for a vigorous debate on the issue.  
 
 While the political elite were in the policy formation process and before any decision had been 
finalised, the media published more sources independent of the government. The media appear to have 
acted independently and utilised a range of sources to ensure a range of perspectives on the crisis. 
Once commitment to the intervention was declared, the media began increasing the use of government 
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sources, and utilised a closer media-government relationship. The media typically sought credible 
sources, and the government was one of the most reliable, up-to-date sources of information on 
political activity. By putting faith in the government and using them as a source of information, the 
media build a symbiotic relationship. If the media had continued to present alternative perspectives 
from outside government after policy had been finalised and that challenged the official position, this 
would suggest that they were challenging the government. By challenging the government, the media 
may have undermined their relationship, which would make the government possibly less inclined to 
share information in the future. This does not appear to have occurred.  
 
 The media do not appear to have pushed for a different policy or policy change, which 
excludes the likelihood of a CNN Effect. While the media demonstrated much independent framing, 
using sources outside of the elite, the possibility of a CNN Effect in Australia becomes less likely 
when assessing the findings with existing theories on a CNN Effect. One typology of the CNN Effect 
requires the media to place a new issue or crisis on the agenda and push for greater policy attention 
(termed the agenda setting effect). However, the media appear to have reported on the Solomon 
Islands crisis because it was already on the political agenda. Government action initiated media 
coverage. Additionally, Robinson’s strong effect argues that not only do the media have to place the 
crisis on the agenda but also that they can influence government policy during debates on possible 
response options. 424  The systematic analysis of media content and narratives compared to 
government’s reveals that the media stayed within the debate set by the political elite, although, the 
media did use more sensational frames such as Armed Intervention. They did this by using such 
frames at a much higher frequency than government even though government used them first. This 
occurred in both the way the government could respond to the crisis, as well as critiquing possible 
response options.  Nevertheless, a strong effect does not appear to have occurred, as the media were 
not pushing for a particular response and remained within the range of debate set by government. 
Media independence appears to occur as the media dramatizes frames by presenting them more 
frequently and in more sensational ways than government. Most importantly however, is the fact that 
the media do not use sympathetic or emotionally moving frames; which is a prerequisite of a CNN 
Effect based on previous research.425 The media could have victimised the Solomon Islands people in 
an attempt to gain public attention and ‘push’ for intervention. However, this was not the case as the 
government were the agents who placed the crisis on the agenda and set the event in motion for 
intervention.  
 
The New Zealand Debate 
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The possibility of a CNN Effect in New Zealand is also eliminated, as government activity 
preceded media coverage. Following key government activities, media coverage notably increased in 
volume. This indicates that New Zealand government actions influenced the timing of media 
coverage. The political elite brought the crisis to the attention of the media, and the media used these 
actions as a cue for newsworthy topics. Furthermore, like Australia the media avoided using 
Humanitarian frames outside a few cases. The media framed the crisis as a humanitarian issue at 
similar levels to government and Parliament - around 5% of all the problem frames. This indicates that 
the media were not pushing for a response, as seen in other CNN Effect research.  
 
In terms of the entire range of debate, there are both similarities and differences in the way 
media content and government activities are framed. On the one hand, the New Zealand media 
appeared to index its coverage to the political elite when defining the problems of the Solomon Islands 
crisis. There was some degree of similarity between the media and Parliament in the way the entire 
debate was framed. Both the media and Parliament appear to have used the Intervention and Armed 
Intervention frames frequently, although Parliamentary debate took shape after the government 
indicated it would contribute to the intervention. On the other hand, there are more instances where the 
media’s solution and critical perspectives vary from both the government and Parliament. The 
differences in media, government, and Parliament debates indicate that the media did not index its 
coverage to the political elite. Rather the media appear to have used the debate as a cue and only then, 
like Australia, applied more sensational frames at greater frequencies.  
 
The New Zealand media appear to have used government frames but these references were 
often not reported in the media until over two weeks after government had used them, indicating a 
lack of urgency or priority regarding the story. When coverage occurred the media selected more 
sensational solution options and used these at higher frequencies than the government’s more 
moderated approach. Both the range of debate and critical perspectives assessed demonstrate that 
while the media and government stayed within a similar range of debate on the crisis, the media 
sourced these primarily from outside the political elite. In these instances, Independent sources 
critiqued government policy, rather then the media reflecting dissent from within the elite forum.  
 
The New Zealand Government was sourced most frequently in the media, although this was 
not an overwhelming large number (39%) compared to the Australian media’s use of government 
sources (59%). The New Zealand media used government sources to gather information on the crisis 
and to gauge government’s intentions with respect to the crisis. However, when key government 
activity occurred, such as the official statement confirming New Zealand contribution to RAMSI, the 
media followed this using a range of sources from within and outside the political elite. Furthermore, 
the use of Australian sources was staggeringly high, which further indicates a degree of media 
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independence as the media sought alternative views beyond those of the national political elite. The 
timing of Australian government actions appears to have either directly or indirectly affected New 
Zealand media reportage. This was particularly evident during June and July 2003. The reoccurrence 
of Australian government activity the media sourcing reveals that while the media did appear to follow 
the New Zealand government’s agenda, the actions of the Australian government also shaped media 
agenda. Often, Australian government decisions were made before New Zealand, influencing New 
Zealand media coverage, although this does not appear to have pressured the New Zealand 
government to react.  
 
The use of critical perspectives in the New Zealand media vaguely related to the critical 
perspectives of the political elite, yet the media also used independent sources when presenting critical 
perspectives. Similarly, the Australian media independently sought critical perspectives towards 
government, as the political debate was limited in terms of critiquing policy options. Australian 
government decisions’ relating to the Solomon Islands preceded New Zealand debates and decisions, 
and seemed to clearly influence New Zealand media content. The New Zealand media relied heavily 
on Australian sources, more so than the Australian media on New Zealand government sources, which 
referred to New Zealand infrequently. The findings relating to foreign sources in the media have 
proven to be fundamental when establishing the media-government relationship in Australian and 
New Zealand. 
 
Contributions to the Broader Theoretical Debate 
 In terms of the broader theoretical debate, this research extends Indexing Hypothesis and 
CNN Effect research by highlighting the interaction of power and media outside the United States in 
the Pacific Region. In an increasingly globalised world, it is surprising how little the media-
government literature has considered this relationship empirically on other settings.  
 
 According to Althaus, examining foreign sources within media content is necessary to 
understand political debates. 426  The way in which New Zealand media sought information from 
Australian sources reveals a new dimension to the media-government relationship and reporting 
behaviour. When a middle power like New Zealand seeks sources from a more dominant power, such 
as Australia it is showing appreciation for its regional/international power relations in a way that 
would not appear within a superpower (USA) domestic media structure. The New Zealand media-
government relationship appears to be more limited when a larger power is present. The media appear 
to consider the wider power relations and legitimate players on foreign policy issues. This shows that 
the media’s presentation of power relations also works in reverse; a more dominant power is less 
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likely to consider smaller powers in its media coverage or government activity. As Australia is a larger 
power, the local media show less interest in New Zealand government activity or media coverage than 
the other way around. This reveals that when governments are making foreign policy decisions that 
relate to other nations, the power position of that nation relative to the others, influences the media-
government relationship.  
 
 The fact that the New Zealand media and possibly the government, sought information from 
Australia presents something quite interesting about reporting behaviour in the South Pacific region 
that may have wider international implications. As the media go to the most powerful source rather 
necessarily the local source, this has the effect of diminishing the local media-government 
relationship. As New Zealand follows Australia in terms of power relations in the Pacific and the 
international arena, it is possible that the local media-government relationship will almost always 
contract when foreign policy issues are on the media and government agendas especially when that 
issue involves a greater regional or international power. Chapter three demonstrates that in terms of 
foreign policy, New Zealand does not always follow Australia. This indicates that when New Zealand 
is engaged in regional foreign policy issues in which Australia is also involved, the media will rely on 
Australian perspectives. As a result, the New Zealand media reinforce the power relationship. 
However, it is likely that the New Zealand media will act cautiously when presenting Australian 
perspectives, as they may not want to jeopardise the New Zealand government as a reliable source. 
Foreign policy issues outside of the region may also see New Zealand influenced by other strong 
middle or super powers, if the findings of this study are indicative.  
 
 It appears that the Australian media are less concerned about presenting a smaller power 
perspective, such as New Zealand. If power relations play out in a natural order, (where a more 
powerful nation influences the less powerful nation’s media coverage and government actions) then 
we would expect that when a more powerful nation is involved with Australia in addressing a foreign 
crisis, that nation’s perspective is likely to be reflected in the Australian media. For example, had the 
US been involved in assisting in the Solomon Islands, given its super-power status, its perspectives 
would likely show up more frequently in the Australian media. Until such circumstances arise 
however, the Australian media are likely to rely on local political and alternative perspectives to shape 
the local debate on foreign policy. Thus, as a regional leader, Australia is likely to dominate regional 
foreign policy debates. 
 
 In theory, the media’s role is to act as the Fourth Estate to question government officials and 
provide a comprehensive debate on issues for the public. In this sense, the media’s ability to report 
alternative perspectives and the actions of neighbouring governments is critical to fulfilling its 
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democratic duty. The less attention the media pay to neighbouring countries, the more limited foreign 
policy debate will be.  
 
 Another general finding that provides greater insight on the media-government relationship 
and the broader theoretical debate is the way the media stayed within the range of debate set by the 
political elite, but used frames at different frequencies than government or Parliament. Bennett argues 
“news is ‘indexed’ implicitly to the range and dynamic of government debate.”427 With this in mind, 
the media in Australia and New Zealand generally stayed within the spectrum of debate set by the 
political elite during the Solomon Islands crisis, while sensationalising certain frames. The media’s 
capacity to sensationalise issues also demonstrated media independence from the political elite to 
some degree.  
 
 The Australian and New Zealand media’s frequent use of sensational frames that presented 
intervention as a ‘fitting’ response option appears to have supported their respective governments’ 
decision to intervene; particularly as the New Zealand government was somewhat hesitant to go down 
this path. It does not appear that the media were urging the government to intervene, but rather, by 
using sensational frames, creating support for the government decision. In terms of both Australian 
and New Zealand media-government relations, it appears that the governments were utilising the 
media’s role to report information from themselves and test reactions to their proposals for military 
and civilian intervention. Once the media covered the proposed intervention, with little opposition 
within political elite or media, government proceeded to fine-tune policy. This behaviour was more 
prominent in the New Zealand case.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1:  Australian Data Sets 
 
Australian Government  (N = 43) 
Downer, Alexander. "Visit to the South Pacific." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: 
Hansard). December 16 2002. 
———. "Doorstop Interview - Minister for Foreign Affairs Hon Alexander Downer, MP." Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Sydney: Hansard). December 17 2002. 
———. "Visit to Solomon Islands." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). 
December 19 2002. 
———. "Solomon Islands." AUSAid, (Canberra: Hansard). January 5 2003. 
———. "Update on Solomon Islands." AUSAid, (Canberra: Hansard). January 7 2003. 
———. "Doorstop Re. Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
(Brisbane: Hansard). July 9 2003. 
———. "Solomon Islands Parliament Supports Australia's Offer." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
(Canberra: Hansard). July 11 2003. 
———. "Australia Welcomes Passage of Legislation in Solomon Islands." Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). July 17 2003. 
———. "Doorstop, Parliament House Canberra - Uday and Qusay Hussein, Solomon Islands, Pacific Issues, 
David Hicks." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Canberra: Hansard, July 23 2003. 
———. "Doorstop, Melbourne. David Hicks, Mamdouh Habib, Solomon Islands." Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, (Melbourne: Hansard). July 24 2003. 
———. "Doorstop - Parliament House." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). June 
10 2003. 
———. "Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands." In Speech at the Launch of the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute Report, (Canberra: Hansard). June 10 2003. 
———. "Talks on Solomon Islands." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). June 25 
2003. 
———. "Security in an Unstable World." In Speech at the National Press Club, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). June 26 2003. 
———. "Joint Press Conference with New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff - Adelaide Airport." 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Adelaide: Hansard). June 29 2003. 
———. "Co-Operation to Combat Terrorism in the Pacific." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
(Canberra: Hansard). May 17 2003. 
———. "Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group Press Conference, London." Department of Foreign 
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Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). May 21 2003. 
———. "High Level Mission to Solomon Islands and Vanuatu." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
(Canberra: Hansard). October 1 2002. 
———. "Australia Supports New Solomon Islands Peace Body." Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
(Canberra: Hansard). October 24 2002. 
Downer, Alexander, Phil Goff, and Laurie Chan. "Joint Press Conference Following Pacific Island Forum 
Foreign Ministers Meeting, Sydney." Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Sydney, (Canberra: 
Hansard). June 30 2003. 
Gullus, Chris. "Solomon Islanders Receive Fresh Funding for Health Services." AUSAid, (Canberra: 
Hansard). December 18 2002. 
Hill, Robert. "Doorstop Interview - Signing of Indigenous Land Agreement near Timber Creek, Northern 
Territory." In Bradshaw Agreement, Solomons, North Korea, Department of Defence, (Canberra: 
Hansard). July 16 2003. 
———. "Operation ANODE: ADF Contribution to Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands." 
Department of Defence, (Canberra: Hansard). July 22 2003. 
———. "Following Annual Australia and New Zealand Defence Talks." Department of Defence, (Canberra: 
Hansard). June 26 2003. 
———. "Asia Pacific Security after September 11 - Continuity and Change." In Speech to the First 
Anniversary Dinner of the C.E.W Bean Foundation, Department of Defence, (Canberra: Hansard). 
September 25 2002. 
Howard, John. "Transcript of the Prime Minister - the Hon John Howard MP Doorstop Interview, Forum 
Secretariat, Suva." Prime Minister. (Suva: Hansard). August 17 2002. 
———. "Foreign Policy in the Age of Terrorism." In Address by the Prime Minister the Hon. John Howard 
MP to the Sydney Institute Intercontinental Hotel. (Sydney: Hansard). July 1 2003. 
———. "Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon. John Howard MP Press Conference ", Prime Minister. 
(Canberra: Hansard). July 22,2003. 
———. "Address at Informal Farewell Reception for Troops & Police Heading to the Solomon Islands, Raaf 
Base, Townsville." Prime Minister. (Townsville: Hansard). July 23 2003. 
———. "Joint Press Conference with Solomon Islands Prime Minister, the Hon. Sir Allan Kemakeza MP." 
Prime Minister, (Canberra: Hansard). June 5 2003. 
Rudd, Kevin. "Once Again  Minister - Too Little Too Late." Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
(Canberra: Hansard). December 17 2002. 
———. "Solomon Islands - "Arc of Instability" Becoming Even More Unstable." Shadow Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). December 19 2002. 
———. "Howard and Downer Can't Agree on the Solomons Script." Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). July 3 2003. 
———. "Who Will Help Pay the Reported $1.5 Billion Price Tag for the Solomons?", Shadow Minister for 
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Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). July 4 2003. 
———. "Solomon Islands Crisis." Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). June 
9 2003. 
———. "ASPI Repost on the Solomons Islands Highlights Mr. Downer's Failed Townsville Peace 
Agreement." Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Canberra: Hansard). June 10 2003. 
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Appendix 3: Codebook and Definition of Codes 
 
CODES DESCRIPTION 
Date  
25.06.2002 - 
24.06.2003 
All data sets are catalogued by the publication date.  
Medium The data sets are categorised by the news agency or political institution that 
published the item. Due to the way Factiva database structured its articles, the 
news agency was identified on the first line after the tile. The government data 
sets are initially divided into the government or Parliament, and then coded 
with the department, ministry, or political party.  
Newspaper  
1 Herald Sun  
2 Daily Telegraph  
3 Sydney Morning Herald  
4 New Zealand Herald   
5 Dominion Post  
6 The Press  
Government   
1 Prime Minister  
2 Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
3 Other Ministers  
Parliament  
1 Government  
2 Coalition 
Government 
 
3 Opposition 
Parties 
 
4 Other, e.g. Select Committee Experts  
Problem Frame The problem frames describe the issues relating to and resulting from the 
Solomon Island crisis. These have been expressed in the data sets and are 
divided into eight main categories.  
1 Economic The economic frame applies words or phrases that describe economic 
concerns at the time of the crisis. These include the terms, failing, declining, 
struggling, and bankrupt economy or government; it also describes the 
economic hardships of the people, such as unemployment.  
2 Security Threat 
Australia and 
New Zealand  
The security threat AUNZ frame portrays the crisis as a security risk to 
Australia or New Zealand and makes a direct reference to either or both of 
these countries. This includes references to the arc of Instability, as a threat 
specifically to Australian and New Zealand. 
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3 Security Threat 
Region  
The regional security threat frame describes the Solomon Islands crisis as a 
security risk to the Pacific region but does not including a direct reference to 
Australia and New Zealand as this is categorized as Security Threat AUNZ. 
This frame includes reference to the Solomon Islands as part of the arc of 
instability, as the instability threatens regional security, not just Australia or 
New Zealand.  
4 Failed State  The failed state frame includes direct references to the Solomon Islands as a 
failed state, on the brink of becoming a failed state, or as a collapsing state. 
5 Humanitarian The humanitarian frame incorporates humanitarian issues relating or resulting 
from the crisis. For example, references to refugees, loss of livelihood or 
human suffering. It includes frames that present victimises the Solomon 
Islands people and uses sympathetic framing.  
6 Lawlessness The lawlessness frame includes words or phrases that describe the Solomon 
Islands to be in a in a state of lawlessness. These included direct reference to 
the term law and order, armed attack, corruption, drugs, extortion, gangs, 
militants, hostages, kidnappings, killing, murder, assassination, money 
laundering, rape, warlord, rebel leader, or weapons.   
7 Ethnic Violence  The ethnic violence frame refers to the internal conflict between the Solomon 
Islands two ethnic groups: the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army and the 
Malaitan Eagle Force.   
8 Terrorism The terrorism frame includes references to the possibility of terrorist cells 
operating in, or exploiting the internal instability and lawlessness in the 
Solomon Islands.  In many cases the threat of terrorism is related to terrorist 
cells using the Solomon Islands as a ‘safe-haven’ for its activities.  
Solution Frame The solution frames are the proposed response options to the Solomon Islands 
crisis. These have been offered in the data sets and are divided into eight main 
themes.  
1 Aid The aid frame encompasses references to the contribution of financial or 
material assistance to the Solomon Islands government from a foreign 
government or agency.  
2 Non-intervention The non-intervention frame specifically states that Australia and New Zealand 
will not intervene in the Solomon Islands.  
3 Non-Armed 
Police 
The non-armed police frame indicates that only police in a non-armed 
capacity should intervene in the Solomon Islands’. The role of a non-armed 
police force is to reform and develop the practises of the Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force.  
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4 Intervention 
Unspecified or 
Undecided 
The intervention unspecified or undecided frame encompasses any reference 
to Australian and/or New Zealand intervention in the Solomon Islands as a 
proposed solution to the problems. However, the type of intervention is 
unspecified, or only discusses it broadly at that stage This category could 
include reference to military, police or civilian intervention, although which 
approach is still undecided by policy-makers. After the intervention category 
has been specified within a media article or government action, any 
unspecified reference to ‘intervention’ is part of the previous specified 
intervention type within the same publication. For example, after police, 
military, or civilian options are referred to within an article the intention is no 
longer unspecified; any reference to an intervention after this is in direct 
reference to that type of intervention and categorised to that frame.  
5 Macro Reform The macro reform frame incorporates references to the institutional reform of 
Solomon Islands; including the government, economy, judiciary, and police 
institutions.  
6 Armed Police & 
Defence 
The armed police and defence frame refers to a police or defence force 
carrying weapons from Australia, New Zealand, or other PICs. This can 
include the terms peacekeepers, peacekeeping, military forces, and armed 
police.  
7 Assistance 
Package 
The assistance package frame is the category that includes the three elements 
armed military and police, and macro reform and civilian personal frames 
together. However, this frame does not include the Scoping Mission.  
8 Other The other category describes infrequent solutions proposed to the Solomon 
Islands crisis. This could include assistance from powers outside of the Pacific 
region, for example, the UN, the European Union, Indonesia, or France.  
Critical 
Perspectives 
towards 
Government Frame 
Critical perspective towards the Australian and New Zealand governments’ 
are identified in this section. These incorporate statements that have been 
stated in the media and government, expressing critical perspectives towards 
government action or inaction. Overall there are nine categories of critical 
perspectives.  
1  Impact on Police 
& Defence 
The impact on police and defence frame claims an overseas deployment of 
police and/or a defence force impacts negatively on the forces at home and 
abroad due to strained resources.  
2 Should Have 
Acted Sooner  
This frame asserts the response from foreign nations, to the situation in the 
Solomon Islands, should have occurred before June 2003.  Reference to this 
frame often reminds the reader that foreign nations could have acted sooner as 
the first requested for foreign assistance by the Solomon Islands was sought in 
early 2000.  
3 Aid Is 
Ineffective 
This frame encompasses the idea that aid from foreign nations is ineffective in 
improving the economic and development situation of the Solomon Islands.  
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4 Lack of Public 
Debate 
This frame criticises the lack of public debate around the proposed responses 
from the Australian and New Zealand government’s. Also associated with this 
frame is reference to the speed of the decision to intervene, which was 
arguably hastily and without adequate consultation.  
5 Inflame Situation This frame proposes that intervening in the Solomon Islands, through civilian, 
police, or military forces could exacerbate unstable conditions.   
6 Alienate PICs The alienate PIC frame claims foreign intervention or a heavy-handed 
approach could alienate the Solomon Islands or its Pacific Islands neighbours.   
7 Recolonise and 
Control  
This frame suggests that foreign intervention is a move to re-colonise and 
control the Solomon Islands for the benefit of the nation intervening.  
8 Questionable 
Purpose of 
Deployment 
The questionable purpose of deployment frame indicates Australia or New 
Zealand has greater interests in combating terrorism and other global security 
concerns rather than resolving the Solomon Islands problems. Therefore, the 
intention and purpose of the intervention is misplaced, possibly resulting in 
unsuitable strategies or outcomes.  
9 Foreign Troops 
will be 'Bogged 
Down' in 
Operation 
This frame encompasses phrases that suggest the Solomon Islands could 
become dependent on the troops in the long term to maintain law and order.  
Sources  
1 Government Government includes the political parties that make up the government in 
power or coalition government. 
2 Opposition 
Government 
The Opposition government includes the political parties and members that 
are not part of the government or coalition government.  
3 Independent An independent source includes individuals or groups that are independent 
from the political arena, political parties, or a foreign government. These can 
include but is not limited to, academics, NGO’s, independent think tanks, 
religious leaders, or local people.  
4 Foreign 
Government 
Australia or New 
Zealand 
Includes sources from the government or opposition government from the 
foreign nation also part of the consultation on the Solomon Islands. For 
example, if the Australian media applies a source form the New Zealand 
government, this source would be categorised as from the foreign government. 
5 Foreign 
Government 
Solomon Islands 
Includes sources from the Solomon Islands government.  
Direction  
1 Support Support Frames are supportive or promotes government actions or policy 
relating to the Solomon Islands.  
2 Opposition Opposition frames oppose or challenges government actions or policy towards 
the Solomon Islands.  
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3 Mixed Mixed frames contain words that are both supportive and highlight limitations 
to a governments actions or policy relating to the Solomon Islands.  
4 Neutral Neutral frames discuss a governments actions or policy towards the Solomon 
Islands but does not support or challenge this. These frames state facts and 
information rather than opinions.  
 
 
 
 
List of Acronyms for Categories of Appendix 4, 5, & 6 
Full Term 
 
Acronym 
Australia and New Zealand   AUNZ 
Australia  
 
AUS 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
DFAT 
Dominion Post 
 
DP 
Daily Telegraph  
 
DT 
Government 
 
Govt.  
Herald Sun 
 
HS 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
MFAT 
New Zealand 
 
NZ 
New Zealand Herald 
 
NZH 
Pacific Islands Country 
 
PIC 
Sunday Morning Herald 
 
SMH 
The Press 
 
TP 
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Appendix 4: Codebook Test Two – The Range of Debate  
 
 Medium  
Date News Agency Government Parliament 
25.06.02  1 = HS 1 = Prime Minister 1 = Govt. 
24.06.03 2 DT  2 = MFAT / DFAT 2 = Coalition Govt. 
 3 = SMH  3 = Other 3 = Opposition Parties 
 4 = NZH  4 = Other 
 5 = DP   
 6 = TP   
 
Range of Debate 
Problem Frames Solution Frames Critical Frames 
1 = Economic 1 = Aid 1 = Impact on Police & Defence 
2 = Security Threat 
AUNZ 
2 = Non-Intervention 2 = Should Have Acted Sooner 
3 = Security Threat 
Region  
3 = Non-Armed Police 3 = Aid is Ineffective 
4 = Failed State 4 = Intervention 
Unspecified  
4 = Lack of Public Debate 
5 = Humanitarian  5 = Macro Reform 5 = Inflame Situation  
6 = Lawlessness 6 = Armed Police & 
Defence 
6 = Alienate PIC 
7 = Ethnic Violence 7 = Assistance Package 7 = Re-Colonise & Control 
8 = Terrorism  8 = Other 8 = Questionable Purpose of 
Deployment  
  9 = Bogged Down in Operation  
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Appendix 5: Codebook Test Three – The use of sources in the media 
 
Date News Agency Sources Direction 
25.06.2002 - 1 = HS 1 = Govt. 1 = Support 
24.06.2003 2 = DT  2 = Opposition  2 = Opposition 
 3 = SMH  3 = Independent 3 = Mixed 
 4 = NZH 4 = Foreign Govt. AUS. or NZ. 4 = Neutral 
 5 = DP 5 = Foreign Govt. SI  
 6 = TP   
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Appendix 6: Codebook Test Four – Measuring Critical Perspectives  
 
Date  Medium Source Critical Frames 
25.06.02  1 = Newspaper 1 = HS 1 = Impact on Police & Defence 
24.06.03 2 = Govt. 2 = DT  2 = Should Have Acted Sooner 
 3 = Parliament  3 = SMH  3 = Aid is Ineffective 
  4 = NZH 4 = Lack of Public Debate 
  5 = DP 5 = Inflame Situation  
  6 = TP 6 = Alienate PIC 
  7 = Govt. 7 = Re-Colonise & Control 
  8 = Coalition Govt. 8 = Questionable Purpose of Deployment  
  9 = Opposition Govt. 9 = Bogged Down in Operation  
  10 = Foreign Govt.  
  11 = Other  
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